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In this study, we apply resource theory and knowledge-based theory to 
analyze the competitive advantage of VC firms in emerging markets and explore 
how VC firms accumulate their knowledge and build networks through their 
investment strategies in such markets. We summarize four mechanisms of 
knowledge accumulation, learning by jointing venture, learning by hiring, learning 
by doing, and learning by observing. We further highlight the foreign and local VC 
firm's differences in VC investment decision process and syndication strategy. This 
study has shown that VC knowledge affects its usage of learning mechanisms and 
together they affect VC investment strategies in emerging markets.  
In our case study, it is found that VC firm characteristics such as firm 
nationality and governing structure significantly affects VC's usage of the four 
learning mechanisms. Though facing some knowledge deficiencies in initial days, 
new VC firms can use their advantages in certain knowledge or networks to 
exchange for complementary capacities, and thus help the adjustment to the new 
environment.  
In our study on VC investment decision process, we compare the VC deal 
source and management criteria differences between foreign and local VC firms. We 
find that foreign VC firms obtain more solicited deals and less unsolicited deals 
from networks compared to local firms, and foreign VC firms put less emphasis on 
the managerial experience compared to local firms.  
These findings can be explained by knowledge differences between foreign 
and local VC firms. On the deal source, the weakness of their local networks causes 
foreign firms to get less unsolicited deals from networks, but their advantage in 
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general knowledge, particularly the industry knowledge, enables them to search for 
high-quality deals by themselves and obtains more solicited deals as the result. On 
the management criteria for due diligence, the advantage of foreign VC firms in 
general knowledge enables them to put less emphasis on managerial experience in 
the evaluation of venture management team.  
In our study on VC syndication process, we have focused on VC syndication 
motives and their syndication frequencies. While VC firms join syndication mainly 
for risk sharing and there are no differences between local and foreign ones in risk 
sharing and overall knowledge sharing motives, foreign VC firms are more likely to 
join syndication for deal reciprocity and acquiring local knowledge compared to 
local ones. Furthermore, a VC firm with few years of local experience joins 
syndication more frequently compared to a firm with more local experience even 
though the former may have a long history in other VC markets.  
These findings can be explained by the VC learning. First, foreign firms are 
more interested in learning local knowledge and building networks through 
syndication due to their relative weakness in local knowledge and local networks, 
and thus they may be more likely to join syndication for deal reciprocity and local 
knowledge. Second, VC firms with longer years of local experiences would have 
less to learn in syndication but more to be learned by their partners. They are thus 
less interested in syndicated deals.  
 
 
Keywords Venture capital, Knowledge-based theory, Investment strategy, 
Emerging markets, Investment decision process, Syndication motive  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Overview 
Venture capital1 (VC) has been established as an intermediate external 
source of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). As the amount 
of capital managed by venture capitalists has steadily increased over the years, their 
impact on the success of SMEs has correspondingly increased. The size of total 
funds managed by VC firms in the U.S. has experienced tremendous growth from 
about US$30b in the early 1990s, to a new height of US$153.9b in 2000, which has 
contributed significantly to the growth of high technology sectors in the U.S. The 
success of the VC market in the U.S. has helped the country to maintain the 
dominant position in the world economy over the last few decades.  
Since the 1980s, inspired by the U.S. success, many less developed countries 
have started to develop their own VC industries. Currently, the boom of VC 
investments has spread across markets in most developing countries, or called 
emerging markets. For example, the VC investment activities have emerged across 
most Asian Pacific countries since the middle of 1980s (Leinbach, 1991). Though 
the VC history is not very long since its initial development, Asian Pacific countries 
have experienced a boom in terms of both VC funds and VC pool in the last two 
decades (AVCJ, 2003). The whole VC pool in Asia Pacific markets developed from 
US$22b in 1991 to US$81b in 2000, and there were 1,404 VC funds existing in Asia 
Pacific countries at the end of 2000, which increased nearly 500 per cent in 
comparison to 1991. These VC firms invested US$12b in 2000, pushing the VC 
investment portfolio in Asia Pacific countries to US$40b.  
                                                          
1 Here we adopt the broad concept of VC used in Europe and Asia, i.e., all formal private equity 
financing, covering both early stage investments, regarded as the classic VC, and later stage ones, 
even including leveraged buy-out/ buy-ins. 
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The importance of VC industry has attracted more and more academic 
research interests in this area (see review papers such as Fried and Hisrich (1988), 
Barry (1994), and Wright and Robbie (1998)). Many theoretical and empirical 
studies have been undertaken to describe the various aspects of VC (e.g., Sahlman, 
1990; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 1999), which have led to 
a better understanding of the VC industry and helped venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs to improve their performance, as well as regulatory bodies in their 
policy making. However, in general, academic research still lags well behind the 
growth of the VC industry (Wright and Robbie, 1998). In addition, since VC 
research is generally viewed as a sub-field of corporate finance, it has seldom drawn 
perspectives from other research streams such as strategy management and 
organization theory. However, though VC investment is a kind of equity investment, 
it is quite different from mainstream corporate finance due to the low market 
efficiency and liquidity of VC market (Wright and Robbie, 1998), and the market 
context is also different in various VC markets. Finance approach, which normally 
assumes market efficiency and low transaction cost, is thus inadequate to address 
many research questions in VC field. Furthermore, most VC studies so far are based 
on Western developed countries, and VC investment behaviors in emerging markets 
are much under-researched with few research papers (e.g., Wang, Wang, and Lu, 
2003; Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Yeh, 2004). Given the importance of VC industry for 
economic growth in these markets, more research work is needed to support the VC 
market growth.   
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyze VC investment strategy in 
emerging markets with an approach seldom used in VC literature, namely, resource 
theory and its further development, knowledge-based theory. Resource theory, or 
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resource-based view of firm, is widely used in organization theory and strategy 
literature (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Knowledge-based theory further 
highlights the importance of knowledge in knowledge-intensive industries (Nonaka, 
1994; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1996). Different from the dominant finance 
approach used in VC literature, knowledge-based theory is anchored in the 
knowledge heterogeneity and thus can easily take the market context and VC 
knowledge differences into the approach. Thus applying knowledge-based theory to 
study VC behavior in emerging markets can provide fresh insights for better 
understanding of VC investment behaviors in emerging markets. Particularly, in this 
study, we apply knowledge-based theory to explore how a VC firm accumulates its 
knowledge and builds networks in an emerging market through its investment 
strategy. Through an interview-based field study, we have summarized four 
mechanisms of the knowledge accumulation, learning by jointing venture, learning 
by hiring, learning by doing, and learning by observing. We especially pay attention 
to the latter two mechanisms, which correspond to two aspects of VC investment 
strategy, namely, VC investment decision process and syndication strategy. We 
further highlight the knowledge differences between foreign and local VC firms, and 
develop hypotheses thereby, and test these hypotheses with empirical data from 
Singapore market. The analysis has shown VC knowledge affects its usage of 
learning mechanisms and together they affect VC investment strategies in emerging 
markets. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In the rest of this chapter, I 
provide a summary of VC literature with a brief description of VC industry and the 
VC investment process in developed markets. In Chapter 2, I explore the 
institutional and cultural contexts in emerging markets and review the studies of VC 
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behaviors in emerging markets. A literature review on knowledge-based theory is 
also given there. Then, the theoretical framework is developed in Chapter 3 by 
analyzing VC knowledge and means to accumulate the knowledge. I further analyze 
the difference in knowledge and other resources between foreign and local VC firms 
in emerging markets. In Chapter 4, I apply the framework to VC investment decision 
process and syndication strategy, and develop four testable hypotheses. In Chapter 5, 
the methodology for both interview and survey study is discussed, including the 
samples and measurements. Chapter 6 presents interview results to provide an in-
depth understanding on the knowledge base of VC firms in Singapore as well as the 
usage of various learning mechanisms. Then, the empirical results from survey study 
are presented in Chapter 7. Lastly, findings are summarized in Chapter 8 with 
discussions from various aspects. 
 
1.2. How Does VC Work?  
The private equity market is where the VC firm operates. It is much more 
imperfect in comparison to the public equity market. There is severe information 
asymmetry between companies and investors in the market. Companies in this 
market are new start-ups and small entrepreneurial ventures, often possessing 
technology that is promising but typically untested and unknown to outside 
investors. Different from the public equity market, where investors can easily find 
intermediaries such as underwriters and auditors to certify the quality of a listed 
company, the private equity market is not well regulated and there are few financial 
intermediaries. Therefore, investors in this market are often difficult to find qualified 
intermediaries to verify the claims of these small companies, particularly concerning 
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the valuation of their intangible assets such as new technology, the main value of 
these ventures.  
Furthermore, the private equity market is illiquid in nature and thus the 
equity there is difficult to trade in comparison to the public market. Therefore, 
investors have to spend much more effort (which means high transaction cost) to 
find someone to buy their equities (often at a great discount). As the result of 
information asymmetry and market illiquidity, the private equity market is very 
inefficient and may even totally fail. In this market, high quality ventures with 
promising future are mixed with unpromising ones, and investors have great 
difficulty to differentiate between them. The market inefficiency restricts the ability 
of high quality ventures to raise funds and commercialize their new technologies, 
which causes adverse selection, similar to the "lemons market" in Akerlof (1970), 
where buyers only pay for the average value without knowing the true value of 
goods in the market. As a result, high-quality goods would be driven out of the 
market and only low-quality goods are left there. Similarly, in the private equity 
market, high quality ventures may be under-funded, while the risky capital is 
difficult to find high-return ventures to invest in. 
Besides the adverse selection problem in the private equity market, the 
founding team of these ventures is often strong in technology but weak in 
management and marketing. Being small firms, it is difficult for them to recruit 
managerial professionals, even though they know the participation of these 
professionals is often essential for the venture success. On interesting case recorded 
in Bygrave and Timmons (1992, p209-210) is a good example. A professional 
marketing manager initially rejected the offer from a high-tech firm, and only its VC 
partner's visitation and persuasion changed his decision. Later events proved that his 
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presence in that firm was critical for its subsequent growth. Furthermore, people in a 
small venture work closely and tend to develop conformity of thinking, which may 
cause critical mistakes in the venture management. In summary, these problems may 
cause a venture to fail even with a promising product /service, and thus some 
innovative mechanisms are required to help high-quality ventures to survive and 
prosper in the private equity market.  
 VC is one of the important mechanisms, first developed in the U.S., to 
overcome these problems in the private equity market2. Many VC firms are 
independent partnership management firms, managing several VC funds or 
partnerships, which are normally formed by limited partnership3.  
In the context of VC, the partnership normally has limited life (ten years, in 
most cases). In a limited partnership structure, there are two parties, namely, general 
partners and limited partners. Limited partners are patient public institutional 
investors seeking long-term high returns, serving as passive shareholders. General 
partners are venture capitalists, who are professional investment managers with 
various backgrounds such as entrepreneurs or senior managers in industrial 
corporations. They are experienced in moving start-up companies along the 
development path (Sahlman, 1990). General partners actively manage the 
partnership, and are mainly rewarded by bountiful profit sharing to motivate them to 
bear risk for high returns willingly. While they normally put a nominal capital 
(normally one-percent) to the partnership, they can usually share up to twenty-
percent profits as monetary incentives. 
                                                          
2 Besides formal institutional VC firms, some informal investors also operate in this market and 
perform similar roles such as business angels. However, in this study, we restrict our discussion only 
on formal VC firms. 
3 Besides independent VC firms, there are other types of VC firms such as finance-affiliated and 
corporate VC firms. Funds under their management are often perpetuated, and the compensation for 
their investment managers is often lower. For more details, please see Wang, Wang, and Lu (2002).  
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The partnership system enables VC firms to be patient long-term investors, 
who are willing to wait for years before the harvest and thus they can bear with the 
low liquidity in the private equity market. Furthermore, through bountiful profit 
sharing, the partnership system helps VC firms to retain experienced venture 
capitalists, whose industry and investment experience has equipped them for the 
difficult task of searching for promising ventures in the high-risk private equity 
market. Thus VC firms can serve the role of market intermediary in the private 
equity market and partly overcome the problem of adverse selection.   
Besides serving as market intermediary by identifying promising ventures, 
VC firms also function as professional service providers by helping the venture 
growth with their financial capital and various value-added services. These services 
include bringing in industry knowledge and insights for strategic planning, helping 
to recruit key members into the management team, coaching inexperienced 
entrepreneurs, and motivating the young venture for long-term sustainable growth 
(Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). All these value-added services are essential for 
venture success and make VC firms more than mere capital providers in the growth 
of entrepreneurial firms.  
In summary, VC firms play two important roles in the private equity market. 
They are both market intermediaries who help long-term investors searching for 
promising ventures to invest in, and professional service provider to help the growth 
of young ventures. As the result, VC industry is highly successful in the U.S. 
Though ventures supported by VC firms occupy only a small percentage of SMEs 
(Berger and Udell, 1998), they have led the growth of many new high-tech 
industries such as semiconductor, computer, software, and biotechnology and 
fundamentally changed the way in which we live and work. For example, VC firms 
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have helped many young start-ups to compete against big companies in the birth of 
the local area network (LAN) industry (Von Burg and Kenney, 2000). Also, many 
brand names in IT industry such as Apple, Lotus, Sun, and Compaq are firms 
supported by VCs in their early days.  
 
1.3. VC Investment Process  
Here we provide a short summary of the VC investment process as the 
background of our research. Wright and Robbie (1998) classified the VC investment 
process into four stages: fund raising, assessment, monitoring, and investment 
realization. VC investment strategy discussed in this study would mainly be 
strategies in the stage of assessment and monitoring, though we may refer to the 
other two stages occasionally.  
First, at the fund raising stage, a VC firm needs to raise funds from public 
institutional investors (if the VC firm is independent) or from parental or related 
institutions (if the firm is not independent). The latter type can be finance-affiliated, 
corporate-owned or government funded. Traditionally, most VC firms are 
independent, whose funds are normally with limited life (ten years, in most cases) in 
order to control the possible conflict of interests between VC managers and fund 
providers (Sahlman, 1990). Survival of such a firm greatly relies on their fund 
raising ability, which largely depends on the reputation of the venture capitalists and 
the performance of previous VC funds of that VC firm (Gompers, 1996).  
 Second, at the assessment stage, a VC firm seeks possible investment 
opportunities, values them through initial screening and further due diligence, makes 
investment decisions (e.g., Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Hall and Hofer, 1993), and 
structures deals by legal contracts (Gompers and Lerner, 1996). At this stage, the 
 9
VC firm uses its industry knowledge and investment experience to identify 
promising ventures and negotiate proper contracts to align the interests of 
management teams with itself. Theoretical work of this stage mainly focuses on 
information asymmetry faced by venture capitalists and the adverse selection 
problem as a result of this asymmetry (Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 1990).  
Third, at the monitoring stage, the venture often experiences rapid growth. 
During this phase, venture capitalists need to monitor the venture closely and make 
further investment decisions as their investments are often made in stages (Gompers, 
1995). Venture capitalists also actively involve in making strategic decisions for the 
venture and contribute to the venture growth by offering various value-added 
services. It is also the period for entrepreneurs to learn management skills from 
venture capitalists (Black and Gilson, 1998). The dominant theoretical model to 
describe this stage is the agency model (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza and Gupta, 
1994; Bruton, Fried, and Hisrich, 2000).  
In the agency model, a principal delegates some decision-making 
responsibility to an agent due to various reasons such as information asymmetry. 
However, the objectives of the agent may conflict with that of the principal 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). Therefore, the research work has focused on how to control this 
conflict. Applying this model to VC studies, the venture capitalist is viewed as the 
principal and the entrepreneur as the agent. VC studies of this stage typically focus 
on how the venture capitalists monitor and motivate the entrepreneurs to work for 
the venture success. For example, Gompers and Lerner have used the agency model 
to explain various aspects of VC behavior in the U.S. such as detailed legal contracts 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1996), geographical localization of ventures supported by a 
VC firm (Lerner, 1995), and stage financing (Gompers, 1995). However, while this 
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theory helps at one level of understanding, it does not incorporate the dynamic 
nature of interactions in this relationship (Cable and Shane, 1997), and also fails to 
address the social contexts within which this relationship is situated. Therefore, 
agency theory is not sufficient to explain the complex behaviors between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs. Models from game theory such as prisoners' dilemma 
could be better in studying such relationships (Cable and Shane, 1997).  
Finally, the last stage of the VC process is the investment realization or exit, 
during which the VC firm exits from the venture via acquisition or launch of an IPO 
(initial public offering). The VC firm is rewarded bountifully if the venture is 
successful. Its past contribution to the venture growth is reflected in the market 
valuation premium on VC-backed IPOs (e.g., Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and 
Vetsuypens, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Brav and Gompers, 1997). 
However, VC firm would gain very little or even lose significantly if the venture is 
not so successful and it has to exit through liquidation of the venture (often in the 
case of significant loss) or equity buyback by the venture (moderate gain or loss) 
(Gladstone, 1988). 
In summary, VC firms are exposed to great risk in their investment process 
but could also reap high returns by investing in promising entrepreneurial companies 
and their valuable help for the success of these companies.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 VC in Emerging Markets 
Since the 1980s, inspired by the U.S. success, many countries, both 
developing and developed, have started to develop their VC industries. However, 
even in many developed countries, attempts to replicate the U.S. experience have not 
been very successful. For example, Murray and Marriot (1998) has found that 
European VC firms fail to invest much in high-tech early stage ventures because of 
poor returns in the early stages. Murray and Marriot have further questioned whether 
the successful investment in high-tech ventures is a unique American phenomenon. 
Similar experience is also reported in Japan (Hamao, Packer, and Ritter, 2000).  
As the performance of VC firms in many developed countries is not 
satisfactory, naturally VC firms perform even worse in emerging markets4 such as 
fast-growing Asian countries. Understanding the importance of VC in nurturing 
high-tech industries through their investment in early-stage high-tech ventures, these 
countries often started their VC industries with much initial enthusiasm. VC firms 
are established with sufficient capital from various sources such as governments, 
banks, and other financial institutions to support high-tech early-stage ventures. 
However, many of these high-tech VC firms fail to achieve this original purpose. 
Instead, they soon divert to low-tech and later-stage investments, or even to 
speculations in stock markets or property markets. Even in some relatively well-
established markets such as Singapore, most ventures supported by VC are in their 
expansion stage, not the expected early stage (Gibbons, Tan, Zutshi, and Alampalli, 
1998), and few VC firms focus on local high-tech ventures. Therefore, in these 
                                                          
4 Here we define emerging markets in its broadest sense, including both newly industrial economies 
such as Singapore and Korea, as well as more developing countries like India and China. Though the 
GDP level of some newly industrial economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong are similar to 
developed countries, their market infrastructure is still lagging behind that of developed economies.   
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emerging markets, VC industries are still far behind their potential in helping the 
growth of high-tech industries there.  
With the growth of VC industries in emerging markets in 1990s, gradually 
more research interests has been drawn to the study of VC behaviors in emerging 
markets. Literature has shown that VC firms in emerging markets often behave 
differently from those in developed markets. Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Singh (2002) 
has reported that VC firms in Asia often focus on later or expansion stage financing. 
Lockett, Wright, Sapienza, and Pruthi (2002) found significant differences in the use 
of valuation methods and information sources in different markets. The 
internationalization of VC firms, i.e., VC firms based in developed countries 
expanding to emerging markets, is one of the research interests. Wright, Lockett, 
and Pruthi (2002) has examined the investment decision making of foreign VC firms 
in India, and found that foreign VC firms adapted their risk assessment to local 
situations and behaved differently from their practices in the West.  
One important reason of all these differences is the market context, including 
factors such as the legal, institutional and cultural infrastructure (Hoskisson, Eden, 
Lau, and Wright, 2000). In this section, we explore the institutional and cultural 
background of VC in emerging markets and discuss additional difficulties and 
challenges faced by VC firms in comparison to developed markets.  
First we look at the institutional background. Empirically, it has already been 
reported that institutional background influences the VC behaviors significantly in 
emerging markets (e.g., Bruton et al., 2002; Bruton et al., 2004). The market context 
between developed and developing markets differ not only in formal institutions that 
include laws, regulations, and politics but also in informal institutions that include 
values, norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct (e.g., La 
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Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2003). Different from developed markets, where the legal and institutional 
environment has been generally well evolved to protect the interests of investors, the 
same cannot be said about many emerging markets. Stulz and Williamson (2003) 
argue that differences due to culture and general morality across societies dictate 
different behavior of investors. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) has compared various 
corporate governance mechanisms around the world and reported that practically, 
minority investors do not have any control on public firms in many less developed 
countries. If investors in public markets were so, it would be even worse in private 
equity markets where minority investors can rely on fewer mechanisms to protect 
their interests. Thus VC firms would experience much difficulty in the stage of 
monitoring. As the result, it is observed that the ability of Asian VC firms to monitor 
ventures is much poorer than that of the West (Bruton et al., 2002).  
Second, VC firms in emerging markets are often not as knowledgeable as 
their counterparts in developed countries. Due to the short history of VC industry 
there, local VC firms in emerging markets are not very experienced in SME 
investment. Certainly, there are some experienced foreign VC firms in these 
markets. The entry of these experienced international VC firms based in more 
developed countries such as the U.S. and West Europe can accelerate the market 
maturity process. However, these foreign VC firms are relatively weak in local 
knowledge (e.g., market and culture knowledge) and networks, and the market 
context differences may hinder them from investing in promising ventures (Lockett 
and Wright, 2002).    
Third, SMEs in emerging markets are not mature enough and often lack 
adequate understanding of the modern capital market, including the role of VCs. For 
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example, many founders of Asian firms, influenced by their Asian culture and 
tradition, are often reluctant to invite outsiders into management and unwilling to 
sell part of their firm’s equity. This is especially true with family-controlled 
businesses (Tan, 1998). Thus VC firms, as outside investors, may have some 
difficulty in finding promising ventures to invest in.  
Fourth, overall financial infrastructure in emerging markets is not as 
developed as it is in developed markets. For example, the professional consulting 
industry is less mature in emerging markets. VC firms have to rely more on their 
own efforts to collect market and industry information during their decision making 
process, and thus are less efficient. Also, the stock market there is often relatively 
small, particularly the second board stock market is not vibrant, and the merger and 
acquisition market is not very active, thus the exit means of VC firms in emerging 
markets are not as many as that of the West. As the result, VC firms may experience 
more difficulty in their exit. As the VC exit mechanism is very important to the 
success of VC market by enabling VC firms to recycle their resources (Black and 
Gilson, 1998), the overall weakness of financial infrastructure would adversely 
affect the VC market growth. 
In summary, in comparison to the developed markets, VC firms in emerging 
markets face different market context and their investment behaviors have to adapt 
to their own context and environment. In these markets, the institutional and cultural 
context restricts VC's ability of using legal rights in venture monitoring, thus the 
normative contractual approach alone (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001), which is based 
on agency model and well used in developed markets, is insufficient. Moreover, the 
contractual approach may overemphasize contracts with short-term performance as 
the benchmark measurement, and often leads over-monitoring and results in joint 
 15
agency value reduction (Jacobides and Croson, 2001). Therefore, other control 
mechanisms are needed to complement the weakness of the contractual approach. 
Furthermore, the weakness of financial infrastructure in emerging markets restricts 
VC's exit and the recycle of its resources. The VC weakness in their knowledge and 
the immaturity of entrepreneurs in emerging markets also limit VC's capacity of 
identifying promising ventures and providing value-added services. Therefore, VC 
firms have to find means to gain knowledge and establish proper relationship with 
entrepreneurs. Since theoretical models used in developed markets normally assume 
knowledgeable VC and its sufficient control over the venture, we need a new 
theoretical framework to incorporate above context differences of emerging markets, 
and suggest some practical investment strategies for VC firms there.  
 
2.2. Resource Theory and Knowledge-based Theory  
In this study, we use resource theory and its further development knowledge-
based theory as our new framework. Resource theory is one of the main theoretical 
perspectives used in the study of strategic management in emerging markets 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
In the field of strategic management, there is a long debate on the source of 
superior firm performance, or called economic rents. One group put emphasis on the 
firm environment (e.g., Porter, 1980), and the other on the firm itself. Resource 
theory belongs to the second group, which puts emphasis on the firm itself and 
views the firm as a "collection of productive resources" (Penrose, 1959). The 
superior firm performance, often called competitive advantage by resource theorists, 
has been contributed to firm resources that firms have accumulated over time. There 
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is some empirical evidence to support this theory such as Miller and Shamsie (1996) 
and Pennings, Lee, and van Witteloostuijn (1998).  
To yield sustainable superior performance, rent-yielding resources should be 
firm specific. Otherwise, competitors in the market can easily access to them and the 
rent would disappear very soon. Furthermore, these firm-specific resources must 
possess some characteristics to avoid being imitated or substituted by competitors 
easily (Barney, 1991). The key feature of these resources, or called core 
competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), is that there is no perfect market to buy 
or make them (Barney, 1986). They are internal assets and typically are built or 
accumulated over time by foresights or chance (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
Therefore, a firm usually has to learn and accumulate its firm-specific resources over 
time.  
Firm-specific resources can be classified into two categories, tangible 
resources such as fixed assets, and intangible resources such as brand image and 
knowledge. Intangible resources have no physical existence, but they enable the firm 
to combine and transform tangible resources to outputs in the production process 
(Galunic and Rodan, 1998). In the modern world, most tangible resources are easy 
to be imitated or substituted, and thus cannot be the source of competitive 
advantage. Therefore, we focus our discussion on intangible resources, which are 
more likely to be the source of firm superior performance (Spender, 1996).  
Among firm-specific intangible resources, knowledge is often the source of 
other intangible resources and thus the source of competitive advantage (Spender, 
1996; Grant, 1996). It is sometimes considered as "the only meaningful resource" 
(Drucker, 1993). Thus knowledge-based theory is developed to argue that the 
knowledge and related capacities are the most important source of a firm's 
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sustainable competitive advantage (Nonaka, 1994; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 
1996; Nonaka, Toyama, and Nagata, 2000). 
To define knowledge is not easy (Grant, 1996). Here we loosely define it as 
information and insights necessary for a firm in its production. It can be classified 
into two types, articulable or explicit, and tacit or implicit (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; 
Polanyi, 1967). Articulable knowledge can be codified such as the recipe of a pizza, 
and therefore can be easily transferred unless legally protected by various 
knowledge property rights such as patents and copyrights (Liebeskind, 1996). On the 
contrary, tacit knowledge such as the process of pizza making is not articulable and 
thus cannot be easily transferred (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). It is often 
embedded in uncodified routines or in the social context of the firm such as 
collaborative working relationships within the firm ((Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Szulanski, 1996). Also, it is often unique, difficult to imitate, and uncertain 
(Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996). Therefore, tacit knowledge is not easily 
imitated and is often the source of sustainable competitive advantages of a firm 
(McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2002).  
At the heart of a firm's tacit knowledge resides in its human capital (e.g., the 
timing of pizza making is only known by the baker), as typically seen in many 
knowledge-intensive firms such as VC firms (Pfeffer, 1994; Dimov and Shepherd, 
2005). These firms mainly generate value through their selection, development, and 
use of the human capital (Lepak and Snell, 1999).  
Though human capital is mobile to some degree, it can still be a sustainable 
firm-specific resource due to two reasons. First, the value of human capital may be 
related to other firm-specific knowledge, or it is valuable only when integrated with 
capabilities of other people or other firm-specific resources that are not mobile (Hitt, 
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Bierman, Shimizu, and Kochhar, 2001; Lepak and Snell, 1999). For example, the 
pizza baker may lose much of his value if he leaves the firm because the good taste 
of the pizza depends on not only his baking skill but also one important firm-made 
ingredient of the pizza whose making process is unknown to the baker. Second, a 
firm that intends to keep its competitive advantage of human capital can use various 
mechanisms to build mobility barriers on its valuable human capital. For example, 
most professional service firms where human capital is an essential resource adopt a 
partnership form of organization (Maister, 1993). Those staffs that have 
accumulated valuable knowledge and network resources through "learning by 
doing" are eventually rewarded with partner status and own some stakes in the firm 
(Galanter and Palay, 1991). They would lose these privileges if they left the firm. 
The potential generous profits from the partnership can prevent these experienced 
partners from moving to other firms even when being offered with high salary if the 
firm business is promising. Empirically, Hatch and Dyer (2004) has found that 
superior performance came from better practices to develop firm-specific human 
capital and provided evidence of the inimitability of human capital. 
  In summary, the knowledge-based theory highlights the importance of 
knowledge, particularly the tacit knowledge in building the competitive advantage of 
knowledge-intensive firms. Therefore, a knowledge-intensive firm, such is the case 
for VC industry, should develop strategies both to generate knowledge and apply its 
knowledge to create value for its shareholders.  
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. VC Knowledge and Networks  
The dominant approach in VC research, the financial approach, views VC 
investment similar to institutional investment in the public market with returns and 
risk as main factors in investment decision (Brealey and Myers, 1996). According to 
this approach, what a VC firm interested is the expected returns and the risk it can 
tolerate. The VC firm can first choose the investment stage (early stage gives higher 
returns but is more risky) and industries (high-tech ones give higher returns but are 
more risky). Then it should invest in many different companies with the same risk 
level to diversify the unsystematic (firm-specific) risk.  
However, the private equity market, which VC firms invest in, is much 
different from the public market. It is far from efficient due to the severe information 
asymmetry and high transaction cost in the market. In response, a VC firm has to be 
a major minority shareholder in just a few ventures in order to get access to 
sufficient information of these ventures to overcome the information asymmetry. 
Furthermore, investing in just a few ventures would also reduce the transaction cost. 
However, such a strategy limits the VC's ability to diversify the unsystematic risk. 
The overall performance of a VC firm is much affected by investment returns of one 
or two ventures (Sahlman, 1990). Therefore, a VC firm needs to use other means to 
reduce the investment risk instead of the diversification. According to the resource 
theory, the market imperfection actually provides opportunities for firms to use their 
firm-specific resources for superior performance (Peteraf, 1993). A VC firm should 
thus accumulate and use its firm-specific resources to cope with the unsystematic 
risk in the private equity market (Wright and Robbie, 1998). Thus in this section, we 
apply the resource theory and knowledge-based theory to study VC industry and 
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analyze the VC knowledge base and related capacities that can provide sustainable 
competitive advantages. A good understanding of these knowledge and related 
capacities would be the first step for VC firms to build competitive advantages.  
In the context of VC industry, VC firms operate as not only capital but also 
service providers in the private equity market by identifying promising ventures in 
their early stages and providing value-added services such as management skills and 
relational capital (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). As VC's financial capital is almost 
identical for all VC firms, it cannot be the source of the competitive advantage5. The 
competitive advantage of a VC firm should come from its ability of identifying 
promising ventures and providing value-added services, which could ensure long-
term high and stable investment returns for its shareholders. Such ability depends on 
the knowledge of the VC firm, most of which resides in the investment managers, or 
called venture capitalists. Thus we may conclude that the main source of VC's 
competitive advantage is within its knowledge and the related capacity, which are 
often in the form of human capital. Most important capacity in the VC context is the 
VC networks, which provide vital access to knowledge (Kogut, 2000). Firm 
reputation gained through its past experience is another important source of 
competitive advantage.  
VC knowledge 
According to the knowledge needed for a VC firm to search for investment 
opportunities in a specific market and add value to ventures it invests in, VC 
knowledge can be roughly divided into four types, namely industry knowledge, 
management knowledge, finance knowledge, and local knowledge.  
                                                          
5 While VC firms are different by their fund size, size alone seldom affect their investment ability 
since the fund size is normally much larger than the size of particular deal and VC firm can also use 
syndication to expand its funding ability (Lerner, 1994).  
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First, industry knowledge refers to VC's general understanding and insights 
on the technology trend in the industry and the market needs for venture products or 
services. It provides insights for a VC firm to evaluate the technological and market 
potential of a venture product or service, and it is particularly important in making 
early stage investments. As the product or service of an early stage venture has not 
been proven in the market yet, the venture capitalist has to use his industry 
knowledge to evaluate the prospect of a venture rightly and make the investment 
decision wisely. Even for a later stage venture with a product or service partly 
proven in the market, certain industry knowledge would still be useful for the VC 
firm to estimate its full potential during the stage of assessment. While the venture 
capitalist is not required to be as knowledgeable as the entrepreneur in technical 
details of the venture product, he needs to have a good understanding on the industry 
and market growth. Or at least in this age of information explosion, the venture 
capitalist is capable of obtaining necessary information quickly through literature 
and his networks, which enables him to know the prospect of the venture product 
and not to be blinded by the optimism of the entrepreneur. One venture capitalist in 
the interview described the process, 
In due diligence process, if the project is something we don't know very well, 
we will talk to outside people for ideas, especially people we know in the 
past with expertise in that industry area. We will also do our own research, 
search literature, and check with referees if it is from referral. 
Second, management knowledge refers to the knowledge related to the 
venture management, which can be divided into two types, knowledge of technology 
management and knowledge of general management. The former focuses on the 
management of various technologies in a venture, and the latter on other aspects of 
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management such as human resource management. Since ventures often face severe 
competition, good technology by itself is not sufficient for venture success. For 
example, though Apple's Macintosh system was widely agreed to be superior over 
Microsoft's DOS system in the 1980s, the Microsoft's DOS system still managed to 
dominate the operating system of personal computers then. Mata, Fuerst, and Barney 
(1995) has shown that the knowledge of technology management is a main 
sustainable advantage that an IT firm can possess in the fast growing IT industry, 
instead of the technology itself. Very often the technological superiority may not 
bring market share and competitive advantage due to poor technology management. 
A VC firm with good knowledge of technology management can be a great help to 
young entrepreneurs who are knowledgeable in technology but may not be well 
trained in the technology management.  
Furthermore, knowledge of general management is mainly important for a 
VC firm in the stage of monitoring by first understanding the state of the venture 
management and then contributing to the improvement of the venture management. 
Compared to the technology management knowledge, it is more culture-specific, 
and a venture capitalist must know how to communicate with entrepreneurs properly 
in order to improve the venture management and not to deteriorate the relationship 
instead. One venture capitalist in the interview mentioned how to accumulate such 
knowledge,  
The way to accumulate management knowledge is through involvement. It is 
very hard to learn it from outside. You get involved, go inside, do not run 
away from the problems, and then you learn the management. 
Third, finance knowledge refers to the knowledge in financial valuation and 
control. On the one hand, a VC firm needs to know the financial value of a venture 
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in order to avoid overpaying in the stage of assessment. Furthermore, the VC firm 
should know how to structure the deal to protect its interest and motivate the 
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, in the following monitoring stage, the VC firm can 
use its knowledge of financial control to help the venture improve its financial 
management, which is especially important when the venture is expanding. Most 
finance knowledge is not related to market context but some of it is related.    
For example, detailed contracts are widely used in the developed markets for 
venture capitalists to control and motivate entrepreneurs effectively (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1996). However, this practice may widen gaps between venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs and become a source of conflict in many emerging markets such 
as Asian ones, for Asian cultures put more emphasis on inter-personal trust instead 
of detailed legal contracts (Thorelli, 1986). Batjargal and Liu (2004) has found that 
in China, venture capitalists who enjoy strong relationship with entrepreneurs rely 
less on making contractual covenants, which is supposed to be the normal way to 
protect investor's interests in developed markets.  
While the above three types of knowledge actually cover knowledge VC 
needed, here we derive a new type of knowledge, called local knowledge, to denote 
all knowledge related to the local context. Above discussion on using contracts in 
Asian markets thus becomes local knowledge. Later the first three types of 
knowledge refer to knowledge devoid of the local context, and are called general 
knowledge as a whole.  
Local knowledge can be seen as the understanding of local business 
environments such as local market conditions and the local culture for effective 
communication with local entrepreneurs. Good local knowledge is important for pre-
investment screening (e.g., management due diligence) in the assessment stage as 
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well as further value-adding in the monitoring stage. In the assessment stage, a VC 
firm needs to know the local market condition so that it could estimate the potential 
and the possibility of market success for a venture product. One venture capitalist 
said during the interview,    
We are very concerned about the detailed market size as an estimation of the 
best potential of the venture. You can't say an Internet broadband service 
will be well received in India given its one billion population. The real 
potential market size is the number of Internet broadband subscription there.  
Besides understanding the local market, local knowledge is essential in 
knowing the entrepreneurs, understanding their backgrounds and characters and 
knowing how to communicate with them. Even after a VC firm decides to invest, it 
still needs the local knowledge in the deal structuring to follow the local regulation. 
One venture capitalist explained in the interview that this is why the firm co-invests 
with a local VC for its deal in a foreign country, 
When reaching issues like deal structuring or dealing with local regulations, 
we need the help of a local VC partner.  
VC networks 
Network resources refer to the VC networks in the venture industry as well 
as financial community, including both firm and personal (venture capitalist) 
networks. The importance of network is highlighted by social network theory 
(Granovetter, 1985). Firms are not atomic organizations in impersonal markets but 
are embedded within their social networks, which have economic value in many 
aspects. Uzzi (1997) further argues that the social networks generated through 
regular transactions are effective economically due to the high trust built up among 
them. Furthermore, networks are related to the knowledge (Kogut, 2000), for they 
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provide the firm an access to both general and local knowledge much faster. Gulati, 
Nohria, and Zaheer (2000) further argues that firm networks and the knowledge they 
allow the firm to tap into can serve as a source of sustainable competitive advantage 
if firm networks are created through a path dependent process.  
In the VC context, networks of a VC firm are important resources in its 
operation. In the private equity market facing severe information asymmetry, 
networks of a VC firm is valuable means to access to various private knowledge and 
information. In the stage of assessment, the VC firm can obtain some useful 
information such as the capability of an entrepreneur through its connection with 
venture's main suppliers, customers, or competitors. Networks become very valuable 
in this stage to help search for investment opportunities. One venture capitalist in the 
interview gave one example of using networks.  
Take one airline project as an example. We have known C, former CEO of a 
famous airline company, for a long time. When we saw the project, we talked 
to C, 'do you mind to look at the project with us? We don't really know this 
industry'. He looked at it and said, 'if it is real, it is very attractive'. So we 
decided to invest in it with his participation.  
Without this network with the expert in the airline industry, the venture 
capitalist would have had to search literature to know the industry for the investment 
decision. It would have taken him much more time, or he might have just skipped 
the project. 
In the stage of monitoring, the VC firm can further use its relationship with 
entrepreneurs as a kind of control for the entrepreneurs by building relationship with 
entrepreneurs through nurturing trust with them (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). In 
the context of emerging markets, networks become more important compared to 
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developed markets due to the generally weak legal and institutional environment in 
emerging markets (Xin and Pearce, 1996). The ineffectiveness of contractual control 
in emerging markets demands the complement of the network as a means of control.  
For example, the Guanxi, a Chinese version of social networks, is found essential in 
the VC investment in China. VC firm there are found more likely to make the 
decision to invest if the venture capitalists enjoy good pre-investment relationship 
with entrepreneurs themselves or people close to them (Batjargal and Liu, 2004).  
Besides acting as a means for information and control, VC networks can also 
add value to ventures VC invested in. Entrepreneurs often view the established 
network of a VC firm with high regards. For example, the relationship of a VC firm 
with established companies which it previously supported is very valuable for the 
inexperienced entrepreneurs in a young venture, for these networks often provide 
promising business opportunities.  
Most knowledge and networks we have discussed above are not firm 
specific. Industry knowledge is known by industrial experts and partly accessible by 
public through various industry and market reports. Management, finance, and local 
knowledge are more stable and could even be taught in classrooms and known by 
more people. Networks normally are not exclusive to one venture capitalist or VC 
firm. One venture capitalist discussed the nature of such sharing within the VC 
community in the interview. 
 In VC industry, information sharing is a common practice. It is very 
informal. You can just exchange notes and ideas. All of us try to form 
opinions on certain company or industry through all these informal 
exchanges. We don't worry losing deals due to information sharing. If 
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another VC firm is interested in our deal, we prefer to co-invest with it. It is 
better to be friendly. 
 However, a venture capitalist has to apply his knowledge to certain project 
and make necessary judgments on the prospect of the venture product and the 
capability of the entrepreneurs. After making the investment decision, he still needs 
to apply knowledge in the future for various decisions in the venture management 
till the final exit. Such application requires a combination of all these types of 
knowledge as well as using networks effectively for any knowledge shortages. It 
reveals the real capability of the venture capitalist. As one venture capitalist said in 
the interview,  
Making investment is actually the easiest thing to do, but how to deal with 
the management team and make the company success until your divestment 
is the real challenge. It just likes the efforts needed for a successful 
marriage. You need to work with the team, play the strength, hit or pull back 
at the right time. All are very subjective, depending on your experience. A 
venture capitalist only after ten-year investment experience becomes more 
useful to new entrepreneurs. 
Though the venture management is knowledge application rather than 
generation (Spender, 1992), or exploitation rather than exploration (March, 1991), it 
is not easy given the cross-discipline nature of the four types of knowledge as well 
as the human factor in it6. The network of a VC firm can be seen as the extension of 
its knowledge base, and using it effectively also requires skill and capability. It takes 
the VC firm much effort to build the relationship before it can be used since the 
effectiveness of such information seeking is related to the relationship strength 
                                                          
6 Knowing people is never easy. It is a fact well acknowledged during the interview.  
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(Borgatti and Cross, 2003). The venture capitalist also has to know whom to contact 
among persons he knows and what to ask so that he may obtain the information he 
needs.   
In conclusion, we may summarize the core competence of a VC firm is in its 
ability to integrate various types of knowledge and apply them to the context of a 
particular venture.  It depends on the experience of its investment managers as well 
as their passions for learning new knowledge given the fast-changing nature of high-
tech industries. Networks play important roles in this knowledge integration and 
application process by complementing what the VC firm lacks.   
 
3.2. Means to Accumulate Knowledge  
After analyzing VC knowledge, networks and its core competence, the next 
issue is about the means by which VC firms accumulate knowledge and 
complementary network. Huber (1991) presented five processes through which 
organizations acquire knowledge, congenital learning, grafting, experiential 
learning, vicarious learning, and searching and noticing. In the VC context, 
searching and noticing normally are not conducted separately from the VC 
investment practice, but included in either VC's own experience or observation of 
other VC firms. So it is included in experiential or vicarious learning and not 
discussed further. Thus we propose four learning mechanisms for VC firms to 
accumulate knowledge in correspondence, namely, joint venture, learning by hiring, 
learning by doing, and learning by observing.  
The congenital learning in Huber (1991) refers to the learning process before 
the foundation of a new organization so that it may inherit sufficient knowledge for 
a good start. While it is often a natural process (inheriting knowledge from its 
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founders), here we highlight one important means often used in the VC context 
during this stage, i.e., the joint venture. It is widely used in the business world, 
particularly in the international business (Harrigan, 1985). Mowery et al. (1996) 
showed that firms often use various forms of alliances including joint venture to 
acquire knowledge. In the context of VC firms in emerging markets, the founder 
(either a foreign VC firm moving to the new market or a local corporation venturing 
to the VC field) may not have accumulated all necessary industry, management, 
finance, and local knowledge. Creating a joint venture with other resource holders is 
a feasible way to acquire knowledge in a short time. For example, one international 
VC firm, Advent International, used the joint venture structure to establish a global 
VC network (Vonk, 1988). One of its associated VC firms in Singapore, Transtech 
Venture, was a joint venture between Advent International and three local 
government-linked giants, EDB, DBS Bank, and NatSteel Corporation.      
The second mechanism, grafting in Huber (1991) refers to organizations 
increasing their knowledge by acquiring and grafting on members who possess new 
knowledge. Originally it includes both acquiring new companies and hiring new 
employees. In the VC context, being small professional service companies, VC 
firms seldom acquire other firms or form joint ventures except during entry to new 
market (it is the first mechanism in our classification). Hiring venture capitalists, i.e., 
recruiting experienced venture capitalists or entrepreneurs who possess valuable 
knowledge and networks through their industrial or investment experiences, is the 
normal way of grafting. Thus here we call this mechanism learning by hiring.  
Knowledge literature suggests human mobility is often a way of transferring 
tacit knowledge (e.g., Dosi, 1988; Teece, 1982; Winter, 1987). Song, Almeida, and 
Wu (2003) has explored the conditions under which learning by hiring is more 
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likely. In the VC context, most knowledge and network resources are possessed by 
individual venture capitalists rather than VC firms though the firm may own the 
reputation, thus learning by hiring is a common means for VC firms acquiring new 
knowledge. In this way, a new VC firm can become knowledgeable in a short 
period. Though the partnership system sets a mobility barrier on experienced venture 
capitalists, it is still possible for other VC firms to recruit experienced venture 
capitalists by various incentives. More commonly, they can recruit investment 
managers from other lines (e.g., experienced corporate managers or ex-
entrepreneurs) to avoid the barrier. One venture capitalist in the interview mentioned 
his personal experience, 
Before joining the VC Firm, I worked in a large IT corporation in charge of 
its acquisition business for over ten years. All our managers are experienced 
in making investments in private companies with different industry focus. 
The third mechanism, experiential learning in Huber (1991) refers to the 
learning through direct experience, or called learning by doing in organization 
learning literature (e.g., Levitt and March, 1988; Nass, 1994). It refers to the process 
by which the firm becomes more practiced and hence more efficient at doing what it 
is already doing (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Tsang (2002) reports that foreign 
joint venture partners in China improve their skill of knowledge acquisition through 
learning by doing.  
In the VC context, learning by doing is to accumulate knowledge and 
networks through making investment directly (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2005). It is 
an important way of VC learning because much knowledge such as industry and 
management knowledge is better learned through experience (Pisano, 1994). One 
venture capitalist in the interview shared his experience. 
 31
If you invest in a deal in a particular industry, then it is where you do start to 
build up a lot expertise and detailed knowledge. For example, you would 
know jargons in that industry. We could even learn a lot of industry 
knowledge in the investment due diligence process though eventually we do 
not invest.  
The fourth mechanism, vicarious learning in Huber (1991) refers to 
organizational learning through observing the strategies, management practices and 
especially technologies possessed by other organizations. Strategic alliance literature 
has extensively studied this type of learning (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997; Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, and Sparks, 1998; Kale, Singh, 
and Perlmutter, 2000). It is an important mechanism of learning given its low cost 
compared to learning by doing and effectiveness in learning embedded knowledge 
(Hamel, 1991). Here we call it learning by observing following the learning 
literature (e.g., Bandura, 1973; Couzijn, 1999). Nadler, Thomson, and Van Boven 
(2003) reports that learning by observing can improve the learning of negotiation 
skills compared to learning by doing alone.    
In the VC context, learning by observing is to observe the investment 
practice of other VC firms in order to learn useful knowledge and build networks. It 
is normally in the form of syndication though other forms of alliances are possible 
(Bygrave, 1987; Lerner, 1994). In a syndicated investment, two or more VC firms 
co-invest in one venture, and often one of them works as the leading VC to do most 
work in the venture investment process (Wright and Lockett, 2003). Since VC 
syndication is a common form of alliance in the VC industry (Wright and Lockett, 
2003), we would focus on VC syndication in the discussion of learning by 
observing. 
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 For the four mechanisms of VC learning, first we should notice they are not 
mutually exclusive and can happen simultaneously. A VC firm can be formed as a 
joint venture and further hire experienced venture capitalists from the market. Later 
it can continue its learning through direct investment experience (learning by doing) 
and syndication practice (learning by observing). For one syndicated deal, the VC 
firm can learn both from its syndication partners and the investment experience. It 
may even hire an industrial expert for the deal success.  
However, the relative importance of the four mechanisms in the life cycle of 
a VC firm is different. Learning by joint venture and learning by hiring are more 
important in the initial stage of a VC firm since they provide fast access to 
knowledge and network the VC firm lacks. Learning by doing and learning by 
observing are more common learning means in the daily VC investment practice and 
become more and more important in the later growing stage of the VC firm. Thus 
we focus on these two mechanisms since they are more related to VC investment 
strategies. Among the two VC learning mechanisms, learning by doing plays the 
main role while learning by observing is a good complement, especially in context 
of emerging markets.  
Learning by doing is important due to two reasons. First the venture 
capitalist pool for learning by hiring is small in emerging markets, where the history 
of VC industry is short and experienced venture capitalists are few. The knowledge 
of an experienced venture capitalist in developed markets cannot be simply 
transferred to an emerging market since the local knowledge is context-specific. 
Thus the cost of learning by hiring is often high. A new VC firm without strong 
institutional backing may experience much difficulty in recruiting experienced 
venture capitalists. For such a firm, it is more likely to build its competitive 
 33
advantage by training its inexperienced investment managers, who are often 
recruited from industrial or financial sectors related to the VC firm, through learning 
by doing. 
Second, the VC industry landscape is moving very fast, particularly for the 
investment in high-technology industries. A venture capitalist has to keep on 
learning to understand the trend and make wise investment decision. Learning by 
doing is more effective learning mechanism in such a context. One venture capitalist 
mentioned his experience in the interview, 
The learning process is in your whole investment process of value-adding, 
selling deals to industry, trying to help the venture, etc. During the process, 
you learn more about the industry.  
However, there are constraints on learning by doing and learning by 
observing can then become a good complement. For example, a VC firm without 
overseas investment experience dares not invest there alone. Pure learning by doing 
would be too risky for the VC firm. It would prefer to get a local partner to co-invest 
and learn the local knowledge through the syndication experience. One venture 
capitalist stated his overseas investment strategy in the interview in this way, 
Singapore companies are our main focus, and we may also invest in their 
overseas expanding. We normally do not invest in pure overseas firms unless 
having trusted co-investors. 
Here we can see learning by observing is relatively low risk and thus a VC 
firm can use it to learn something far from its current knowledge base. A VC firm 
without much knowledge on a new industry or region can accumulate valuable 
knowledge and networks quickly after obtaining syndication opportunities in that 
industry or region. Though leading VC firm could use its information advantage to 
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syndicate out unpromising ventures and thus partly transfer the risk to uninformed 
syndication partners, practically such behavior is rare due to the reputation 
consideration, and syndication leaders would prefer to syndicate out well-performed 
ventures instead (Lerner, 1994).  
However, a VC firm would not syndicate out deals indiscriminately. It is not 
willing to give any VCs the access to its practice and share its profit, knowing that 
the syndication opportunity would strengthen the competitive advantage of the 
partners and thus create potential competitors. So only when the syndication leader 
have good relationship with the partner or can gain something from the partner, e.g., 
building networks for future benefits or the partner can contribute to the deal 
success, the co-investment can be made. In the above quoting, the VC firm only co-
invests with trusted ones, i.e., VCs in its close networks. So ultimately, learning by 
observing is still subject to the knowledge and networks of a VC firm. 
After discussion on the four mechanisms of VC learning, we further look at 
the influence of VC learning on the VC investment process. According to our 
discussion in Section 1.3, there are four stages in this process, fund raising, 
assessment, monitoring, and investment realization. A VC firm starts with some 
initial knowledge and networks, and it can further use learning by joint venture or 
learning by hiring to accumulate more knowledge. It then raises funds internally or 
externally, whose success also depends on the VC firm's knowledge base as well as 
its reputation.  
The VC firm then enters the stage of assessment, first by deciding its 
investment stage, industry, and region preference based on its current knowledge 
base and the request of its fund investors7. After that, it starts to obtain deals using 
                                                          
7 Normally fund investors take financial returns as the investment objective, though some corporate 
VC firms also invest with strategic purposes (Hellmann, 2002).  
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its knowledge and networks. When there are co-investment invitations from other 
VC firms, the VC firm gets opportunities for learning by observing. Its learning 
motive would sure affect the syndication strategy such as its syndication motives.  
Then regardless of the deal is syndicated or not, the VC firm needs to 
conduct extensive due diligence to evaluate the prospect of the deal. Here the VC 
firm is in the process of learning by doing. Its knowledge and learning motive may 
affect the due diligence criteria also. After conducting the due diligence and the VC 
firm decides to invest, it may still need co-investors if it senses a lack of knowledge 
or financial capital. Thus the syndication loop could be active here, and learning by 
observing becomes effective also.  
In the assessment stage after due diligence, the VC firm needs to structure 
the deal to protect investors' interests. Here VC firm continues in the process of 
learning by doing (and learning by observing if it is a syndicated deal).  
After entering the stage of monitoring and investment realization, the venture 
may encounter various problems, and the VC firm continues to learn by learning by 
doing (and learning by observing if syndicated) when it tries to help the venture 
success. There are also strategic issues in this stage such as the relationship 
management between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to ensure smooth 
learning. All these experiences would enrich its knowledge and networks, and could 
also be used for its future investments.  
To summarize about discussion, we develop the following framework to 
highlight the learning process in the life cycle of VC investment process graphically, 
which is shown in Figure 1. 
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Note: This figure illustrates the VC learning process in the life cycle of investment process. 
Before the VC fund raising, the VC firm can accumulate knowledge and networks through 
learning by joint venture or learning by hiring. After it starts the investment process, its 
current knowledge and networks affect its strategy in the whole process. On the other hand, 
the VC firm can use learning by doing (and learning by observing if going to syndication 
process) to accumulate more knowledge and networks in several stages of this investment 
process. The VC firm can go to syndication process either by obtaining a deal from its 
partners or by its decision to syndicate out a deal after the due diligence process. In the first 
case, the VC firm will conduct due diligence after the syndication process. In the second, it 
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will go to deal structuring after syndication process (following the brown arrows). Bolded 
boxes are issues we will explore further in this study. 
 
This framework demonstrates how a VC firm learns in its whole investment 
process and the influence of its knowledge base (including networks) on the 
investment process. The VC investment strategy is not only subject to VC current 
knowledge base, but also affects its VC knowledge accumulation. For VC firms in 
emerging markets, the VC knowledge accumulation is particularly important due to 
the relative immaturity of the markets. In this study, we only focus on the part of the 
learning process, mainly the deal sources, due diligence process, and syndication 
process, though the framework is applicable to many other aspects of VC investment 
strategies. 
 
3.3 Differences between Foreign and Local VC Firms 
While we will explore above framework in our interview study for more 
details on the interaction between VC learning, knowledge and investment 
behaviors, the main body of our empirical work would only focus on one aspect of 
the framework, the foreign and local VC firm differences. VC knowledge and 
networks as well as the learning intention are not easy to measure directly. Thus in 
this explorative study, we would rather focus on the influence of VC external 
characteristics on VC investment behaviors. In the setting of an emerging market, 
foreign and local VC firm differences would be a prominent one. 
In an emerging market, most foreign VC firms are based in developed 
countries such as the U.S. and West Europe. After the success in their domestic 
(home) markets, they choose to expand to new markets for various reasons such as 
seeking investment opportunities outside the domestic market (Hall and Tu, 2003). 
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Being international VC firms with rich investment experience, their entry brings not 
only the international funding but also the professional practices to the emerging 
market. Understanding the multiplying effect of VC investment to local economy, 
the local government is often very supportive to the entry of foreign VC firms. One 
venture capitalist from Taiwan explained his reason for coming to Singapore in our 
field study, 
We were invited by NSTB (now called A*STAR) to manage a matching fund 
(i.e., NSTB providing half funding) then. Since we have invested in 
Singapore before, we took this opportunity to start an office here, managing 
two VC funds.    
These foreign VC firms come from diverse background and often possess 
different capabilities. In the case of Singapore (the market of our empirical setting), 
there are foreign VC firms from the US, Western Europe (e.g., UK, France, and 
Germany), as well as Asian regions such as Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. They 
can be independent VC firms following the traditional US pattern (investing in early 
stage and high-tech ventures), or finance-affiliated VC firms investing in expansion 
stage or even pre-IPO ones, or corporate VC firms focusing on ventures in certain 
industries. However, they would have one common advantage and one common 
disadvantage compared to local VC firms. 
 The common advantage of foreign VC firms is their richer investment 
experiences since firms expand to overseas only after their local successes. As the 
result, they would possess more industry knowledge accumulated in their domestic 
markets if they still invest in industries they are familiar with (normally they do). 
They also possess the advantage of general management knowledge over local firms 
and would be more confident in their value-added ability to ventures they invest in. 
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It is reported that foreign VC firms can contribute more to the venture strategy than 
local ones due to their knowledge superiority (Pruthi, Wright, and Lockett, 2003). 
Thus normally foreign VC firms enjoy advantages over their local counterparts with 
respect to industry and management knowledge which devoid of local context, i.e., 
the general knowledge. 
However, there is one common disadvantage for foreign VC firms, the 
liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) which has been discussed extensively in 
international business literature (e.g., Hymer, 1976; Caves, 1982). It arises from the 
unfamiliarity of the environment and the cultural, economic, and political 
differences. While most empirical studies support its existence (e.g., Zaheer, 1995; 
Lu and Beamish, 2001; Miller and Parkhe, 2002), Nachum (2003) reports its non-
existence in the case of financial service firms in London. In a study on the turnover 
of top-management team in US firms, Davis and Nair (2003) reports that the 
turnover in international acquisition is significantly higher (except for acquirers 
without prior US FDI experience), and thus these foreign acquirers generally do not 
see the importance of liability of foreignness. International business literature further 
concludes that the liability of foreignness is likely to be more severe in a market-
seeking, horizontal MNC (e.g., Caves, 1982; Barlett and Ghoshal, 1989). VC 
industry is just the case. During the field study, we notice that most local branches 
of international VC firms enjoy much autonomy in deal searching and investment 
decision (only the final approval goes to their headquarters). The level of integration 
across different branches is quite low. Essentially VC firms are competing on a 
local-for-local basis. 
From the knowledge perspective, while VC general knowledge and 
reputation can easily be transferred across countries, the local knowledge is less 
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mobile and networks are more localized. The global scope of a VC firm can be 
helpful to its fund raising, and is an aspect of its value adding to its portfolios in 
their overseas expansion. However, the essential part in VC investment is a good 
understanding of local entrepreneurs and local market for the selection of right 
ventures and providing the right support. Foreign VC firms would be weak in their 
local knowledge due to their short history in the local market. Though foreign VC 
firms often hire local investment managers to accumulate local knowledge and 
networks, it takes time for local managers to be assimilated into the firm. Its firm-
level network is often weak locally. On the contrary, local VC firms often enjoy 
advantage in local knowledge either from themselves or through local shareholders 
as well as broader local networks. All these differences would affect the investment 
behaviors of VC firms. It is reported that foreign and local VC firms differ in the 
due diligence effort due to their differences in the network strength (Lu, Hwang, and 
Wang, 2005).  
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CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESES 
4.1 VC Investment Decision Process  
4.1.1. Background 
In the VC assessment stage, a VC firm needs to make investment decision. 
During the investment decision process, the VC firm first searches for investment 
opportunities through various sources, and then selects among these investment 
proposals to choose suitable ventures to invest in. A VC firm usually spends much 
effort in both deal searching and selection process, and is very selective in choosing 
the ventures it would invest in. In the deal searching process, the VC firm uses both 
market and networks to search for potential investment deals. After obtaining many 
investment proposals seeking for VC funding, the VC firm starts the deal selection 
process. It is typically divided into three steps: initial screening, preliminary review, 
and a comprehensive due diligence process (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse, 1997). In the 
first two steps, a VC firm normally uses some simple criteria such as deal size, 
region and industry to select a few promising candidates for further detailed 
evaluation. In the third step, the VC firm normally uses detailed investment criteria, 
called criteria for due diligence in this study, such as the integrity of the 
entrepreneurs as important guidelines for the investment decision. Certainly it is not 
a strictly sequential process as the VC firm may go through several deals at the same 
time and the investment decision or the knowledge gained in one deal may affect the 
decision process of other deals.   
There have been many studies on the VC investment decision process and 
particularly on the due diligence process (e.g., Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994; Harvey and Lusch, 1995; Smart, 1999; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 
2001). Many studies such as MacMillan, Siegel, and Subbanarasimha (1985), 
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MacMillan, Zemann, and Subbanarasimha (1987), Hall and Hofer (1993), and 
Muzyka, Birley, and Leleux (1996) have further investigated the investment 
decision criteria used by VC firms in the due diligence process. These criteria 
mainly cover three areas: management, market and product (or service if the venture 
is a service provider), and finance. The management refers to the quality of 
entrepreneur and his management team, such as their characters, vision, and strategy 
for venture growth. The market /product refer to various issues related to the venture 
market and product, such as the product quality, market potential, competitor 
strength, and customer base. The finance refers to the financial status and value of 
the venture.  
Different from past study, we do not assume VC homogeneity but apply our 
framework to explore how VC current knowledge and the intention to accumulate 
knowledge affect VC investment decision process, particularly the deal source and 
the due diligence criteria.  
4.1.2. Relationship between VC knowledge/ networks and deal sources  
We first apply our framework to study the VC deal sources. While basically 
VC deal sources can be categorized into several types such as deals from networks 
and deals from intermediaries (Fenn et al., 1997), there are not any known empirical 
studies to study VC deal sources. Here we differentiate VC deal sources first by 
whether the deal is solicited or unsolicited, and second by the market and the 
networks.  
While VC firms are very selective in the investment process (Sweeting 
(1991) reported that VCs in the UK invested in about 2% of all received proposals), 
some VC firms still feed the need to solicit for deals, particularly for VC firms with 
specialized knowledge but new in the market. A venture capitalist in a corporate VC 
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firm, whose parent is a famous semiconductor MNC, emphasized the importance of 
solicited deals (called deals by own search in his words) and gave an example in the 
interview. 
 Deals by own search can be an important deal source. Some of our best 
deals are from it. If I plan to invest in Thailand, I will consult the General 
Manager in Thailand's subsidiary of our parent corporation. I work with the 
local team to scan the market, find the potential, and work with government 
there to find out industries that both they interested and we knowledgeable. 
In this case, the venture capitalist searches for deals in a new market by first 
working with its local team and the government to decide its industry focus, and 
then further searching deals within that focus. The good industry knowledge of the 
firm is the basis for such an approach though various networks are also used. A VC 
firm with good industry knowledge in one or few industries would be more likely to 
solicit for deals, especially when its unsolicited deals are not sufficient to meet its 
demands.     
Unsolicited deals can be further divided into deals from networks, 
intermediary (costly market), and entrepreneurs directly (free market but requiring 
more screening). Deals from networks are deals introduced by individuals or 
companies known by the VC firm. They can come from parent corporations of the 
VC firm, portfolio companies supported by the VC firm, other VC firms as 
syndication partners, entrepreneurs already known by the VC firm, or any other 
contacts known by the VC firm. Some VC firms get most deals from their networks. 
One venture capitalist said in the interview, 
All our deals come through our network. So far we haven't gone out to 
market ourselves. 
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Naturally a VC firm with extensive local networks would get more deals 
from its networks. Deals from networks normally are more reliable (though the 
reliability varies with the quality of networks) and the VC firm can thus spend less 
effort in the due diligence. One venture capitalist said in the interview, 
Deals introduced by our corporate parent are the best due to its industry 
experience and its pre-check on market and technology.  
Focusing on foreign and local VC firm differences, we look at their 
differences in unsolicited deals from networks and solicited deals. As foreign VC 
firms are strong in industry knowledge but weak in local networks, we may 
hypothesize that they get more solicited deals but fewer unsolicited deals from 
networks compared to local ones, resulting in the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: In an emerging market, a foreign VC firm obtains more 
solicited deals and less unsolicited deals from networks when compared to a 
local VC firm. 
4.1.3. Relationship between VC knowledge and criteria for due diligence  
 According to our framework in Section 3.2, VC current knowledge and the 
intention to acquire knowledge (learning by doing) affect the VC due diligence 
process. One possible effect is weights on the criteria for due diligence. Though 
various factors such as the managerial quality, product quality, market potential and 
venture financial condition need to be considered in the due diligence process, 
weights on these criteria could be different for VC firms with different knowledge 
and learning motives. For example, a VC firm that intends to invest for long-term 
returns would be more concerned about the future growing ability of a venture even 
beyond the prospect of the IPO, the exit time for most VC firms. It would put a 
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greater weight on criteria such as “entrepreneurs to have aspiring vision for long-
term venture growth" than a VC without such a long-term perspective.   
In the context of comparison between foreign and local VC firms in 
emerging markets, we here only focus on the relationship between VC knowledge 
and management criteria that evaluate the quality of the venture management team.  
Before discussing the influence of VC knowledge, we first look at 
management criteria in details. Management criteria can be loosely divided into two 
types, criteria that are more difficult to judge such as the integrity and capability of 
the venture management team, and criteria that are that are relatively easy to judge 
such as good reputation and good track record of the management team. We call the 
former managerial quality and the latter managerial experience.  
While the two types of management criteria are related and the latter is often 
a reflection of the former (e.g., a capable entrepreneur normally can gain good 
reputation after some time), the latter is easier to judge in the management 
evaluation. It is easy to see whether the entrepreneur is experienced or not, but not 
easy to see whether he is capable or not in the short period of VC due diligence 
process, no matter how experienced the venture capitalists in charge of the 
evaluation are. One venture capitalist in the interview said, 
With people, something is not so obvious, especially in such a short 
courtship period. In the courtship, everything is rosy. It takes time after you 
work with the management team, and then the true colour will be shown. 
Therefore, practically, venture capitalists often rely on the managerial 
experience as main supporting evidences in the evaluation of the entrepreneur 
(Shane and Cable, 2002). 
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However, mere managerial experience is often insufficient for the 
management evaluation. While it can be of help to exclude some unqualified 
entrepreneurs (even though an entrepreneur with a record of venture failure may still 
be capable), many new entrepreneurs are without track record and reputation. Some 
of these ventures could nonetheless be promising with managerial help from VC 
investors. A VC firm armed with general knowledge therefore is unwilling to miss 
such opportunities since such a VC firm can largely make the investment decisions 
based on its sound judgment of the VC products (industry knowledge) and 
confidence in its managerial assistance to the venture (management knowledge). It is 
willing to invest without experienced entrepreneurs provided the venture team is 
capable and cooperative, which could be measured by the management quality. Thus 
it may lower the requirement on the managerial experience but not on the 
managerial quality.   
Since foreign VC firms enjoy advantages in the general knowledge in an 
emerging market, we expect foreign VC firms emphasizing less on the managerial 
experience though similar on managerial quality compared to local VC firms. 
On the other hand, local VC firms are relatively weak in general knowledge 
but strong in local knowledge and local networks. They may thus rely more on the 
good track record of entrepreneurs as evidences for their capabilities and trust in 
their capabilities for the venture success. They are less confident in the venture 
product itself due to their weakness in the general knowledge. One local venture 
capitalist gave following example to explain his view in the interview. 
Now a promising product, called vanilla ice cream, is the market favor. 
Later the market change, the market favor is chocolate ice cream. A good 
management team would realize the change and try to find the way making 
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the chocolate. An inexperienced management team may be good in making 
vanilla ice cream and is making better vanilla, but no one likes it any more. 
Thus entrepreneur's experience is more important than promising product 
and market.  
In this example, the venture capitalist saw the market change as something 
unpredictable, and the only chance of success is to follow the market change. A 
venture capitalist with better industry knowledge may take a different view. 
Furthermore, foreign VC firms often see the possibility of adding experienced team 
members into an inexperienced management team. One venture capitalist made 
following statement in the interview.  
Experience is not essential. It can be bought. However, we will recommend 
the injection of experienced team members if the original team is 
inexperienced. 
Therefore, we have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: In an emerging market, a foreign VC firm emphasizes less on 
the managerial experience of a venture management team compared to a 
local VC firm. 
 
4.2 VC Syndication Motives 
VC syndication, the co-investment of VC firms, is a prominent phenomenon 
in VC investment practice (Lerner, 1994). It is a special type of inter-firm alliances. 
Different from traditional joint ventures, syndication is a more loose form of 
alliances since neither separated new entity is formed nor long-term commitment is 
made, but it sometimes can generate lasting relationship through repeated 
syndication (Wright and Lockett, 2003).  
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Researchers on VC syndication have highlighted three main motives for VC 
firms to join syndication, namely, finance motive, resource-based motive, and deal 
flow motive8 (Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Lerner, 1994; Lockett and Wright, 2001). The 
deal flow motive is called deal reciprocity in this study to emphasize the deal 
exchange instead of deal itself in this motive.  
The finance motive of syndication is mainly risk sharing. Syndication is seen 
as a means of diversification, which reduces the VC capital investment in one deal. 
A VC firm often syndicates out an investment deal when the deal size is relatively 
large in comparison to the total size of its VC fund. Syndication enables the VC firm 
to gain access to more ventures and reduce its non-systematic risk (the risk 
associated with firm-specific factors) thereby. Thus the variation of VC return is 
reduced without the reduction of its expected return.  
Furthermore, due to the illiquidity of VC investment, VC firms face the 
difficulty of divesting a risky deal after making investment. Syndication thus 
provides a means of risk sharing that may help reduce overall VC investment risk 
(Lockett and Wright, 2001).   
Resource-based motive is mainly knowledge sharing based on the resource 
theory. From the resource perspective, syndication can reduce the VC non-
systematic risk through the information sharing among syndication partners in both 
the assessment stage (ex ante) and the monitoring stage (ex post). In the assessment 
stage, syndication provides valuable second opinions in the deal evaluation and thus 
reduces the possibility of making wrong investment decisions (Lockett and Wright, 
2001). In the monitoring stage, specialized expertise is often required when the 
                                                          
8 In some literature, deal flow motive is classified as one type of resource-based motive since deal 
flow can be seen as one type of resources. However, here we follow recent literature such as 
Manigart et al. (2002), and define the resource-based motive in its narrow sense (restricting resources 
to knowledge and information) to avoid possible conceptual confusion.   
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venture has reached some milestones in its growth (Sapienza, Manigart, and 
Vermeir, 1996). For example, when the venture starts exporting its product to new 
markets, professional marketing specialists may be required to help the venture 
management, which can improve its performance and reduce the risk. If this request 
for expertise cannot be met by the venture itself, it can be met by VC's own resource 
base or from external industry specialists such as professional consultants (Brander, 
Amit, and Antweiler, 2002). Syndication becomes valuable if the VC firm can 
obtain the expertise from its syndication partners, either directly or indirectly (i.e., 
through networks of its partners), which can save the cost of searching and hiring 
these industry specialists in the market. 
The deal reciprocity motive of syndication refers to the increase of VC 
access to deal flow through the exchange of syndicated deals. A steady flow of 
investment opportunities is essential for a VC firm. Sorensen and Stuart (2001) has 
shown that syndication is a powerful way to extend the geographical and industry 
investment scope of a VC firm. Bygrave (1987) has also noticed that VC firms could 
strengthen their ties with one another through repeated syndication and thus 
accumulate network resources. The deal reciprocity reduces VC performance 
fluctuation arising from firm-specific factors and extends VC networks (Lockett and 
Wright, 2001). 
To make syndication beneficial and impartial to each party, VC firms often 
practice repeated syndication by exchanging syndication opportunities with one 
another since syndication leaders normally contribute more to the venture success. A 
VC firm who serve as the leader in one syndicated deal may be invited by its 
syndication partners to join another syndication as a non-leader when its partner 
becomes the leader. Such deal exchanges normally are not legally binding and often 
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affected by partners' relationship. One venture capitalist in the interview gave 
following comment, 
One reason for syndication is to share deal flow with other investors. So 
when they invest in something, we have the access also. All these exchanges 
are very flexible, and there are no set ways or rules. 
Empirical studies in the West have generally shown that finance motive is 
more important than resource-based and deal reciprocity motive (e.g., Lockett and 
Wright (2001) on the U.K. market and Manigart et al. (2002) on the Western Europe 
market). In the context of emerging markets, our research interests are not only the 
relative importance of these motives, but also the effect of firm characteristics on 
these motives.  
From our framework in Section 3.2, syndication is a means for learning by 
observing, and we can easily see that both the resource-based and deal reciprocity 
motives are related to VC learning. Focusing on the foreign and local VC firm 
differences, foreign firms are strong in industry knowledge but weak in local 
knowledge and local networks. Thus we may expect foreign and local VC firms may 
be different in their resource-based and deal reciprocity motives when they join 
syndicates.  
 First we look at the resource-based motives. It is difficult to see overall 
knowledge and learning differences between foreign and local VC firms since both 
of them may have the desire to share and access to complementary knowledge in the 
syndication. However, when we further divide knowledge into industry knowledge, 
local knowledge, and other knowledge including finance and management 
knowledge, we can expect differences between them. Given the weakness of foreign 
VC firms in local knowledge, besides hiring local managers, they may choose 
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syndication with local VC firms to acquire the local knowledge. Especially when 
they are still not sure of the market prospects, co-investment provides a more 
flexible mechanism for them to "test the water" before entering the market with full 
strength. Thus we may expect foreign VC firms have stronger motive for local 
knowledge compared to local VC firms. 
On the other hand, local VC firms are relatively weak in industry knowledge. 
Thus similar we may expect the syndication motive for industry knowledge would 
be weaker for foreign VC firms when compared to that of local ones. As for other 
knowledge, i.e., management knowledge and finance knowledge, or seeking second 
opinion, the direction is less clear. For example, it is difficult to judge whether the 
learning desire of foreign VCs is stronger in management knowledge since foreign 
VCs are strong in general management knowledge but weak in local culture and 
management. Thus we do not explore it further. 
Second we look at deal reciprocity motives. It is clearly linked with VC's 
network building. Networks are more important in emerging markets compared to 
developed ones due to the weak legal and institutional environment there. VC firms 
have to rely more on networks for deal searching and venture monitoring. For VC 
firms weak in local networks, they would take the network building as one important 
strategy. They may more likely take syndication as a means to build-up its networks, 
and thus have stronger deal reciprocity motive. Since generally foreign VC firms are 
weak in local networks, they may make more efforts on network building, which are 
also helpful to acquire local knowledge. Therefore, we could hypothesize that a 
foreign VC firm would be more likely to join syndication for deal reciprocity 
compared to a local VC firm, while the latter may join a syndicate with foreign ones 
for other motives (e.g., risk sharing). 
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On the finance motives (risk sharing), we do not expect significant 
differences between foreign and local VC firms since the finance motive is largely 
determined by VC risk bearing ability, which is not much related to either firms' 
nationality or their knowledge and networks. Thus we do not explore further. 
To conclude above discussions, we have following hypothesis on VC 
syndication motives, which is further divided into three sub-hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 3a: In an emerging market, a foreign VC firm is more likely to 
join syndication for local knowledge compared to a local VC firm.  
Hypothesis 3b: In an emerging market, a foreign VC firm is less likely to join 
syndication for industry knowledge compared to a local VC firm.  
Hypothesis 3c: In an emerging market, a foreign VC firm is more likely to 
join syndication for deal reciprocity compared to a local VC firm.  
VC syndication frequency 
Besides the influence of VC learning on syndication motives, we further look 
at the effect of VC learning on the syndication frequency. Grant and Baden-Fuller 
(2004) proposes that the advantage of strategic alliances is more in the accessing 
rather than acquiring knowledge. It can explain the stability of some long-term 
alliances. In the VC context, given the repeated syndication among some VC firms, 
such reasoning is plausible. If this were true in the VC syndication context, we 
would expect no significant change in the VC syndication frequency when firm 
aging. A VC firm would continually syndicate, often with its regular partners, to 
access to some specific knowledge for the venture success. However, if the learning 
motive were more important than merely accessing to knowledge, then the VC firm 
might gradually learn the knowledge needed and thus would syndicate less when it 
aging.  
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In the context of emerging markets, we expect the learning motive is more 
important than the accessing. Local knowledge and networks are essential for a 
foreign VC firm to survive and grow in the local market. If the firm can acquire 
these knowledge and networks, certainly it is better than fully relying on its partners, 
which often affects the VC efficiency and performance. Steier and Greenwood 
(1995) gives an example how a promising venture eventually failed due to the low 
efficiency from the complex relationship among multiple co-investors. If the VC 
firm managed to acquire sufficient local knowledge and networks through past 
syndication as well as hiring locals and learning by doing, it would be gradually less 
interested in the syndication. Now in a syndicated deal, it has less to learn (mainly 
industry knowledge left) but more to lose either due to the low efficiency from the 
management of such a partner relationship or the possible leaking of its knowledge 
and thus its competitive advantage. Thus an old VC firm in the local market, 
regardless local or foreign, would syndicate less compared to younger ones. 
Another possible reason for young VC firms to syndicate is to overcome the 
liability of newness (Manigart et al., 2002). Syndication can expand the deal flow 
and networks beyond firms' natural boundaries (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Young 
VC firms may thus use syndication to increase their own standings and legitimacy in 
the VC community. To differentiate the learning effect and the liability of newness, 
we can use firms' total age as a control variable, and explore the effect of VC local 
age, defined as the history of the VC firm in the local market, on the syndication 
frequency. Thus we develop the following hypothesis accordingly. 
Hypothesis 4: In an emerging market, a VC firm with longer years of local 
experience would syndicate less frequently compared to a VC firm young in 
the local market after controlling for their total ages. 
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CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Sample 
We choose Singapore as the data setting due to three reasons. First, the VC 
market in Singapore is relatively large. Being a small city-state in Southeast Asia, 
Singapore is one of the regional financial centers. The Singapore VC industry started 
in 1983 when the first VC fund was set up with S$48m. With 20 years, the size of 
the VC pool had reached US$16b in 2004 with more than 100 VC firms, 500 VC-
supported companies and more than 80 IPOs, ranking the third in Asia Pacific 
region. The local VC industry has been viewed highly by the Singapore government 
and given many incentives for its development due to VC's role in supporting high-
tech SMEs (Gibbons et al., 1998). For example, in 1999, Singapore government set 
up a US$1b fund (Technopreneurship Investment Fund) to support local high-tech 
SMEs. The fund was subsequently managed by several leading local and foreign VC 
firms, some of which started their operations in Singapore due to the attraction of 
this fund (e.g., the Taiwan VC firm interviewed in Section 3.3).   
Second, there are various types of VC firms in Singapore, both local and 
foreign VC firms. Due to its limited pool of human and capital resources, Singapore 
has no restrictions on foreign talents or capital movement. Therefore, many 
American, European, and Japanese VC firms have chosen Singapore as the starting 
point of their overseas expanding, and later used it as a regional center of VC 
investment in Southeast Asia and, in some cases, for the whole Asia. One foreign 
venture capitalist in the interview praised Singapore government for its effort to help 
the VC industry, 
They have done so much, and I have not seen any other countries spending 
so much effort.  
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Besides the significant presence of international VC firms, local VC firms, 
either traditional independent VC firms or corporate VC firms established by cash-
rich large corporations for strategic purposes, are also very active in the Singapore 
VC market. 
Third, among emerging markets, the industry breadth of VC market in 
Singapore is relatively broad with a higher concentration in high-technology sectors 
(e.g., IT, electronics) (AVCJ, 1999). It is relatively closer to original VC roles in the 
West. Foreign VC firms could thus enjoy some advantages in their industry 
knowledge compared to local ones. All these make Singapore market a suitable 
empirical setting for the testing of our hypotheses in emerging markets.  
While Singapore itself is often be classified as a newly industrialized 
economy (e.g., Lockett and Wright, 2002), its market infrastructure is still much 
different from that of the West. As many Singapore VC firms actually invest in its 
less developed neighboring countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, it is reasonable 
to define the market as one emerging market. VC firms there would face the 
problem of the liability of foreignness. 
5.1.1. Data for case study 
To better understand the process of VC learning in an emerging market, we 
first conduct a case study among VC firms in Singapore. Case study is especially 
useful when the research subject is little known (Yin, 1994). There are few empirical 
studies on the VC learning (e.g., De Clercq and Sapienza, 2005), and fewer in the 
context of emerging markets. Though we have developed a framework from 
organization learning literature to describe the VC learning process, we need to get a 
deep understanding of the process and its interaction with firm characteristics. Thus 
we conduct a multiple case study for better chance of generalization (Eisenhardt, 
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1989b). It serves on both theory testing and theory building, and could provide 
directions for further study in this research topic. In the procedure of conducting 
case study, we closely follow the step suggested in Yin (1994). 
 The case study data were collected primarily from face to face interviews, 
and complemented with second-hand archive information such as press reports and 
website reports. VC industry is relatively not transparent, especially in emerging 
markets, where even the aggregated investment return data are difficult to obtain 
(AVCJ, 2003). Among the nine VC firms we interviewed, only five of them have 
company websites. Most websites are very simple with little information (e.g., brief 
firm background, CV of investment staff, contact address). Thus face to face 
interview is essential to explore the in-depth process of VC learning and the VC 
investment strategies. 
 The interviews were semi-structured so that the conversation could develop 
freely as well as allow in-depth inquiry into the nature of VC knowledge 
accumulation. The topics discussed in the interview covered the whole spectrum of 
the theoretical framework, from the VC learning process to its deal source, due 
diligence criteria, and syndication behaviors. The motive to start the VC firm as well 
as the performance was also touched in the interviews. The interview question list is 
attached in Appendix A1. Interviews last from 30 minutes to one hour, and all 
conversations except one9 were tape recorded and transcribed. The interview report 
draft was sent back to interviewees for proof reading. Some sensitive information is 
thus removed (thus some quotations in the thesis will not be found in the full 
interview report under the request of interviewees to protect their identities).    
                                                          
9 That firm (Firm J) has been interviewed twice, the one not recorded (with the Vice President for her 
personal reasons) provides some complementary information to the first one (with the Managing 
Director).  
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It is not possible to use triangulation (Eisenhardt, 1989b) in this study due to 
the small size of VC firms and the busy schedules of these venture capitalists. 
However, during the interviews, we ask more objective questions and often ask 
interviewees for concrete examples. Interviewees also knew that the research team 
could verify facts with other interviewed VC firms and did not dare to exaggerate 
their capabilities too much. Some even asked what other firms were interviewed 
before. Thus potential biases in the data could be reduced though the tendency of 
exaggerating VC capability may still exist and thus lowers the actual usage of VC 
learning. 
Additional questions were frequently used in the interview process to give 
flexibility and validity in the case study (Eisenhardt, 1989b). For example, when 
interviewees answered their syndication motives in general, they were often further 
asked about their motives in few particular IPO firms to explore their syndication 
behaviors in more details.  
Field notes were used in the interview process and helped both the data 
collection and data analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989b). These notes were often helpful to 
ask additional questions and guide the interview process.  
The research data are obtained in the following process. We first obtained 
some basic information about VC firms in Singapore. Information on a population 
of 136 local VC firms was obtained in 2005 from EDB (2002) as well as AVCJ 
(2003), the two primary sources of VC information in Singapore. Then we 
differentiated VC firms according to VC nationality and type10 [(foreign, local) X 
(independent, financial, corporate), total six groups], and sent requests for interviews 
to two or three sampled VC firms in each group through e-mails. Such grouping of 
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cases could improve the generality of the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Due to the 
low response rate (many interviewed venture capitalists were busy in travelling and 
could only set the interview date one or two weeks later), we often sent one more 
round of requests if getting no response from the first round. Finally we managed to 
interview nine VC firms. All interviews were conducted between October and 
December 2005.  
The detailed description of the VC firms is in Appendix A2 (However, we 
are only allowed to publish three of them in full length as the rest of them are not 
willing to release the detailed report lest others may guess their identities and know 
their strategies thereby). A short summary of the firm characteristics is presented in 
Table 1. Among the nine firms, two are corporate VC firms (Firm A and Firm C, 
both are subsidiaries of large foreign multinational corporations), one is financial 
VC firm (Firm E), and five are independent though two of them also link with 
financial institutions (Firm G and Firm J). One of them (Firm H) is not a typical VC 
firm (a business incubator) as the firm does not manage a fund. However, we put it 
into our analysis since it operates similar to a VC firm in many aspects (e.g., due 
diligence, co-investment) and its partners can easily become venture capitalists. On 
the firm nationality, there are four foreign VC firms (Firm A, Firm B, Firm C, and 
Firm G) (foreign VC firms are defined as VC firms whose major shareholders are 
foreign-based companies) and five locals. On firm age (based on local age), one is 
set up in 1980s, three in 1990s, and five in 2000s. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
10 Such division is reasonable as VC literature has shown differences among independent, finance-
affiliated (e.g., Wright and Robbie, 1996; Wang, Wang, and Lu, 2002), and corporate VC firms (e.g., 
Gompers and Lerner, 1999) as well as the foreign and local differences (Wright et al., 2002).    
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of Origin VC type 
Founding 
Year 





Firm A Europe Corporate 2001 Manager 1 
Firm B US Independent 1987 Managing Director 2 





Firm D Singapore Independent 1997 Managing Director 1 
Firm E Singapore Finance 1993 Vice president 2 
Firm F Singapore Independent 2004 Executive Director 2 
Firm G Europe Independent 2001 Advisor NA 
Firm H Singapore Incubator 2004 Business Head 1 






Compared to overall VC population in Singapore, the interview sample 
represents the overall population well by covering all types of VC firms and all ages. 
Though local corporate VC firm and foreign finance VC firm are not covered 
directly, Firm A can be seen partly local11, and Firm G is affiliated with a large 
European bank.  
 
                                                          
11 Firm A is a fifty-fifty joint venture between a foreign corporate VC firm and a local governmental 
VC firm. We define it foreign since the foreign partner plays more active role in the firm 
management.  
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Persons we interviewed are senior venture capitalists in the firm (such as 
Executive Director, Managing Director, Vice President, or Business Head), except 
for the case of Firm G, whose interviewee is an advisor and does not known the 
operation of the VC firm much. However, her personal experience with the firm 
could provide one aspect of the firm operation. For all other cases, interviewees have 
been with the firm for a long time and are knowledgeable about the firm 
evolvement. Six of them are the founder or one of co-founders of their respective 
VC firms, and most of them are ranked first or second in the firm. 
5.1.2. Data for investment decision process study 
For the study of VC investment decision process, we conducted 
questionnaire surveys to collect the relevant information. The study was conducted 
originally to investigate the VC investment decision process differences by VC type, 
but later we found it can be used for the testing of our knowledge and learning 
framework and we further conducted the syndication study to complement some 
shortcomings of this study.   
We first used items from literature such as MacMillan et al. (1985) and 
Muzyka et al. (1996) to make a draft questionnaire. Then in order to improve the 
survey quality and adjust to the local context, we managed to conduct extensive 
interviews with over thirty VC firms in Singapore. The questionnaire is modified 
according to the interview response and the final form is shown in Appendix B1. 
Mr. Nicolaus Wrede helped in the interviews process and the questionnaire design. 
Criteria for due diligence process are divided into three categories, namely, 
management, market /product, and finance. VC managers in the sample were asked 
to evaluate each criterion separately as well as the deal percentage from various deal 
sources. 
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The research data are obtained in the following process. We first obtained 
some basic information about VC firms in Singapore. Information on a population 
of 83 local VC firms was obtained in 1999 from EDB (1999) as well as AVCJ 
(1999), the two primary sources of VC information in Singapore. Through initial 
contacts and checking record with the Registry of Companies & Businesses (a 
government agency responsible for company registration in Singapore), among the 
83 VC firms, two companies were found to be merged, one moved to Hong Kong, 
three no longer conducting VC investments, and ten closed down. Thus the actual 
VC population in Singapore was 67 at the end of 1999 (excluding newly established 
VC firms in that year not reported by EDB or AVCJ). In November 1999, a 
questionnaire survey was sent to each of the 67 VC firms, targeting senior venture 
capitalists (such as Investment Director, Managing Director, Vice President, or 
Managing Partner), but only one reply was required from each VC firm. Within four 
months, we received 34 responses with a response rate of 51%, which is considered 
high for an empirical VC study. Response rates of similar studies like MacMillan et 
al. (1985) and MacMillan et al. (1987) are 68% and 30% respectively.  
We have also compared the firm specific characteristics of respondents with 
non-respondents, reported in AVCJ (1999) including the firm size, firm age, firm 
nationality (whether local or foreign), and firm type (whether independent or non-
independent). Non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test is used to measure the 
significance of non-respondent bias. The results are presented in Table 2.  
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 N Mean S.D. Z-score 
respondents 34 154.5 196 1.01 Firm size (S$ million) 
non-respondents 33 216.3 271  
Firm age (year)  respondents 34 7.9 4.8 0.35 
 non-respondents 25 7.4 4.2  
Firm nationality  










Firm type 34 0.32 0.47 0.34 
(independent 1, others 0) 
respondents  
non-respondents 33 0.36 0.49  
   
Note: Z-scores are derived from two-sided non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test 
to measure the median differences between two groups, and all are non-significant (p-
value >0.10). 
 
Table 2 shows that there are no significant differences between respondents 
and non-respondents in all firm specific characteristics. Thus we could believe that 
the non-response bias is not significant. The overall high response rates thus provide 
a fairly representative view on the VC investment behaviors in Singapore.  
Among the 34 participant VC firms, 17 are foreign VC firms, and the rest are 
local. Detailed information on these VC firms is presented in the following Table 3.  
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TABLE 3: Detailed information of sample on VC investment decision process 
Country of 
origin 
Firm type (independent 
1, others 0) 
Local age Size (S$ million) 
UK 1 5 35 
Singapore 0 10 5 
Vietnam 1 8 35 
Japan 0 10 750 
Singapore 1 17 350 
USA 0 5 75 
Japan 1 5 350 
Australia 0 5 35 
Europe 0 4 150 
Singapore 0 7 35 
Singapore 0 19 5 
Japan 0 5 35 
Japan 0 18 35 
Singapore 0 4 5 
USA 1 3 350 
Singapore 0 3 35 
Singapore 0 19 350 
Singapore 0 10 150 
Singapore 0 13 350 
Singapore 0 4 35 
Singapore 0 11 75 
Singapore 0 6 27 
Japan 0 10 35 
USA 0 6 150 
Philippines 1 4 35 
Singapore 0 4 75 
Europe 0 2 350 
Singapore 0 3 75 
Singapore 0 6 5 
USA 1 12 150 
Europe 1 9 5 
Singapore 0 8 35 
Singapore 1 11 750 
France 1 5 150 
 
Note: The two Philippine and Vietnam VC firms are actually organized by foreign VC 
investors to invest in these two countries, the Singapore offices are more for the purpose of 
fund raising. Their exact origins are not sure. However, it is safe to define them as foreign 
firms.    
 
Among the 17 foreign VC firms, all non-independent firms are finance-
affiliated. For 17 local firms, seven are finance-affiliated and eight corporate ones. 
The average age of the 34 VC firms is 7.9 year. Among the 34 responses, three 
responses lacked information on investment deal source (one foreign and two local) 
and thus not suitable for the analysis of Hypothesis 1. One response lacked the 
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information on criteria for due diligence (one local) and thus not suitable for the 
analysis of Hypothesis 2. Thus the useable sample size for Hypothesis 1 and 2 is 31 
and 33 respectively. 
5.1.3. Data for syndication study 
For the study of VC syndication motivation, we similarly conducted 
questionnaire surveys to collect the relevant information. We mainly used a 
questionnaire developed by Lockett and Wright, which has been used in the U.K. 
(Lockett and Wright, 2001; Wright and Lockett, 2003) and the Continent Europe 
(Manigart et al., 2002). Before the survey, we managed to interview ten VC firms to 
adjust to the local context. The interview covered a wide spectrum of VC investment 
practices. Detailed on the ten VC firms can be found in Wang (2002). Among the 
ten VC firms, five are local and the rest are foreign ones. We will sometimes quote 
from this field study in the discussion of interview results to provide more details.  
The questionnaire is slightly modified according to the interview response 
and the final form is presented in Appendix B2. Issues we investigated are motives 
for VC firms to join syndication as well as the criteria for the selection of 
syndication partners. VC managers in the sample were asked to evaluate the 
importance of each factor. 
The research data are obtained in the following process. We first obtained 
some basic information about VC firms in Singapore. Information on a population 
of 136 local VC firms was obtained in 2003 from EDB (2002) as well as AVCJ 
(2003), the two primary sources of VC information in Singapore. We mailed our 
questionnaire to target senior venture capitalists of all 136 VC firms in Singapore in 
February 2003. Of the 136 questionnaires, 5 were undeliverable, and 14 firms 
replied that they were no longer active in VC investment. Thus our effective sample 
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pool consisted of only 117 VC firms in Singapore. Within three months, we received 
40 responses with a response rate of 34%. A few months later, we obtained five 
more responses. Excluding eight responses which were lack of syndication 
experience and thus not usable for this study, the useable sample size is 37 and the 
useable response rate is 32%, which is acceptable for an empirical VC study. 
Response rates of similar Manigart et al. (2002)'s study vary from 36% to 59% 
across different European countries. We have also compared the firm specific 
characteristics of respondents with non-respondents, reported in AVCJ (2003) such 
as firm size, and found no significant differences. Thus we could believe that the 
non-response bias is not significant in this study. This study may thus provide a 
fairly representative view on the VC syndication behaviors in Singapore. 
Among the 37 participant VC firms, 21 are foreign VC firms, and 16 are 
local. Detailed information on these VC firms is presented in the following Table 4. 
Here VC total age is defined as the VC's operating years from its founding, and local 
age as its operating years in the local market (i.e., Singapore market). In the 
syndication study, VC size are measured by number of investment managers in the 
VC firm instead of the VC fund size as there are two missing values for the latter, 
and the two measures are significantly correlated with correlation 0.39 (p-
value<0.05). 
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TABLE 4: Detailed information of sample on VC syndication 
     
Country of 
origin 
Firm type (independent 
1, others 0) 
Total age Local age Size (No. of 
managers) 
Europe 0 9 3 1 
Singapore 1 19 19 17 
USA 1 23 4 80 
UK 0 55 6 73 
Singapore 1 14 14 5 
Singapore 1 3 3 5 
USA 0 15 15 18 
Singapore 0 10 10 3 
Europe 0 11 6 13 
Singapore 1 2 2 2 
Singapore 0 4 4 3 
Europe 1 7 6 12 
Singapore 1 6 6 19 
Taiwan 1 8 3 10 
Singapore 1 2 2 3 
Singapore 0 3 3 4 
USA 0 7 4 4 
Taiwan 1 3 3 15 
UK 1 28 1 10 
UK 1 57 7 7 
Europe 1 7 8 6 
Singapore 0 22 10 80 
USA 1 13 4 5 
Singapore 1 20 20 12 
Singapore 1 13 6 2 
USA 1 8 3 16 
Japan 0 13 13 4 
Singapore 1 5 5 1 
Singapore 0 14 14 4 
Japan 1 13 13 4 
Taiwan 1 13 3 19 
Canada 1 11 3 9 
Europe 0 4 4 1 
USA 1 18 17 22 
USA 0 14 3 1 
Singapore 1 1 1 6 
Singapore 1 14 14 5 
 
Among the eight foreign non-independent VC firms, five are finance-
affiliated and three are corporate ones. For five local non-independent VC firms, one 
is finance-affiliated and four are corporate ones. The average total age of the 37 VC 
firms is 13.2 year, and the average local age is 7.1 year.  
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5.2 Measures for Investment Decision Process Study 
5.2.1. Measures for VC deal sources  
Due to the scarcity of VC literature on deal sources, we derive measures 
solely based on the interview feedback. Seven categories are summarized from 
various sources suggested during the pre-survey interview. They are 1) 
entrepreneurs themselves, 2) intermediaries, 3) VC's parent organizations or 
shareholders, 4) ventures supported by the VC firm, 5) active searching using VC's 
contacts, 6) entrepreneurs known by the VC firm, and 7) invited for syndication. 
Each VC firm is asked to give the percentage of their potential deals from each 
category. In the survey VCs are asked to give sources other than the seven 
categories, but only four VCs provides the percentage (at most 10%) and only one 
named the category (advisory, can be seen as one type of intermediaries). Thus we 
can believe the seven categories include most deal sources. 
 These seven categories can be further combined into four types, solicited 
deals, unsolicited market, unsolicited networks, and intermediary. Category One is 
entrepreneurs themselves, i.e., entrepreneurs not known by the VC. It is clear that 
deal from entrepreneurs is unsolicited, and is also from the market since there is not 
any direct or indirect relationship between the VC firm and entrepreneurs before the 
investment. It can serve as a measure of VC reputation since more reputable VC 
firms may attract more entrepreneurs approaching them directly.  
Category Two clearly belongs to intermediary. In VC market, there are some 
intermediaries such as brokers and consulting firms serving both the investees and 
investors as bridges between the two sides, and earning commissions by introducing 
deals. Deals introduced by intermediaries normally are more reliable but also costly. 
Though we can also view deals from intermediaries as the market, here we 
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differentiate it from deals from entrepreneurs directly due to above differences. Also 
deals from intermediaries can be either solicited or unsolicited, so it is better to leave 
them in one separated category.     
Category Three, Four, Six and Seven can be classified as unsolicited 
networks due to the presence of VC's related parties (i.e., companies within 
networks of the VC firm) in helping the deal introduction. In Category Three, the 
related party is VC's parent organizations or shareholders. In Category Four, the 
related party is ventures already supported by the VC firm, which introduced the 
new venture deal to the VC firm. In Category Six, the related party is entrepreneurs 
already known by the VC firm. In Category Seven, the related party is other VC 
firms within the VC network since syndication is an important mechanism for VCs 
to share risk, knowledge or deals among firms they know (Lockett and Wright, 
2001).  
Category Five belongs to the solicited deals. In deals by own search, a VC 
firm may use its various contacts and networks to search for deals. However, 
different from deals from unsolicited networks or markets where the VC firm 
passively obtains deals, here the VC firm knows what it needs (e.g., a specific 
industry, region or stage) and are actively searching for deals meeting its criteria.  
As the result of above discussion, we can define four variables, Market, 
Intermediary, Networks, and Solicited, accordingly. Variable Market is defined as 
the percentage deal from Category One. Variable Intermediary is defined as the 
percentage deal from Category Two. Variable Networks is defined as the aggregated 
percentage of deals from Category Three, Four, Six and Seven, and variable 
Solicited is defined as the percentage deal from Category Five.  
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 5.2.2. Measures for VC due diligence criteria 
In the survey, we use ten items as criteria to evaluate venture management 
team in the due diligence process. They are derived from literature and modified 
according to pre-survey interview responses. In Macmillan et al. (1985), there are 
six items on entrepreneur personality and experience found important (means greater 
than 3). They are capable of sustained intense effort, able to evaluate and react to 
risk well, articulate in discussing venture, thoroughly familiar with the market 
targeted by venture, leadership ability in the past, and the relevant track record. 
Criteria on the teamwork and balanced team members also appeared in Macmillan et 
al. (1985). Later in Hall and Hofer (1993) when largely repeating Macmillan et al. 
(1985)'s criteria, there is a new item "management commitment" though essentially 
it is similar to "capable of sustained intense effort" in Macmillan et al. (1985). 
Muzyka et al. (1996) further adds an item "organizational relation". Based on these 
eight criteria, we conducted pre-survey interview to test the validity of these criteria 
as well as ask for other criteria they use. 
Interview feedback helped us to add and modify these items. Finally we 
design ten items as the measure for management criteria. The first item "integrity" is 
added as most interviewees view this criterion as extremely important. Perhaps this 
reflects the influence of eastern culture on the requirement of entrepreneurs. The 
second item "motivation and commitment" is developed from "management 
commitment" in Hall and Hofer (1993) and "capable of sustained intense effort" in 
Macmillan et al. (1985) to include both the desire and the action of the 
entrepreneurs. 
The third item "vision and business idea" and fifth item "strategic thinking & 
management" are summarized from interview feedback. They are similar to 
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"articulate in discussing venture" in Macmillan et al. (1985) but provide more 
detailed information and differentiate the venture idea from strategies for venture 
success. The fourth item "standing to competitor" is similar to "thoroughly familiar 
with the market targeted by venture" in Macmillan et al. (1985) but put more 
emphasis on the competitive advantage of the venture in the market.  
The rest five items are largely based on the literature. The sixth one 
"teamwork & complement" is from Macmillan et al. (1985). The seventh item "track 
record & experience" is similar to "relevant track record" in Macmillan et al. (1985). 
The eighth one "leadership & HR skills" is similar to "leadership ability in the past" 
in Macmillan et al. (1985) but now including HR skills. The management of human 
resources are more emphasized in the Asian context. Later in our case study, one 
venture capitalist made such a statement to show the importance of the internal 
relationship in the founding team.  
The most difficult problem to solve is the problem within the management 
team. For example, there are two founders in a venture, and now they are 
fighting with each other. Once there is internal fighting, it is very difficult to 
solve, and we have to write-off the investment. 
The ninth item "risk awareness & control" is close to "able to evaluate and 
react to risk well" in Macmillan et al. (1985), and the tenth one "organizational 
relation" is same as "organizational relation" in Muzyka et al. (1996).  
The ten items are quite inclusive of management criteria in the due diligence 
process. It covers more items compared to previous literature. In the later survey, 
there are not any new items suggested by responders. In the survey, VC managers 
provide their evaluation on these criteria with Likert scales, ranging from 1 ("poor") 
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to 5 ("excellent"). The ten items are widely used since the average of each item is 
more than 3. 
 To test Hypothesis 2, we need to develop measures for VC investment 
criteria on the managerial experience and the managerial quality. Factor analysis is 
used to derive these variables from the multiple items reported in the survey since 
we do not have direct literature reference to differentiate these two types of criteria 
on venture management team. We conduct factor analysis on ten items for the 
evaluation of management team, and the result is presented in Table 5. Three factors 
whose eigenvalues are greater than one (the normal practice in factor analysis) are 
loaded. As these factors account for 65% of observed variance in the data and the 
KMO measure is 0.60, the factor analysis is deemed valid.     
TABLE 5: Factor analysis on criteria for venture management evaluation 
 









Integrity  0.681 -0.042 0.393 
Motivation & commitment 0.234 0.332 0.805 
Vision & business idea 0.748 0.223 0.029 
Standing to competitor 0.734 0.460 -0.097 
Strategic thinking & 
management 
0.142 0.830 -0.058 
Teamwork & complement 0.243 0.485 -0.132 
Track record & experience -0.169 -0.238 0.783 
Leadership & HR skills 0.766 -0.027 -0.093 
Risk awareness & control -0.153 0.775 0.078 
Organizational relation 0.530 0.658 -0.023  
Note: This table reports the factor analysis result for venture management criteria. There are 
total ten items used to measure criteria used by venture capitalists for the evaluation of 
venture management team. Three factors whose eigenvalues are greater than one are loaded. 
The sample comprises 33 Singapore VC firms. Boldface values indicate item loading from 
their respective factors. 
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The first two of the three components derived from factor analysis are quite 
close conceptually, for both components are the descriptions of the quality of 
management team but often difficult to measure. The emphasis of the first 
component is more on the personal capability of the entrepreneur, his integrity, 
vision, position in the market, and so on. The second is more on his capability in 
relation management, his team relationship, risk control (strategic thinking in this 
group perhaps due to the relation factor in the vision execution), etc. Here we can 
take the combination of the two components as the measure for "managerial quality" 
in Hypothesis 2 for simplicity. Reliability analysis reports Cronbach Alpha of 0.79 
for this component, which supports its internal consistency.  
The third component is different from the first two. It includes two items, 
motivation & commitment, and track record & experience. The relationship between 
the two items is not so obvious. Perhaps a less experienced entrepreneur needs to 
show more commitment to convince the investors. Reliability analysis reports 
Cronbach Alpha of 0.89 for this component, which supports its internal consistency. 
Both items are relatively easy to evaluate by venture capitalists, and can be seen as a 
measure for the likelihood of venture success if the venture capitalist actually cannot 
judge the internal capability of the entrepreneurs and the prospect of the venture 
product. Thus we could take this component as a measure for criteria "managerial 
experience".  
After the factor analysis, we average item scores by each VC firm for the two 
components and derive the value of two variables, Managerial quality and 
Managerial experience respectively. 
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5.3. Measures for Syndication Study 
5.3.1. Constructs for syndication motives 
For the testing of Hypothesis 3 on VC syndication, we similarly need to 
develop measures on VC syndication motives.  
In this study, multiple items from Lockett and Wright (2001) are used to 
measure the syndication motives of VC firms with slight adjustment based on pre-
survey interviews. A few items shown not important in interviews are removed such 
as "the generation of fee income for putting deal together" and "not syndicating the 
deal would lead to the creation of a subsidiary company". VC managers were asked 
to evaluate the importance of these items using Likert scales, ranging from 1 ("not 
important at all") to 5 ("very important"). These items are quite inclusive of 
syndication motives as there are not any new items suggested by responders in the 
later survey. 
In the survey, we investigate the motives of syndication similar to Lockett 
and Wright (2001)'s study in the U.K. VC syndication motives are measured by two 
sets of items. The first set of items measures motives to syndicate out deals (as the 
leader), and the second set measures motives to join syndication as the non-leader. 
Similar to Lockett and Wright (2001), we measure the finance, resource-based, and 
deal reciprocity motives with items in the first set (See Table 6). 
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TABLE 6: Items used to construct syndication motives (as the leader) 
How important are the following factors in influencing your decision to syndicate deals? 
(Please rate from 1 to 5, 1 = very unimportant  ... 5 = very important)
Finance motive: 
The large size of the deal in proportion to the size of funds available (large size to 
fund) 
The large size of the deal in proportion to the firm’s average deal size  (large size to 
average deal) 
The large size of the deal in proportion to the largest deal previously undertaken by 
your firm as a sole investment (large size to past large deal) 
The requirement for additional rounds of financing (additional funding) 
To diversify a high degree of specific risk associated with the deal (share deal risk)  
 
Resource-base motive 
The deal is outside the investment stage(s) in which you usually invest (out of stage) 
The deal is outside the industries in which you usually invest (out of industry) 
The deal is located outside of the geographical region(s) in which you usually invest 
(out of region)  
The deal is in a foreign country (foreign country) 
The need for VC's expertise due to the difficulty of finding industry experts from 
outside (industry expertise) 
The need to access specific skills in order to manage the investment (specific skills) 
The need to seek the advice of other venture capital firms before investing (second 
opinion) 
 
Deal reciprocity motive 
The possibility of the future reciprocation of deals (future deal reciprocation) 
The reciprocation of past deal flow (deal reciprocation) 
 
Note: This table reports the items used to measure VC syndication motives as the leader. 
Total fourteen items are categorized to three groups (finance, resource-based, and deal 
reciprocity) according to literature. Short names in brackets are later used in Table 7 and the 
body text to save space.   
 
The result of factor analysis is presented in Table 7. Five factors whose 
eigenvalues are greater than one are loaded. As these factors account for 79% of 
observed variance in the data and the KMO measure is 0.54, the factor analysis is 
deemed valid. 
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Large size to fund -0.13 0.87 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 
Large size to average 
deal 
0.22 0.86 0.16 0.13 -0.04 
Large size to past 
large deal 
0.34 0.40 0.25 0.72 0.04 
Additional funding 0.02 0.92 -0.14 0.02 0.02 
Share deal risk 0.21 -0.23 0.01 0.84 0.15 
Out of stage 0.75 -0.14 0.09 0.23 -0.09 
Out of industry 0.82 0.06 0.11 0.17 -0.01 
Out of region 0.71 0.17 -0.02 0.27 0.27 
Foreign country 0.66 0.11 0.18 -0.20 0.53 
Industry expertise 0.84 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 0.27 
Specific skills 0.65 0.13 0.18 0.24 -0.30 
Second opinion 0.05 -0.15 0.12 0.20 0.82 
Deal reciprocation 0.11 -0.12 0.94 0.08 0.03 
Future deal 
reciprocation 
0.17 0.02 0.93 0.06 0.14 
 
Note: This table reports the factor analysis result for syndication motives as leaders. The full 
name of each item can be found in Table 6. Five factors whose eigenvalues are greater than 
one are loaded. The sample comprises 37 Singapore VC firms. Boldface values indicate 
item loading from their respective factors. 
 
The factor analysis shows support to our classification. Though there are five 
factors loaded, we can find that conceptually Component 2 and Component 4 are 
very close. The former is more related to the VC funding limit, and the latter is more 
on risk sharing, but both is related to finance motives. Similarly, Component 1 and 
Component 5 are close. The former is related to resource-based motives by 
accessing to complementary resources (industry knowledge, local knowledge or 
management knowledge), and the latter is for second opinion, also a kind of 
knowledge sharing.  Component 3 is different from other components and is a 
measure of deal reciprocity motives. Thus we combine Component 1 and 
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Component 5 together to derive the measure for resource-based motives, and 
Component 2 and Component 4 together to derive the measure for finance motives. 
The reliability analysis also supports our classification. The internal 
consistency of the three scales is high with Cronbach Alpha of 0.67 for finance 
motives (5 items), 0.83 for resource-based motives (7 items), and 0.92 for deal 
reciprocity motives (2 items), indicating that our measures are reliable. For each 
component, the items are averaged to obtain the value of three variables, Finance, 
Resource-based, and Deal reciprocity for each VC firm.  
5.3.2. Constructs for industry knowledge and local knowledge 
Items in the second set to measure syndication motives as non-leaders are 
presented in Table 8.  
TABLE 8: Items used to measure syndication motives (as the non-leader) 
 
How important are the following factors in influencing your decision to join a syndicate 
as a non-leader? 
(Please rate from 1 to 5, 1 = very unimportant  ... 5 = very important)
The deal is in an industrial sector in which you perceive yourself to have a 
specialization (industry specialization) 
The deal is outside the industrial sectors in which you usually invest (outside industry) 
The deal is at an investment stage in which you perceive yourself to have a 
specialization (stage specialization) 
The deal is outside the investment stages in which you usually invest (outside stage) 
The deal is located within the geographical region(s) in which you usually invest 
(region specialization) 
The deal is located outside the geographical region(s) in which you usually invest 
(outside region) 
To gain experience of a particular industry / sector (industry learning) 
To gain experience of a particular geographical region (region learning)  
The fit of the deal in terms of your portfolio of investments (portfolio fit) 
The investment time-scale envisaged (time fit) 
The likely demand for additional finance (additional funding) 
The financial terms of the deal (deal terms) 




Note: This table reports the items used to measure VC syndication motives as a non-leader. 
There are total thirteen items used. Short names in brackets are later used in the body text to 
save space.   
  
Items here can similarly construct some variables to measure syndication 
motives. However, they are largely repetitive works. Here we are more interested in 
developing measures for different types of knowledge within resource-based 
motives since Hypothesis 3 is related to VC industry knowledge and local 
knowledge.  
Among the seven items related to resource-based motives in Table 6, "out of 
industry" and "industry expertise" are conceptually more related to the industry 
knowledge, and "out of region" and "foreign country" are more related to the local 
knowledge. Among the rest three items, "out of stage" and "specific skills" are more 
related to the management knowledge, and "second opinion" is a general item for 
knowledge sharing. However, using two items to measure a variable is often weak 
(unless they are very close and different from others, such as the two items for deal 
reciprocity motives). Thus we look at items in the measure of VC syndication 
motives as the non-leader to improve the measures for the industry knowledge and 
the local knowledge.  
Among the items in Table 8, items related to VC knowledge conceptually 
include "industry specialization", "outside industry", "stage specialization", "outside 
stage", "region specialization", "outside region", "industry learning", and "region 
learning". Focusing on the learning of industry and local knowledge, we can see 
items "outside industry" and "industry learning" are related to acquiring the industry 
knowledge through syndication, and items "outside region" and "region learning" 
are related to acquiring the local knowledge. Thus we finally derive variable 
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Industry knowledge from four items, namely, "out of industry" and "industry 
expertise" in Table 6, and "outside industry" and "industry learning" in Table 8. 
Similarly, variable Local knowledge is derived from four items, "out of region" and 
"foreign country" in Table 6, and "outside region" and "region learning" in Table 8.   
Reliability analysis provides further support for our classification. The 
internal consistency of the two scales is high with Cronbach Alpha of 0.78 for 
industry knowledge, and 0.73 for local knowledge, indicating that our measures are 
reliable. For each component, the items are averaged to obtain the value of variable 
Industry knowledge and Local knowledge for each VC firm. 
 
 79
CHAPTER 6 RESULTS FROM INTERVIEW STUDY 
6.1 Learning Process of VC Firms 
In analyzing the data, we used several procedures suggested by Eisenhardt 
(1989b) and Yin (1994). First we conducted within-case analysis to identify 
knowledge bases of the nine cases and learning mechanisms they used. Then we 
conducted cross-case comparison to observe the linkage between the learning 
mechanism and firm characteristics and how VC knowledge and learning affect its 
investment behaviours. 
In within-case analysis, we summarize the VC firm knowledge from 
interview report and the learning mechanisms mentioned in the interviews. A 
mechanism not mentioned does mean it is never used, but at least it is less important 
than mentioned ones in that VC firm. Summary of within-case analysis is presented 
in Table 9.  
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Firm A good good insufficient good 1, 4 
Firm B good good good insufficient 2, 4 
Firm C good good insufficient good 4 
Firm D good good good good 2, 3 
Firm E insufficient insufficient good good*   3, 4 
Firm F insufficient good good good 2, 3 
Firm G NA NA good NA 2 
Firm H good good good good* 2 
Firm J insufficient Insufficient good good 1, 2, 4 
 
Note: Learning mechanisms are denoted in numbers, 1 for learning by joint venture, 2 for 
learning by hiring, 3 for learning by doing, and 4 for learning by observing. On the initial 
local knowledge, “good*” means good local knowledge restricted in Singapore market. 
Information on Firm G is not sufficient to judge its knowledge quality.  
 
Then we look at how four learning mechanisms are used in these nine 
interviewed firms in cross case analysis, and analyze how their initial knowledge 
and networks as well as other firm characteristics affect their learning mechanisms.  
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6.1.1. Learning by joint venture 
From the interview report, Firm A and Firm J started as a joint venture and 
thus these two firms used this learning mechanism. Now we further analyze their 
motives. 
Firm A is a small corporate VC firm (with only one full-time staff), and its 
operation relies much on its partners (Corporation W and governmental VC firm Y), 
particularly Corporation W. It looks more like the jointed effort of two parties rather 
than an autonomous entity. The Manager gave one example in the interview,  
For each potential deal, we set up a working committee including people 
from both partners, normally two or three persons. People from related 
business units in Corporation W often play the crucial role. They look at the 
technical side, the industry, the market, etc. People from Company Y focus 
on the financial side and help in deal structuring.  
Firm A possesses good industry and management knowledge inherited from 
Corporation W. It can even draw management and local knowledge from local 
subsidiaries of Corporation W given its extensive global networks. The Manager 
mentioned its deal in Korea,  
On industry side, we can also rely on the local subsidiary of Corporation W 
in Korea. It can help in industry and local knowledge.  
However, as a corporate venture arm, Firm A sees its weakness in finance 
knowledge, and here is the contribution of its joint venture partner Y. The Manager 
said,  
Company Y is more experienced in the venture investment with a broad 
industrial perspective. It is also experienced in deal structuring and financial 
management of the venture. All these can complement what we lack. 
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Here we can see the benefit of learning by joint venture. One can access to 
the knowledge and networks of another firm by relatively low cost. However, the 
Manager also shared the disadvantage of the joint venture,  
One major problem is bureaucracy. People from different backgrounds often 
have different investment objectives, and it takes much time for them to reach 
a consensus. Such bureaucracy often slows down the decision process and 
makes the VC firm's operation less efficient.  
On the other side, Firm J took a different approach in learning by joint 
venture. As a joint venture of three sponsors, Firm J can be seen as the expansion of 
Sponsor II since the founder was from Sponsor II and in charge of its acquisition 
activities, and other two sponsors have own VC subsidiaries. Being a large 
diversified corporation, Sponsor II chose learning by joint venture to gain entry to 
VC industry. It got the help of other two sponsors on fund-raising and VC expertise. 
However, Firm J operates as an independent entity from Day One, and its sponsors 
are less influential compared to Firm A, possibly to avoid the conflict of interests 
with VC firms related to its two Sponsors. It took the route of independence to 
gradually develop its own competitive advantage, especially later focuses on 
outsourcing service providers across different industries in Asia. Vice President of 
Firm J said, 
We do our daily investment activities such as due diligence all by ourselves. 
Most of our investment staffs are recruited from the market except the 
founder, who was with Sponsor II before. However, normally the three 
sponsors would have one or two representatives sitting in our investment 
committee, and have the right of final deal approval. 
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 In the case of both Firm A and Firm J, learning by joint venture is for quick 
access to complementary resources (financial knowledge for Firm A, VC expertise 
for Firm J) in its initial days. For the joint venture to be successful, the initiator 
should possess distinctive resources to attract its partners (industry leader for 
Corporation W in the case of Firm A, extensive business networks for Sponsor II in 
the case of Firm J). Thus we develop following proposition from the study of two 
cases. 
Proposition 1: The learning mechanism of learning by joint venture is more 
likely to be used when its initiators possess distinctive resources but lack 
complementary resources owned by its partners.  
6.1.2. Learning by hiring 
Learning by hiring is a more popular learning mechanism in the VC learning 
process. Firm B, Firm D, Firm F, Firm G, Firm H, and Firm J have used this 
mechanism based on the interview report. We can further distinguish two different 
patterns in their learning by hiring.  
The first pattern is simply hiring from the market. It is often applicable to a 
reputable VC firm that can afford the high cost of hiring experienced venture 
capitalists. Firm B was started by a local with VC investment experience in the US, 
and it continues its growth by hiring capable venture capitalists from various sectors. 
The experience of its Director is also an example as he said, 
With engineering background, I had involved with VC investment in the US, 
subsequently served as a high-level manager in large local companies, and 
later co-founded a local start-up till its IPO (it was supported by Firm B 
also). After liquidating my shares, I was invited by Firm B to be a partner.  
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Similarly, Firm G hired a specialist in supply chain management (an ex-
managing director) to help its two portfolio companies. Firm J also hired capable 
investment managers from the market. The experience of its Vice President (ex-
investment manager in a large corporation, specialized in IT outsourcing) is another 
example. The experience of T (founder of Firm F) with US VC firm N (T's former 
employer, then T was an ex-manager and government officer) also follows this 
pattern. 
 In all these cases, the VC firm first senses the lack of one specific 
knowledge (Firm B and Firm N in local knowledge, Firm G in supply chain 
management, Firm J in IT outsourcing), and then hire experts from the market. 
Though the cost of such hiring is high, they are willing to pay for the success of their 
firms.  
The second pattern is hiring through networks. Firm D is small since it "does 
not manage others' money", but it managed to have 16 partners help its investment 
activities. Firm F is a small VC firm without institutional support, but the Director 
left a consultant company for it being a long-time friend of founder T. Firm H is 
even smaller but the Head still got a few experienced partners to help. Both Firm D 
and Firm H use partnership structure to let partners keep most income from their 
investment activities instead of paying salaries to them.  
In both patterns of learning by hiring, all firms are independent and thus can 
provide attractive remuneration package (normally certain percentage of profit 
sharing, called carrier in VC industry) to people they hired. In the pattern hiring 
through networks, these firms are smaller and the personal characters of founders 
become important factor to attract people, but the profit sharing part is still 
important. However, a less reputable firm would face difficulties in hiring 
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experienced people. Furthermore, VC firms affiliated with large corporations or 
institutions are often constrained in their remuneration package12, and thus learning 
by hiring practically becomes infeasible for them. This may explain why Firm A and 
Firm J started as joint venture instead of hiring venture capitalists from the market 
(later Firm J became and successful, and thus can hire from the market). Thus we 
develop following proposition.  
Proposition 2: The learning mechanism of learning by hiring is more likely 
to be used when the VC firm or the founder is not only reputable, but also 
can provide generous remuneration packages, often in the form of profit 
sharing, to attract experienced investment managers.  
6.1.3. Learning by doing 
Learning by doing is a common learning mechanism in the VC learning 
process since all VC firms can learn something from their investment experiences. 
Here we are more interested in its relative importance in the VC learning. In our 
interviews, Firm B, Firm D, Firm E and Firm F touched the issue of learning by 
doing, and we can also recognize two different patterns.  
First is the learning in fast changing technologies, mainly the learning of 
industry knowledge. The Director of Firm B said,  
After becoming a venture partner, I can see a lot of ideas in my daily work 
and learn new things every day.  
The Director is an experienced manager and entrepreneur, and he continues 
his learning in his daily works since Firm B focuses itself in high-tech industries that 
are growing very fast. Similarly, partners in Firm D are experienced managers but 
still learn to catch up the trend. The Managing Director of Firm D said,  
                                                          
12 All interviewed VC managers asked not to release their compensation packages, but it is clear that 
all non-independent VC firms do not have carriers for investment managers.  
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 I am the kind of guy who is still very keen to learn more. A lot of my 
partners are like that, still very charged. Many of them found the need to do 
something with intellectual challenge after retirement, and decided to join 
us. 
Second is the learning of VC investment practice, particularly for 
inexperienced venture capitalists. Firm E is a finance-affiliated VC firm without 
much investment experiences in the private equity, and its managers rely more on 
learning by doing. The Manager shared one example in the interview, 
 There were seven shareholders in one start-up, and the venture eventually 
failed because each shareholder does not have significant shares. When 
there was a problem, two executives who run the company only had 10% to 
15% shares each, and thus were not motivated to solve the problem. Those 
interested in turning the company around were not motivated either given 
their limited potential gain. I learned from this experience that venture 
managers should hold sufficient shares.  
Through one failed venture, the Manager learned not to make the same 
mistake again. Firm F is a young VC firm and its staffs except the founder are not 
very experienced in the VC investment. Its Director saw the importance of learning 
by doing, 
When you are to make an investment decision, you talk to internal people, do 
own research, talk to your networks, and even talk to possible investors. 
Through all these, you learn much more, and finally you can feel 
comfortable to make the decision. 
As a summary of above two patterns, we develop a proposition as follows. 
Proposition 3: The learning mechanism of learning by doing is more 
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important for inexperienced VC firms or VC firms facing fast changing 
environment (e.g., high technology industries).  
6.1.4. Learning by observing 
Learning by observing is also a common practice in the VC learning process. 
Almost all VC firms participate in syndication though may have different motives. 
Most of them tend to be the leader or co-leader in syndicated deals except Firm E, 
but normally they expect the contribution of partners more than money.  
Looking in details, Firm A got a local VC firm to co-invest its Korean deal 
for local financial knowledge. The Manager said, 
When reaching issues like deal structuring or dealing with local regulations, 
we need the help of the local partner. We also rely on our co-investor for 
effective monitoring since we don't understand Korean language used in the 
board meeting even if sitting in the board. 
 So here Firm A needs the co-investor to help in the deal structuring and 
understanding local regulations as well as the venture monitoring.  
For Firm B, it co-invests mainly for contribution from partners (normally 
local knowledge) and network building. The Director said,  
Through co-investment, we can get more people to work for us. When we 
invest in India or Korea, we get local VC firms to co-invest with us. It helps 
us in both the local knowledge and venture monitoring. 
Further analyzing its eight IPOs in Singapore, its co-investment strategy can 
be understood more clearly. There are co-investors in seven IPOs and five of them 
are led by Firm B. Only one later stage IPO are solely invested by Firm B (IPO 
happened just nine months after the investment). Among the five syndicated deals 
led by Firm B, most co-investors are local VC firms and the majority are 
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government-linked VCs. It shows Firm B is very conscientious of building good 
relationship with local institutions to obtain local knowledge and build local 
networks even though most of its partners are locals.  
Firm C co-invests more for the finance knowledge. Its manager said in the 
interview, 
We prefer a financial VC as the partner. The purpose is to have a balance in 
corporate governance. We come as a strategic investor, and we would like to 
have a financial investor complementary to us.  
Firm D expects its co-investment partners be strategic investors and 
contribute to the venture success. Its Managing Director said, 
Most of our co-investors are business angels from various backgrounds. 
Some are coming from banking background, some technology background, 
and some operational background. The main criterion for co-investors is 
their capability. They have to be strategic investors and can contribute to the 
venture. Investors with only money are not welcomed. 
 Firm F co-invests for both risk sharing and deal exchange. The Director said 
in the interview, 
One reason of co-investment is to share risk when the deal is large, and the 
other is to share deal flow with other investors.  
Firm H seeks investors based on the needs of portfolio companies, the Head 
said in the interview, 
Our investees may require more than money from investors. We are 
matching investors with investees. We ourselves are also selective in investor 
partners. Some VCs are cooperative and some are not. Some are willing to 
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help, but some always question you for anything and some like to squeeze 
people to the last blood.  
 Compared to other interviewed firms, Firm J co-invests much less and is 
more for risk sharing. The Vice President said,   
The main reason of co-investment is to share risk, especially when the deal is 
in early stage. We may then bring in some governmental-supported seed 
funds to share the risk. We seldom co-invest for the industry knowledge of 
our partners unless the deal requires specialized knowledge. 
In summary, learning motive is more significant for Firm A, Firm B, and 
Firm C, which sense their certain weaknesses and exchange by their distinctive 
resources (industry knowledge in the case of Firm A and Firm C, and VC expertise 
for Firm B).  
Firm E is an interesting case to explore how learning by observing works. 
When Firm E, a subsidiary of local insurance company R, started, it lacked both 
industry and management knowledge. Learning by joint venture was not easy since 
R did not possess distinctive resources. Learning by hiring was not feasible given its 
corporate package for staffs. The advantage of Firm E was local clients of R. The 
Manager said in the interview, 
We know our clients very well after doing business with them for a few years. 
Thus we can invest in some better-managed clients with good prospects, and 
get more leverage by equity investments.  
However, clients of R were not broad enough for VC investments. Most of 
them were local manufacturing companies. Firm E had to go beyond this base for 
sufficient long-term investment returns. Besides following some local bank-
affiliated VC firms (Company R enjoys good relationship with some local banks) to 
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invest in the region (the Manager commented such overseas expansions were high-
risk but low return), Firm E needed to involve in more promising high-tech ventures.  
So when Firm E started, it also started a fund of funds to invest in other VC funds. 
Such a fund of funds not only diversified investment risks, it also helped Firm E to 
build relationship with some reputable VC firms. One example is its long-time 
partner, US-based VC Firm Z. Firm E even invited Firm Z to co-invest in its client 
Company Q, later generating more than five-time returns. The Manager said,   
When we started, we had some input from VC Firm Z. They were more 
experienced since they entered Singapore market in later 1980s. So we 
invested in them, co-invested with them (e.g., Company Q), and learned some 
VC practices such as conducting due diligence and structuring deals. 
The good relationship with Firm Z is very rewarding. Later during the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, which brought local and regional markets to the recession for 
a few years, Firm E earned a lot by following Firm Z to invest in the US high-tech 
firms. It also helps Firm E to accumulate more industry knowledge and VC 
investment experiences. The experience of Firm E shows how an inexperienced VC 
firm without distinctive resources can use learning by observing through building 
good relationship with reputable VC firms.  
Summarizing our cases, we can see learning by observing is similar to 
learning by joint venture in accessing to complementary resources through the 
resource exchange or building relationship. However, learning by observing is more 
flexible. A joint venture becomes separated entity and you have the fixed partners, 
while you can always change partners in the syndication. Firm Z may be not 
interested in forming a joint venture with Firm E (which may compete with Firm Z) 
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but is willing to take it as a regular syndication partner for deal sharing given their 
good relationship. Thus we develop the following proposition.    
Proposition 4: The learning mechanism of learning by observing is more 
likely to be used when the VC firm needs a more flexible access to 
complementary resources of its syndication partners through the resource 
exchange or relationship building.  
 
6.2 Effect of VC Learning  
In this section, we further investigate the effect of VC learning on its 
investment behaviors, particularly issues touched by our hypotheses on VC deal 
source, due diligence process and syndication behaviors.  
On VC deal source, the case study is not conclusive. Some venture capitalists 
would say all types of deal sources are important and some rely more on networks. 
For evidence related to Hypothesis 1, there are three foreign VC firms and five local 
VC ones in the case study (Firm G's information is unavailable for issues we 
explored in this section). Most of them put emphasis on their networks as main deal 
sources. We don't have percentage as what in the survey and thus difficult to judge 
the validity of Hypothesis 1. Among the three foreign VC firms, both Firm A and 
Firm B put emphasis on networks. Firm A is small and can largely satisfied with 
deals from its networks, particularly its parent company. Firm B is old in the local 
market and has already built extensive local networks. It can also attract a lot of 
market deals due to its good market reputation. Thus solicited deals may be less 
important. The investment practice of Firm C seems to support Hypothesis 1. In the 
interview, the venture capitalist said, 
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Our deal source could be our parent corporation, our networks, external 
resources, other VC firms, our own search, or even from entrepreneurs, and 
all these sources are important.   
On VC due diligence criteria, case study provides more information. 
However, many of them felt difficult to answer the question whether the 
entrepreneur experience is more important than the promising product. Firm B put 
great emphasis on the teamwork and required each team member perform his role. 
Firm C made similar statement, "core-managers should function according to their 
roles". On the other hand, local VC firms including Firm D, Firm E, Firm F 
answered positively to the question and put entrepreneur experience as a more 
important criterion. Firm H and Firm J gave answers similar to Firm B and Firm C.  
In conclusion, while we can see local VC firms put more emphasis on the 
entrepreneur experience in general, their emphasis also vary with their different 
focuses. For example, Firm J is specialized in industry (service outsourcing), it may 
thus possess more industry knowledge to judge the prospect of the venture product, 
and may thus rely less on the entrepreneur experience (similar to our argument for 
Hypothesis 2). Firm H is a business incubator and naturally its clients are less 
experienced since experienced entrepreneurs are easier to get VC funding and need 
not to engage the intermediary service of Firm H. 
On VC syndication behaviors, case study provides more information than the 
survey since the case study shows who are these VCs' syndication partners and why 
they syndicate together. On syndication motives, the behavior of Firm A supports 
Hypothesis 3a and 3b, syndication (its Korean venture) is mainly for local financial 
knowledge but not for industry knowledge. Hypothesis 3c is not supported since 
Firm A actually is not interested in investing heavily in Korean market. Similarly, 
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experience of Firm B supports Hypothesis 3a and 3c (building local networks) as 
well as Hypothesis 3b. However, Firm C is a foreign VC firm but does not co-invest 
for either local knowledge or networks (it co-invests for financial knowledge). So 
Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3c are not supported though Hypothesis 3b is still 
supported in the case of Firm C. 
 For local VC firms, Hypothesis 3 predicts that they syndicate more for 
industry knowledge but less for local knowledge or networks. Among the rest five 
local VC firms, Firm D co-invests not for local knowledge but industry knowledge 
(strategic investors), and also not very interested in network building. So Hypothesis 
3 is supported. Firm E co-invests both for local and industry knowledge, and also 
uses syndication to build networks (e.g., its experience with VC Firm Z). So here 
only Hypothesis 3b is supported. Firm F co-invests for deal exchange and network 
building, but not for local or industry knowledge. Thus Hypothesis 3a is supported 
but not Hypothesis 3b or Hypothesis 3c. Firm H's syndication is different from other 
VC firms since it is an incubator. Firm J seldom co-invests for knowledge or 
networks and thus Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3c are supported but not 
Hypothesis 3b.   
In summary, Hypothesis 3 is partly supported but VC firms in real world are 
not simply divided into two classes given their different paths of knowledge 
accumulation. The differences between foreign and local VC firms may often be 
blurred by other factors. For example, Firm C (a foreign VC firm) is not weak in 
local knowledge even though it is young in the local market because it can get 
access to local knowledge and networks through the local subsidiaries of its 
corporate parent. Similarly, many local VC firms also expand to overseas markets 
and thus they are actually "foreign" from the knowledge perspective when we 
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investigate their investment behaviors in overseas markets. However, it is very 
difficult to differentiate such factors in a survey study. 
For Hypothesis 4, it is difficult to judge given the small sample of case study. 
However, the differentiation between acquiring and accessing knowledge seems 
reasonable. It seems some VC firms using syndication to simply gain access to 
knowledge instead of acquiring knowledge, just as what Grant and Baden-Fuller 
(2004) proposed. For example, Firm A and Firm C seem quite satisfied with their 
industry knowledge advantage and may continue to get professional VC firms to 
help in the finance knowledge by syndication. Similarly, Firm E is happy to back the 
local market and invest in low-tech manufacturing firms again after some high-tech 
investment experiences in the US. So it would be interesting to conduct an empirical 
test on the hypothesis and explore whether the learning effect is more prominent 
than pure knowledge accessing.     
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CHAPTER 7 RESULTS FROM SURVEY STUDY 
7.1 Results for Investment Decision Process Study 
7.1.1. Descriptive analysis 
Before going on hypothesis testing, we first conduct the descriptive analysis 
for an overview of our data sample. Here we have two VC characteristic variables 
mentioned before, VC nationality and VC age, and four variables related to VC deal 
source (Market, Intermediary, Networks, and Solicited). We also add two more VC 
characteristic variables, VC size and VC type. VC size is one important measure of 
VC characteristics (Hall and Tu, 2003), and VC type has been studied extensively 
(e.g., Wright and Robbie, 1996; Wang et al., 2002). The descriptive result is 
presented in Table 10. Here VC nationality and VC type are binary variables. VC 
nationality is coded one if the respondent is a foreign VC firm, and zero if the 
respondent is a local one. VC type is coded one if the respondent is an independent 
VC firm, and zero if the respondent is affiliated with other institutions. VC age is 
defined as the operating years of the VC firm in the local market (i.e., local age), and 
VC size is measured by the monetary size of managed VC funds.  
TABLE 10: Descriptive statistics of variables on VC deal sources 
 
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. VC nationality 0.50 0.51        
2. VC type 0.29 0.46 0.39*       
3. VC age (year) 7.9 4.8 -0.19 0.05      
4. VC size (S$ 
million) 
150 194 0.06 0.24 0.12     
5. Market (%) 27.3 23.5 -0.05 0.04 -0.14 -0.20    
6. Networks (%) 25.3 20.4 -0.37* -0.22 -0.05 0.05 -0.48**   
7. Intermediary (%) 22.3 14.1 -0.08 -0.01 -0.11 -0.28 -0.15 -0.09  
8. Solicited (%) 23.3 23.5 0.40* 0.14 0.23 0.35* -0.48** -0.33† -0.39*
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Note: This table presents means, standard deviations, and correlations among variables 
used for VC deal sources. The sample comprises 34 Singapore VC firms. Correlations 
reported are two-tailed Pearson correlations.  
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
Table 10 shows the correlation among our variables. Among VC 
characteristic variables, most of them are not related except VC nationality and VC 
type, indicating that most foreign VC firms in the sample are independent. The 
means of four variables on VC deal sources are quite close, within the range of 20% 
to 30%. Among these four variables, while naturally we may expect their negative 
correlations, it is interesting to notice that variable Intermediary is not related to 
most other variables except Solicited. Variable Intermediary is also not related to 
VC characteristic variables. VC size is related to variable Solicited, indicating large 
VC firms obtain more deals through the solicitation.  
Similarly, we conduct the descriptive analysis for variables related to 
management criteria for due diligence. Same as above, we have four VC 
characteristic variables, VC nationality, VC type, VC age, and VC size as well as 
two variables related to VC deal source (Managerial experience and Managerial 
quality). The result is presented in Table 11.  
TABLE 11: Descriptive statistics of variables on VC management criteria 
 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. VC nationality 0.50 0.51      
2. VC type 0.29 0.46 0.39*     
3. VC age (year) 7.9 4.8 -0.19 0.05    
4. VC size (S$ million) 150 194 0.06 0.24 0.12   
5. Managerial experience 4.32 0.41 -0.36* -0.11 0.03 -0.05  
6. Managerial quality 4.05 0.46 -0.19 -0.09 0.20 -0.01 0.45**
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Note: This table presents means, standard deviations, and correlations among variables 
used for VC management criteria for due diligence. The sample comprises 34 Singapore 
VC firms. Correlations reported are two-tailed Pearson correlations.  
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
Table 11 shows the correlation among our variables. Most VC characteristic 
variables are not related to management criteria. Managerial experience and 
Managerial quality are highly correlated since the emphases on two aspects of 
entrepreneurs' quality are often related. Managerial experience of foreign VC firms 
is lower compared to local ones, as what is expected in Hypothesis 2. 
7.1.2 Testing for Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 discusses foreign--local differences in deal sources and states 
that foreign ones get more solicited deals and less unsolicited deals from networks 
compared to local ones. Since VC nationality is a binary variable, naturally we use a 
two-tailed t-test (t-statistics) and a non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (Z-
scores) to measure the significance level of foreign--local differences in deal 
sources, measured by variable Market, Networks, Intermediary, and Solicited. The 
result is presented in Table 12.    
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26.3 28.3 -0.24 -1.19 Market (%) 
 (17.5) (25.0)   
18.1 33.0 -2.15* -1.75† Networks (%) 
(20.0) (30.0)   
Intermediary (%) 21.3 23.3 -0.40 -0.54 
 (20.0) (25.0)   
32.5 15.0 2.20* -2.36* Solicited (%) 
 
 
(35.0) (10.0)   
 
Note: This table compares foreign and local VC firms in their deal source differences, 
measured by four different types of deal sources. The sample comprises 31 Singapore VC 
firms (16 foreign and 15 local). The t-statistics and Z-scores compare the mean and median 
differences between foreign and local VC firms, respectively. We calculate the two-tailed t-
statistics based on an F-test for equal variance assumption.  
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
Table 12 shows support for Hypothesis 1. While foreign and local VC firms 
are similar in using market and intermediary, there are significant differences in 
using networks and soliciting deals. Foreign VC firms solicit deals more than local 
ones and use networks less for unsolicited deals.  
As foreign VC firms in our sample are from different countries with 
distinctive background such as the US, the UK, Japan, we further divide foreign VC 
firms into three groups, the US, Europe (including the UK and continent Europe), 
and Asia (including Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and other Asian countries). The means 
and medians of our four variables (Market, Networks, Intermediary, and Solicited) 
for each group are presented in Table 13. Then we can see whether the differences 
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between foreign and local firms are consistent across various groups of foreign VC 
firms.  
TABLE 13: VC deal resource differences among different groups of foreign VC firms 
 










Market (%) 40.0 27.0 17.9 
 (25.0) (15.0) (10.0) 
Networks (%) 18.8 25.0 12.9 
 (25.0) (30.0) (10.0) 
23.8 25.0 17.1 Intermediary (%) 
 (22.5) (20.0) (10.0) 
Solicited 13.8 21.0 51.4 
 (15.0) (15.0) (50.0) 
Sample Size  4 5 7 
 
 
Table 13 shows further support for Hypothesis 1. On Variable Market and 
Intermediary, it is often that of one group of foreign firms is higher than the local 
and another lower, indicating there are no consistent differences between foreign 
and local ones. However, for variable Networks and Solicited, such consistency is 
clear. Networks of all groups of foreign firms are lower and Solicited higher 
compared to local ones except for the US VC firms, which are lower in Solicited. 
Checking the data details, there is actually an outlier in the data sample, one US VC 
firm obtains deal 100% from the market and thus all other variables are zero. If we 
remove this outlier, the mean of the US VC firms becomes 18.3, higher than the 
mean of local ones (15.0).  
Besides the above binary comparison between foreign and local VC firms, 
we further conduct hierarchical regression analyses to control the possible effect of 
other variables.  
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In the test of Hypothesis 1, there are two steps of the hierarchical regression. 
In the first step, we have four control variables, VC type, logarithm of VC age, 
logarithm of VC size (we use the logarithm of age and size instead of age and size 
themselves due to their better normality), and VC reputation. The four variables may 
interact with the variable Networks and Solicited. Independent VC firms may obtain 
less institutional support without the affiliation with large institutions or 
corporations. They may thus be less networked and get less deals from networks and 
have to solicit more deals. A high reputable VC firm (measured by percentage of 
deals from the market, i.e., Variable Market) can get more deals from market and 
thus rely less on networks and soliciting for deals. We can also argue that old VC 
firms are usually more networked and thus may get more deals from networks and 
less solicited deals. Similarly, large VC firms are normally well networked and thus 
may get more deals from networks and less solicited deals.  
In the second step, we add the independent variable, VC nationality, to test 
its influence on two dependent variables, Networks and Solicited. The results are 
presented in Table 14.  
TABLE 14: Results of hierarchical regression on VC deal sources 
 
Dependent Variable Networks Solicited 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 








Control variables         
VC type -1.66 6.1 3.56 6.3 4.00 8.5 -4.01 8.6 
VC age (log) -1.30 5.0 -3.95 4.9 5.19 6.9 9.25 6.6 
VC size (log) -0.85 2.0 -0.48 1.9 2.89 2.7 2.33 2.5 
Market -0.27* 0.12 -0.29* 0.12 -0.43* 0.17 -0.40* 0.16 
         
Independent variable         
VC nationality   -12.3* 5.9   18.8* 8.1 
Adjusted R2 -0.033  0.141  0.176  0.296  
Change of R2   0.123    0.128  
F-Value 1.25  1.99  2.60†  3.53*  
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Note: This table reports results of hierarchical regression with Networks and Solicited as 
dependent variables. We report the coefficient and standard error for each independent or 
control variables in both steps, as well as the adjusted R square and F-value in each step 
of regression. Change of R square is reported in Step 2 to show the model fit improvement 
after adding independent variable. The sample comprises 31 Singapore VC firms.  
 
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
Table 14 shows VC type, VC age, and size are not related to Networks and 
Solicited in Step 1, but Market is negatively related to both Networks and Solicited. 
After adding independent variable, i.e., VC nationality, the regression model fit is 
improved, and VC nationality is significantly related to Networks negatively and 
Solicited positively. Thus Hypothesis 1 is further supported in the regression 
analysis.  
7.1.3 Testing for Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 discusses foreign--local differences in the management criteria 
and states that foreign VC firms put less emphasis on the managerial experience of 
venture management team. To test Hypothesis 2, we first similarly conduct two-
tailed t-test and non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test to measure the 
significance level of foreign--local differences in management criteria, measured by 
variable Managerial experience and Managerial quality. The result is presented in 
Table 15. 
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4.18 4.47 -2.15* -1.96* Managerial 
experience (4.0) (4.5)   
3.96 4.13 -1.07 -1.28 Managerial 
quality (4.00) (4.19)   
 
Note: This table compares foreign and local VC firms in criteria used to evaluate venture 
management team, measured by variable Managerial experience and Managerial quality. 
The sample comprises 33 Singapore VC firms (17 foreign and 16 local). The t-statistics and 
Z-scores compare the mean and median differences between foreign and local VC firms, 
respectively. We calculate the two-tailed t-statistics based on an F-test for equal variance 
assumption.  
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
Table 15 shows support for Hypothesis 2. While foreign and local VC firms 
are similar in their emphasis on the management quality, foreign VC firms put 
significantly less emphasis on Managerial experience in the evaluation of venture 
management team.  
Similar to the test on Hypothesis 1, we further divide foreign VC firms into 
three groups, the US, Europe and Asia to compare their means and medians in 
Managerial experience and Managerial quality. The result is presented in Table 16. 
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TABLE 16: VC management criteria differences among different groups of foreign 
VC firms 
 










4.38 4.20 4.06 Managerial 
experience (4.25) (4.50) (4.00) 
4.16 4.10 3.78 Managerial 
quality  (4.06) (4.00) (3.88) 
Sample Size  4 5 8 
 
 
Table 16 shows further support for Hypothesis 2. On Variable Managerial 
quality, the means of the US and Europe group are close to the local one but the 
Asia group is lower, indicating there are no consistent differences between foreign 
and local ones. However, for variable Managerial experience, the means and 
medians of three foreign subgroups are consistently lower than local ones. We may 
thus conclude that all groups of foreign VC firms put less emphasis on managerial 
experience compared to the local ones.    
Besides the binary comparison between foreign and local VC firms, we 
further conduct hierarchical regression analyses to control the possible effect of 
other variables.  
In the test of Hypothesis 2, similarly there are two steps of the hierarchical 
regression. In the first step, we have three control variables, VC type, logarithm of 
VC age, and logarithm of VC size. All of them may interact with the variable 
Managerial experience. Independent VC firms normally are more professional and 
thus more capable to judge the venture product and market. As the result, they may 
put less emphasis on managerial experience (similar to the argument for Hypothesis 
2). We can also argue that old VC firms are usually more experienced and thus may 
rely less on entrepreneur experience in the evaluation of venture management. 
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Similarly, large VC firms are normally more experienced and could thus put less 
emphasis on entrepreneur experience. In the second step, we add the independent 
variable, VC nationality, to test its influence on dependent variable, Managerial 
experience. The result is presented in Table 17.  
TABLE 17: Results of hierarchical regression on Managerial experience 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 




Control variables     
VC type -0.11 0.17 0.01 0.17 
VC age (log) 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.13 
VC size (log) 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 
     
Independent variable     
VC nationality   -0.31† 0.16 
     
Adjusted R2 -0.078  0.013  
Change of R2   0.113  
F-Value 0.23  1.11  
 
Note: This table reports results of hierarchical regression with Managerial experience as 
the dependent variable. We report the coefficient and standard error for each independent 
or control variables in both steps, as well as the adjusted R square and F-value in each 
step of regression. Change of R square is reported in Step 2 to show the model fit 
improvement after adding independent variable. The sample comprises 33 Singapore VC 
firms.  
 
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
Table 17 shows VC type, VC age and size are not related to Managerial 
experience in Step 1. After adding independent variable, i.e., VC nationality, the 
regression model fit is improved, and VC nationality is weakly significantly related 
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to dependent variable (p-value =0.06), Managerial experience. Thus Hypothesis 2 is 
further supported in the regression analysis.  
 
7.2 Results for VC Syndication Study 
7.2.1. Descriptive analysis 
Similar to VC investment decision process study, we first conduct the 
descriptive analysis for an overview of our data sample. Here we have four VC 
characteristic variables mentioned before, VC nationality, VC type, VC age, and VC 
size. We also have six variables related to VC syndication motives and syndication 
frequency (Finance, Resource-based, Deal reciprocity, Industry knowledge, Local 
knowledge, and Syndication frequency). We also add two more VC characteristic 
variables, Stage, measuring VC's investment stage focus (whether focusing on early 
stage or not), and Industry, measuring VC's industry specialization.  
Here Syndication frequency is measured by a 5-point categorical scale (same 
as variable Propensity to syndicate in Manigart et al., 2002). The VC firm is asked 
to indicate the approximate proportion of syndicated deals to its total deals, 
measured by an ordinal variable, 1 for 0-20%, 2 for 21-40%, 3 for 41-60%, 4 for 61-
80%, and 5 for 81-100%. Both Stage and Industry are binary variables. Stage is 
coded one if the respondent invests more in seed or start-up stage and zero if mainly 
investing in expansion or later stages. Industry is coded one if the respondent is 
specialized in its investing industries and zero if unspecialized in industry.  
The result of descriptive statistics is presented in Table 18. Here VC 
nationality is binary variable, coded one if the respondent is a foreign VC firm, and 
zero if the respondent is a local one. VC type is binary, coded 1 if independent, and 
zero if non-independent. VC age is defined as the VC firm's operating years from its 
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entry in the local market (i.e., local age), and VC size is measured by numbers of 
professional managers.  
 
TABLE 18: Descriptive statistics of variables in syndication study 
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. VC nationality 0.54 0.51            
2. VC type 0.65 0.48 0.003           
3. VC Age (year) 7.08 5.4 -0.16 -0.03          
4. VC size (No.) 13.5 20.2 0.16 -0.09 0.06         
5. Stage 0.35 0.48 -0.12 0.07 -0.29† -0.25        
6. Industry 0.62 0.49 -0.05 0.13 0.04 -0.11 0.11       
7. Finance  3.77 0.72 -0.01 0.17 0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.11      
8. Resource-based 3.08 0.94 0.28† -0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.16 0.34*     
9. Deal reciprocity 2.99 1.06 0.40* -0.20 -0.14 0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.10 0.31†    
10. Industry 
knowledge 
3.07 1.01 0.26 -0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.31† 0.87** 0.43**   
11. Local 
knowledge 
2.93 1.01 0.29† -0.14 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.36* 0.85** 0.33* 0.75**  
12. Syndication 
frequency 
3.00 1.41 0.08 -0.04 -0.44** 0.10 0.24 -0.24 -0.01 -0.07 0.25 0.03 0.04
 
Note: This table presents means, standard deviations, and correlations among variables 
used in VC syndication study. The sample comprises 37 Singapore VC firms. Correlations 
reported are two-tailed Pearson correlations. 
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
Table 18 reports that the mean of variable Syndication frequency is 3.0, 
showing that about half of investment deals are syndicated in our sample, higher 
than the 2.7 of European countries reported in Manigart et al. (2002), which means 
syndication practice is more common in Singapore market. The mean of variable 
Finance is 3.77, much higher than that of Resource-based and Deal reciprocity (3.08 
and 2.99 respectively), indicating the finance motive is more important than 
resource-based and deal reciprocity motives in Singapore market, which is similar to 
Western markets.  
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Most VC characteristic variables are not correlated to either other 
characteristic variables or syndication variables. However, VC nationality is related 
to Deal reciprocity, Resource-based, and Local knowledge (the latter two are weakly 
significant). Syndication motives are often correlated with each other, but 
Syndication frequency is not related to any syndication motives (which is different 
from Manigart et al. (2002)'s study in Europe), but is strongly related to VC age as 
predicted by Hypothesis 4 (p-value < 0.01). 
7.2.2 Testing for Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 discusses foreign--local differences in syndication motives and 
states that foreign VC firms are more likely to join syndication for local knowledge 
and deal reciprocity but less for industry knowledge compared to local ones. Similar 
to the test of Hypothesis 1, we use a two-tailed t-test (t-statistics) and a non-
parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (Z-scores) to measure the significance 
level of foreign--local differences in syndication motives, measured by variable 
Industry knowledge, Local knowledge, and Deal reciprocity. Their differences on 
risk sharing (measured by variable Finance) and overall knowledge sharing 
(measured by variable Resource-based) are also presented, and the results are in 
Table 19. 
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3.31 2.79 1.59 -1.40 Industry 
knowledge (3.50) (2.75)   
Local knowledge 3.20 2.62 1.80† -1.66† 
 (3.12) (3.00)   
3.38 2.53 2.59* -2.35* Deal reciprocity 
 (3.25) (3.00)   
3.32 2.80 1.71 -1.57 Resource-based 
 (3.57) (2.71)   
Finance 3.76 3.78 -0.07 -0.14 
 (3.90) (3.80)   
 
Note: This table compares foreign and local VC firms in the syndication motive, measured 
by variable Industry knowledge, Local knowledge, Deal reciprocity, Finance (risk sharing), 
and Resource-based (knowledge sharing). The sample comprises 37 Singapore VC firms (21 
foreign and 16 local). The t-statistics and Z-scores compare the mean and median 
differences between foreign and local VC firms, respectively. We calculate the two-tailed t-
statistics based on an F-test for equal variance assumption.  
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
Table 19 shows foreign and local VC firms are similar in their risk sharing, 
overall knowledge sharing, and obtaining industry knowledge, but foreign VC firms 
are stronger in deal reciprocity and obtaining local knowledge (weakly significant) 
compared to local VC firms. Thus the bivariate t-test and non-parametric Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test provide mixed support for Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3a 
(local knowledge) and Hypothesis 3c (deal reciprocity) are supported but not 
Hypothesis 3b (industry knowledge).  
 109
Similar to the testing for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we divide foreign 
VC firms into three groups, the US, Europe and Asia to compare their means and 
medians in Industry knowledge, Local knowledge, Deal reciprocity, Finance, and 
Resource-based. The result is presented in Table 20. 
TABLE 20: VC syndication motive differences among different groups of foreign VC 
firms 
 










3.19 3.34 3.20 Industry 
knowledge (3.00) (3.50) (3.50) 
Local knowledge 2.81 3.50 3.10 
 (2.88) (3.63) (3.00) 
Deal reciprocity 3.25 3.38 3.50 
 (3.00) (3.25) (3.50) 
Resource-based 3.14 3.36 3.34 
 (3.00) (3.64) (3.00) 
3.78 4.03 3.24 Finance   
(3.70) (4.30) (3.20) 
Sample Size  8 8 5 
 
 
Table 20 shows further support for Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3c but 
rejects Hypothesis 3b. On variable Finance, the means of the US and Europe group 
are close to the local one but the Asia group is lower, indicating there are no 
consistent differences between foreign and local ones. On variable Industry 
knowledge, Local knowledge, Deal reciprocity, and Resource-based, the means and 
medians of three foreign groups are consistently higher than local ones, showing 
support for Hypothesis 3a, Hypothesis 3c and rejecting Hypothesis 3b (which 
expects foreign lower in industry knowledge). The only exception is that the median 
of the US subgroup for Local knowledge is lower than that of the local one. 
However, the actual values of the middle four local firms are 2.5, 3.0, 3.0, and 3.0, 
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resulting in a median 3.0. On the other hand, the values of the middle four US ones 
are 2.5, 2.75, 3.0, and 3.0, resulting in a median 2.88. The two groups actually are 
very similar. If we remove one outlier in the US group (a large multinational VC 
group with $7b asset and thus not interested in local knowledge, similar to the case 
of Firm C in the interview study), the median of the US group immediately reaches 
3.0. We may thus conclude that all groups of foreign VC firms are more for deal 
reciprocity and local knowledge compared to the local ones in joining syndication.    
Besides the binary comparison between foreign and local VC firms, we 
similarly conduct further hierarchical regression analyses to control the possible 
effect of other variables.  
In the test of Hypothesis 3, there are two steps of the hierarchical regression. 
In the first step, we have five control variables, VC type, logarithm of VC age, 
logarithm of VC size, Stage, and Industry. All of them may interact with dependent 
variables, Local knowledge, Industry knowledge, and Deal reciprocity. Independent 
VC firms normally are more professional and can acquire knowledge by hiring, and 
thus are less likely to learn knowledge or build networks through syndication. We 
can also argue that old or large size VC firms are usually more experienced and thus 
may be less likely to learn knowledge or build networks through syndication. 
Similarly, a specialized VC firm may be less likely to syndicate for knowledge or 
networks, and a VC firm focusing on early stage may be more likely to syndicate for 
knowledge due to the higher risk of early stage ventures. In the second step, we add 
the independent variable, VC nationality, to test its influence on dependent variable, 
Local knowledge, Industry knowledge, or Deal reciprocity. The results are presented 
in Table 21.  
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TABLE 21: Results of hierarchical regression on VC syndication motives 
Dependent variable Local knowledge Industry knowledge Deal reciprocity 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Variables b std.  b std.  b std.  b std.  b std.  b std.  
Control variables             
VC type -0.22 0.38 -0.18 0.37 -0.29 0.37 -0.26 0.37 -0.65† 0.37 -0.61† 0.37 
VC age (log) 0.23 0.56 0.44 0.54 -0.50 0.54 -0.36 0.55 -0.83 0.54 -0.65 0.52 
VC size (log) -0.23 0.38 -0.47 0.38 0.27 0.37 0.11 0.38 0.70† 0.37 0.49 0.37 
Stage -0.01 0.39 0.07 0.38 0.07 0.38 0.11 0.38 -0.02 0.38 0.04 0.36 
Industry -0.02 0.37 0.01 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.22 0.36 0.25 0.34 
             
Independent variable             
VC nationality   0.75* 0.36   0.50 0.36   0.69* 0.35 
Adjusted R2 -0.12  -0.01  -0.07  -0.04  0.055  0.136  
Change of R2   0.123    0.054    0.094  
F-Value 0.21  0.92  0.51  0.75  1.42  1.95†  
 
Note: This table reports results of hierarchical regression with Local knowledge, Industry 
knowledge, and Deal reciprocity as dependent variables. We report the coefficient and 
standard error for each independent or control variables in both steps, as well as the 
adjusted R square and F-value in each step of regression. Change of R square is reported 
in Step 2 to show the model fit improvement after adding independent variable. The 
sample comprises 37 Singapore VC firms.  
 
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
Table 21 shows all control variables, VC type, VC age, VC size, Stage, and 
Industry are not related to dependent variables in Step 1 except for VC type and VC 
size are weakly related to Deal reciprocity. After adding independent variable, i.e., 
VC nationality, the regression model fits for the first model (local knowledge) and 
the third model (deal reciprocity) are improved, and VC nationality is significantly 
related to the two dependent variables, Local knowledge and Deal reciprocity. Thus 
Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3c are further supported in the regression analysis. 
However, for the second regression model (on industry knowledge), the adding of 
VC nationality does not improve the model fit much, and the variable itself is not 
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significantly related to dependent variable Industry knowledge. Furthermore, the 
coefficient between VC nationality and Industry knowledge is positive though not 
significant, opposite to the prediction of Hypothesis 3b. Thus Hypothesis 3b is 
rejected in the regression analysis.  
7.2.3 Testing for Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 discusses how VC age affects the syndication frequency and 
states that VC firms with longer years of local experience would syndicate less 
frequently. To test Hypothesis 4, we first look at their correlation. Table 18 shows 
variable Syndication tendency and VC age are strongly significant with p-value 
<0.01. However, we need to conduct regression analysis to control for other 
variables, particularly the total VC age since the two variables may be highly 
correlated (statistical analysis shows that the coefficient between logarithm of local 
age and total age is 0.50 with p-value <0.01). So such a control is important. 
In the test of Hypothesis 4, we similarly conduct hierarchical regression 
analysis and have six control variables in the first step. Besides control variables 
used before, namely, VC type, logarithm of VC size, Stage, and Industry, here we 
have two more control variables, VC nationality and logarithm of VC total age. In 
the second step, we add the independent variable, logarithm of VC local age. VC 
total age is defined as the VC firm's operating years from its founding. The 
regression result is presented in Table 22. 
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TABLE 22: Results of hierarchical regression on Syndication frequency 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 




Control variables     
VC nationality 0.32 0.49 -0.08 0.49 
VC type -0.26 0.49 -0.36 0.46 
VC size (log) 0.75 0.54 0.76 0.51 
Stage  0.61 0.55 0.61 0.51 
Industry -0.93† 0.49 -0.74 0.46 
VC total age (log) -1.08 0.84 -0.002 0.90 
     
Independent variable     
VC local age (log)   -1.88* 0.78 
     
Adjusted R2 0.050  0.180  
Change of R2   0.131  
F-Value 1.32  2.13†  
 
Note: This table reports results of hierarchical regression with Syndication frequency as 
the dependent variable. We report the coefficient and standard error for each independent 
or control variables in both steps, as well as the adjusted R square and F-value in each 
step of regression. Change of R square is reported in Step 2 to show the model fit 
improvement after adding independent variable. The sample comprises 37 Singapore VC 
firms.  
 
†    p < 0.10  
*    p < 0.05  
**  p < 0.01 
 
 Table 22 shows clear support for Hypothesis 4. In the first step, most control 
variables are not related to Syndication frequency except for Industry, which is 
negatively related, indicating a VC firm specialized in industry would syndicate less 
frequently. It is interesting that VC total age is not related to Syndication frequency. 
After adding independent variable, i.e., VC local age, the regression model fit is 
improved, and VC local age is negatively related to Syndication frequency. Thus a 
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VC firm young in the local market would syndicate more frequently even though it 




CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Conclusions 
Summarizing this study, we have applied resource theory and knowledge-
based theory to analyze the competitive advantage of VC firms in emerging markets 
and explore how VC firms accumulate their knowledge and build networks through 
their investment strategies in such markets. Through an interview-based field study, 
we have summarized four mechanisms of the knowledge accumulation, learning by 
jointing venture, learning by hiring, learning by doing, and learning by observing. 
We especially pay attention to the latter two mechanisms, which correspond to two 
aspects of VC investment strategy, namely, VC investment decision process and 
syndication strategy. We further highlight the foreign and local VC firm's 
differences in these two aspects, develop hypotheses thereby, and test these 
hypotheses with empirical data from Singapore market. This study has shown that 
VC knowledge affects its usage of learning mechanisms and together they affect VC 
investment strategies in emerging markets.  
In our case study, it is found that VC firm characteristics such as firm 
nationality and governing structure significantly affects VC's usage of the four 
learning mechanisms. Though facing some knowledge or network deficiencies in 
their initial days, new VC firms can use their advantages in certain knowledge or 
networks to exchange for complementary capacities, and thus help the adjustment to 
the new environment. For example, a large corporation may use its industry 
knowledge advantage to form a joint venture with a professional VC firm to gain the 
access to the VC practice and help its VC subsidiary succeed. Finding shows that 
VC knowledge influences the VC investment strategy significantly in emerging 
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markets. Four propositions are proposed as the result of our case study, and can be 
good guidance for further empirical study.  
In our study on VC investment decision process based on the survey data, 
two hypotheses are developed to compare the VC deal source and management 
criteria differences between foreign and local VC firms, and are supported in our 
empirical testing. Foreign VC firms obtain more solicited deals and less unsolicited 
deals from networks compared to local firms, and foreign VC firms put less 
emphasis on the managerial experience compared to local firms.  
These findings can be explained by knowledge differences between foreign 
and local VC firms. On the deal source, the weakness of their local networks causes 
foreign firms to get less unsolicited deals from networks, but their advantage in the 
general knowledge, particularly the industry knowledge, enables them to search for 
high-quality deals by themselves and obtains more solicited deals as the result. On 
the management criteria for due diligence, the advantage of foreign VC firms in the 
general knowledge enables them to put less emphasis on the managerial experience 
in the evaluation of venture management team. Findings show that VC knowledge 
influences the VC investment decision process in emerging markets.  
Similarly, in our study on VC syndication process, we have focused on VC 
syndication motives and their syndication frequencies, and developed two 
hypotheses, most of which are supported in our empirical testing. While VC firms 
join syndication mainly for risk sharing and there are no differences between local 
and foreign ones in risk sharing and overall knowledge sharing motives, foreign VC 
firms are more likely to join syndication for deal reciprocity and acquiring local 
knowledge compared to local ones. On the syndication frequency, a VC firm with 
few years of local experience joins syndication more frequently compared to a firm 
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with more local experience even though the former may have a long history in other 
VC markets.  
These findings can be explained by the VC learning. First, foreign firms are 
more interested in learning local knowledge and building networks through 
syndication due to their relative weakness in local knowledge and local networks, 
and thus they may be more likely to join syndication for deal reciprocity and local 
knowledge. Second, VC firms with longer years of local experiences would have 
less to learn in syndication but more to be learned by their partners. They may thus 
less interested in syndicated deals.  
In summary, this study contributes to VC literature through in-depth study on 
VC investment behaviors in emerging markets by applying resource theory and 
knowledge-based theory, particularly in behavior differences between foreign and 
local VC firms in these markets. More detailed discussion on contributions, 
implications and limitation of this study are presented in following sections.   
 
8.2 Discussion for Case Study 
In our case study, the main issue we explore is how VC knowledge and firm 
characteristics affect their usage of different learning mechanisms. There are four 
learning mechanisms, learning by joint venture, learning by hiring, learning by 
doing, and learning by observing. VC firms may use some of them in their path of 
growth based on their characteristics. 
Our analysis shows firms with distinctive knowledge or networks can form 
joint ventures with other knowledge holders. For new entries to the VC market, 
either local corporations or foreign VC firms, this route is one solution. However, 
the joint venture may suffer the problem of bureaucracy (as the case of Firm A), or 
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the parent corporations may lose much control if let it develop independently (as the 
case of Firm J).  
   To avoid problems with the learning by joint venture, a VC firm can use 
learning by hiring to recruit professional investment managers or learning by 
observing to access to complementary resources of other VC firms. The 
effectiveness of the former mechanism largely depends on the attractiveness of the 
firm (either the remuneration package or the founders' personality), and the latter 
still depends on the firm knowledge and networks. Finally, regardless of the usage of 
other learning mechanisms, learning by doing is always the basic learning 
mechanism given the fast growth of VC industries, and particularly for VC firms 
focusing on high-tech industries.  
Our case study contributes to VC literature by providing an in-depth study on 
VC learning process in emerging markets, which is an important but less explored 
topic. It also contributes to the learning literature as we can see how different 
learning mechanisms interact. To the field of international business, the entry mode 
of MNCs is a well-discussed topic, but much less on the entry of VC firms or more 
generally the professional knowledge-intensive service firms. Findings here may be 
applicable to other types of such firms such as accounting, legal service, and other 
types of consulting firms.  
Further research can be done along this line. Finding here still need 
verification of a larger sample data to explore the linkage between VC learning 
mechanism and firm characteristics more rigorously. 
Our case study also has implications for VC firms as well as public policy 
makers. A new VC entry in an emerging market, either a local spin-off or a foreign 
entry, must carefully analyze its knowledge and networks deficiency as well as set 
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its strategic purpose clearly. Then it can design feasible mechanisms to acquire the 
necessary knowledge and networks through various resource exchanges and to 
achieve its strategic purpose.  
For public policy makers who are eager to build up local VC industries, 
providing more networking opportunities and encouraging different types of VC 
firms entering the market may be helpful. Government-linked VC firms often 
possess valuable local knowledge and networks and thus are often attractive 
syndication partners for new VC firms. Government can thus encourage these firms 
to be more proactive in co-investments with new local corporate spin-offs or foreign 
entries to help these firms' learning.  
    
8.3 Discussion for Investment Decision Process Study 
First we discuss the interpretation of our results, particularly whether the 
reported foreign and local VC differences can be attributed to their knowledge 
differences. The heterogeneity of foreign VC firms can actually help us to exclude 
many alternative explanations. It would be difficult to argue for inherited practical or 
cultural differences between foreign and local VC firms given the diversified 
backgrounds of foreign firms. For example, while naturally one may think that a VC 
firm getting less unsolicited market or network deals may seek more deals from 
intermediaries, empirically it is European VC firms rely more on intermediaries but 
Asian VC firms rely much less on intermediaries (see Table 12). However, all 
groups of foreign VC firms are consistently higher in solicited deals, which points 
the common characteristics of foreign firms, i.e., their general knowledge advantage 
over local ones and the liability of foreignness in the local knowledge and local 
networks.  
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Our study on VC investment decision process has contributed to VC 
literature in several aspects. First, it further explores the heterogeneity of VC in 
investment behaviors. Previous research on VC differences has studied factors such 
as location or country (Elango, Fried, Hisrich, and Polonchek, 1995; Jeng and Wells, 
2002), governing structure such as VC type differences (Wright and Robbie, 1996; 
Wang et al., 2002) but not VC internal resources such as VC knowledge. Thus we 
have enriched this part of literature by showing how VC knowledge affect their 
investment behaviors. Second, this study contributes to literature on VC investment 
decision process by a new theoretical framework (knowledge-based theory) which 
links the VC deal source and criteria for due diligence to their knowledge 
differences. Third, it contributes to the less explored field of VC in emerging 
markets by helping understand VC investment decision process in emerging 
markets, particularly on how foreign VC firms differ from local ones. Fourth, to the 
large domain of international business, here we have an interesting study showing 
the homogeneity of foreign VC firms in an emerging market. These foreign VC 
firms come from different background (e.g., the US, Europe, Japan) and are different 
in their investment practices (e.g., governing structure, reliance on intermediary, 
market reputation). However, there is consistency in their more reliance on solicited 
deals and less emphasis on the managerial experience due to their general 
knowledge advantage over local firms. 
There are also practical implications from our findings. For entrepreneurs 
seeking for VC funding, they should know that VC firms are different in their 
resources and thus their approaches in investment decision process are different. 
Knowing their advantages and shortcomings, they should be more selective in 
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seeking a VC firm that can compensate their shortcomings, and thus may contribute 
more to their venture success.  
For public policy makers in emerging markets who are eager to promote 
local high-tech entrepreneurship and VC industry, this study highlights the needs of 
foreign VC firms to accumulate the local knowledge. With investment experiences 
in developed markets and general knowledge as well as international capital, foreign 
VC firms could contribute greatly to both local VC industry and high-tech ventures. 
Knowing their weakness in local knowledge after their entry to emerging markets, 
policy makers can thus develop related pollicies to help them overcome this 
weakness such as some policy incentives for local VC firms, particularly 
government-linked VC firms, to co-invest with foreign ones.       
The main weakness of this study is the small sample size, thus overall it is 
still an explorative study. Further studies can be carried on to see whether the 
finding here is applicable to other emerging markets. Such studies would help to 
understand VC investment behaviors in emerging markets better. 
This study measures VC resource differences indirectly (by external firm 
characteristics). Future studies can also measure on knowledge and networks 
directly to test some more rigorous hypotheses directly. For example, one may 
hypothesize VC firms strong in general knowledge may get more solicited deals 
even after controlling for their network strength.  
Furthermore, being a self-report survey, this study is limited by the self-
reporting bias often due to the tendency of venture capitalists to rationalize their 
decision criteria. Future studies can use some policy capturing experiments to 
explore VC criteria for due diligence. Such experiments are often used in cognitive 
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psychology, and have been introduced to VC studies already (e.g., Zacharakis and 
Meyer, 1998; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001).   
 
8.4 Discussion for Syndication Study 
First we discuss the interpretation of our results and explore whether there is 
any biases in the results. One possible bias is that local VC firms may report their 
syndication practice in foreign countries when they fill the questionnaire. For 
example, Firm E in the case study is a local firm but mainly joins syndication for its 
overseas deals. It is better to view it as a foreign VC in overseas markets and thus its 
behaviors would be in line with our hypothesis (co-investment for local knowledge 
and networks). However, the bias is more likely to blur the foreign and local 
differences, thus the reported significant differences are more likely to be 
strengthened if we manage to control this bias. 
On result interpretation, it is interesting to see Hypothesis 3b is rejected 
(local syndication more for industry knowledge). Actually the empirical result points 
to the opposite though not reaching the significant level yet. It can be interpreted in 
two ways, one is that local VC firms are actually not weak in industry knowledge as 
what we propose, and the other is that they may not learn industry knowledge from 
syndication. From what we learn in the case study, the former is less likely since all 
local VC firms except Firm J13 have no industry focuses and experiences of most 
managers in these firms are in the line of banking or consulting.  
The latter is more reasonable since VC firms can learn through other 
mechanisms. One local VC firm actually got industrial experts as the general 
partners in its portfolio companies. Also local VC firms may be less familiar with 
                                                          
13 Firm J is a joint venture between local and foreign firms, and behaves more like a foreign one in 
many aspects. 
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the syndication practice and thus more doubtful of its partners. They are more 
willing to syndicate with firms they know well. In the interview, one local venture 
capitalist gave following comment on the syndication, 
Co-investment is good for big deals, but the danger is that no one does the 
due diligence. It is not the best way to invest  
On the other hand, foreign VC firms are more familiar with the international 
practice and more eager to use syndication for learning given its flexibility in the 
structure. Even they are relatively good in industry knowledge, they are still more 
eager to learn industry knowledge through syndication compared to local ones.  
 On the interpretation of the reported foreign and local VC differences, the 
heterogeneity of foreign VC firms can actually help us to exclude many alternative 
explanations. It would be difficult to argue for inherited practical or cultural 
differences between foreign and local VC firms given the diversified backgrounds of 
foreign firms.  
Our study on VC syndication behaviors has contributed to literature in three 
aspects. First, to VC literature, it is one of few studies on VC syndication in 
emerging markets, which helps understand VC syndication behaviors there. It 
enriches our understanding on the influence of VC syndication motives, particularly 
on how foreign VC firms differ from local ones.  
Second, to the international business literature, we have shown the existence 
of liability of foreignness in the context of VC industry in an emerging market, and 
thus enrich this literature (e.g., Zaheer, 1995; Miller and Parkhe, 2002; Nachum, 
2003; Davis and Nair, 2003). Though VC industry is less regulated and foreign VC 
firms can easily hire locals to acquire local knowledge, overall they still bear this 
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liability and it is more significant than the liability of newness in the context of VC 
syndication practice.  
Third, to the strategic alliance literature (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 2004), here we have shown that acquiring knowledge is more 
prominent than merely accessing to knowledge in the context of VC syndication.  
This study has implication for public policy makers in emerging markets 
who are eager to promote local high-tech entrepreneurship and VC industry. From 
this study, they should consider the needs of foreign VC firms to build local 
networks. Policy makers can thus develop related policies to help them overcome 
this weakness such as some policy incentives for local VC firms, particularly 
government-linked VC firms, to cooperate with foreign ones either in the form of 
syndication or other forms of alliances.  
One limitation in this study is the small sample size, which makes this study 
still explorative in nature. Further studies are needed to see whether the finding here 
is applicable to other emerging markets. Furthermore, the partner selection criteria 
are not well studied though we have some items in the survey. It will be interesting 
if we obtain sufficient local syndication deals and get to know the motivation of 
each partner as well as their expectation on other partners. It would be better than 
current study design which only provides general syndication motives of VC firms.   
This study measures VC resource differences indirectly (by external firm 
characteristics). Future studies can also measure on knowledge and networks 
directly to test some more rigorous hypotheses.  
 
 125
8.5 Further Research Directions from Theoretical Framework  
Besides the VC investment decision process and syndication process, our 
framework on VC investment strategy, resources and learning presented in Section 
3.2 can be applied to other aspects of VC investment strategies. The framework 
shows that VC investment strategies are affected by VC knowledge. At the same 
time, these strategies can affect VC knowledge also through its learning process. In 
the rest of this section, we further explore two areas of VC investment strategies, the 
VC stage choice and VC strategy in managing relationship with entrepreneurs as 
future research directions from this framework.  
8.5.1 VC stage choice 
The VC investment stage choice refers to the VC investment choice between 
early stage ventures and later stage ones. The immaturity of VC market in emerging 
markets allows VC firms there to have more choices in some strategic issues such as 
investment stage choice and industry diversity choice. In developed markets, a VC 
firm is often required to specify its stage and industry choice (e.g., early stage 
Internet fund) before the subscription of public institutional investors. However, in 
emerging markets facing severe market uncertainty, VC fund-providers normally 
give more freedom to VC firms in their stage and industry choices. Therefore, it is 
more interesting to discuss the VC stage choice in the context of emerging markets. 
There are mainly two factors affecting this strategic choice, financial factors 
such as return and risk as well as non-financial factors like firm resources. First, the 
expected returns of the VC firm (or its shareholders) is certainly influential. 
Traditional finance theories such as CAPM (Sharpe, 1964) assume high expected 
returns if the investor can bear with high risk and diversify its investments well. In 
the context of VC stage choice, since the expected returns of early stage investments 
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are higher than later stage ones though risk is higher, finance theory implies that a 
VC firm should choose early stage investments if it desires for high return and can 
tolerate high risk. However, it is not so simple in practice due to the high 
information and transaction cost in VC market. A VC firm must spend much effort 
on venture monitoring, and thus it cannot afford to invest in a large number of early-
stage ventures to diversify the risk according to the finance theory. Thus non-
financial factors such as VC knowledge would also affect the stage choice strongly, 
particularly in emerging markets. 
 Our framework could thus be useful to explore the two-way interaction 
between VC knowledge and stage choice and derive propositions for further study. 
First, we look at how VC knowledge affects its stage choice, which is relatively 
simple. Early stage investments require more industry and management knowledge 
due to the high risk of ventures in this stage than ventures in later stage, thus a VC 
firm that possesses more industry and management knowledge is more likely to 
make early stage investments. On the contrary, a VC firm with more finance 
knowledge is more likely to make later stage investments.  
Second, according to our framework, being one aspect of investment strategy 
in investing solely, VC stage choice affects its 'learning by doing' process and thus 
its knowledge accumulation. For example, a new VC firm without much 
management knowledge in an emerging market may be willing to invest a small 
amount of fund in early stage to expand its network and learn the management of 
early stage ventures. 
 Summarizing above, the first direction implies that a VC firm should invest 
in a stage compatible to its current knowledge, but the second direction may require 
the VC firm to invest in a stage without sufficient knowledge for the purpose of 
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learning. In emerging markets, the latter implication would be more prominent since 
VC firms there are less knowledgeable in comparison to those in developed markets. 
Thus VC firms there would have stronger desire to accumulate relevant knowledge, 
and we could propose that the relationship between VC current knowledge and 
investment stage is moderated by the VC’s learning desire in emerging markets, 
which could be a proposition in future study. 
 8.5.2 Venture capitalist and entrepreneur relationship 
In VC research, the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship has been well 
studied (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Bruton et al., 2000), but 
most of them use agency approach to study this relationship with the focus on 
economic incentives to control the behaviors of entrepreneurs. From social 
approach, recent studies (e.g., De Clercq and Sapienza, 2001; Shepherd and 
Zacharakis, 2001) started to study this relationship with the emphasis on maintaining 
and strengthening relationship by trust building. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001) 
has proposed four mechanisms to nurture the trust between the entrepreneur and 
venture capitalist, namely, frequent communication, signaling commitment and 
consistency, being fair and just, and good fit with the partner. The four means 
coincide with four of the five means reported in McAllister (1995) in the context of 
manager and worker relationship.  
However, while two of the four means, signaling commitment & consistency 
and good fit with the partner, are almost free of VC efforts in the short-term and can 
be used easily, the other two means, frequent communication and being fair & just, 
could be costly in reality.  
Among the first two means, signaling commitment and consistency is called 
‘professional credentials’ in McAllister (1995). In the VC context, it refers to the 
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reputation of the VC firm or venture capitalist in the VC market. A famous firm or 
investment manager is easily trusted by an entrepreneur. It can be used without 
much cost from the perspective of a venture capitalist though the reputation itself 
takes time to be built up. The second means, good fit with the partner, refers to the 
closeness in their beliefs and values between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur. According to McAllister (1995), such a fit refers to cultural or ethnic 
similarity, which is often generated due to the similar cultural or country background 
of the two partners, often pre-determined in venture capitalist and the entrepreneur 
relationship.   
On the other hand, the other two means could be costly. The first one, 
frequent communication, is an important means to promote trust and enhance 
cooperation from network perspective, and it is also suggested by the prisoner's 
dilemma model (Axelrod, 1984). However, communication is costly due to the time 
and perhaps travelling cost involved, and cannot be used unlimitedly. Gifford (1997) 
has noticed that venture capitalists could only give limited attention to the ventures 
they invested in due to cost constraint.  
The second means in the second group, the mechanism of being fair and just, 
called ‘peer reliable role performance’ in McAllister (1995) or 'procedural justice' in 
Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996), refers to the trustworthiness of the partner. In the 
VC context, it is particularly related to the fairness and reciprocity of VC behaviors. 
As venture capitalists are often the dominant partners in the relationship with 
entrepreneurs, their fairness in dealing with entrepreneurs is very important in 
building the trust from the entrepreneurs, prominently when they are in conflict. 
They can carefully listen to the view of entrepreneurs and seek to find a solution 
acceptable to both parties, or they can use the legal approach or the threat of 
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withdrawing financial support to force entrepreneurs accept their opinion. While the 
former could bring higher level of trust from entrepreneurs, it is often more costly in 
conflict resolution. It takes longer time to settle the conflict using communication 
and negotiation for solution acceptable to entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists may 
worry that it signals wrongly to entrepreneurs of the weakness of venture capitalists 
may encourage the self-interest seeking of entrepreneurs and affect the venture 
performance negatively.  
Our framework in Section 3.2 shows that VC investment is not only a means 
for financial returns but also a means for learning and network building. While the 
focus of agency approach is on financial returns, the focus of social network 
approach is in the network building. Our framework could thus incorporate the two 
aspects, and suggest some strategies for venture capitalists in emerging markets to 
manage a good relationship with entrepreneurs and control the cost at the same time. 
We can thus see venture capitalists should maintain a balance between control 
(motivation of agency approach) and network building (motivation of learning 
approach), between promoting trust (long-term benefits) and controlling cost (short-
term firm performance). Further studies can start here to explore the proper balance 
between these two aspects in different market contexts. 
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APPENDIX A1: QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEW 
A. Firm structure and investment 
1. Questions concerning the firm history, the business model, fund source, 







2. In your due diligence criteria, do you value entrepreneurs' experience more 
important than promising product and market (i.e., are you willing to support 









B. Venture investment:  
1. Do you have co-investors in your investments? If yes, are you the leader or 
follower? What is the duty of different partners? Who are your normal co-









2. What is your normal equity holding? How do you monitor the venture? What 


















C. Firm's knowledge base: 
1. What is current source of firm's industry knowledge (on venture industry 
and market)? How has the firm acquired such knowledge since its inception? 
How important is the firm's network in the accumulation of such knowledge? 
Does the network exclusive to the firm (not accessible by other VC firms)? If 







2. What is current source of firm's management knowledge (on judging the 
venture management as well as monitoring the venture)? How has the firm 
acquired such knowledge since its inception? How important is the firm's 
network in the accumulation of such knowledge? Does the network exclusive 
to the firm (not accessible by other VC firms)? If not, is the firm in danger of 








3. What is current source of firm's local knowledge (knowing entrepreneurs' 
quality as well as future interaction)? How has the firm acquired such 
knowledge since its inception? How important is the firm's network in the 
accumulation of such knowledge? Does the network exclusive to the firm 















APPENDIX A2: INTERVIEW REPORT14 
Case 1: Firm A 
Background 
 
Firm A is a joint venture, between a Europe based corporate VC company (X), and a local 
government-linked VC company (Y). Company X itself is the venture arm of a large European 
Corporation (W), who is a world leader of smart card solutions and mobile telephony applications. 
Company X was set up in 2000 with fund size of US $75m, who invests in start-ups and young 
companies in smart card related industries across Europe, America, and Asia. Company Y is a large 
local VC firm with long investment history and fund size of US$500m.  Firm A itself was set up in 
2001 with fund size of US$6m. Company X and Y provided the initial funding with equal 
percentage.  
 
Though Firm A is a corporate VC firm, there is a limited life for the fund it raised.  
Currently, there are three portfolio companies, two local firms and one Korean firm. There is only 
one full-time staff from Corporation W as the manager of this firm. The joint venture is also seen as 
an experiment of Company Y (due to its government linkage) to support local start-ups through a 
dedicated corporate venture fund.  
 
 
                                                          
14 Only Firm C, Firm H, and Firm J are willing to release the full report. For all other firms, we can 
only publish the first part to give a brief background. 
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Established in 1987, Firm B has become “one of the leading VC firms in the Pacific 
Region".  Originally, Firm B is a US-based venture firm, and it started its international expansion in 
1980s. Initially Firm B attracted Asian investors to put money into its US funds, basically from 
Taiwan and Singapore. So naturally when VC industry took off in Asia at the second half of 1980s, 
Firm B was invited to come. It was restructured in Taiwan in 1987, and came to Singapore in 1988. 
"We basically went back to the people who put money in us and form VC funds with them", said the 
Director. At that time, Firm B set up a closed-end venture fund with US$65m, joined sponsored by 
Firm B and its local partner, a large government-linked corporation. Since then, Firm B has grown 
very rapidly. Currently, there are over US$1.6b under management with offices around the world, 
and most of them are in Asia, all the way from China to India. When briefing the firm history, the 
Director is proud to say, "though we are not considered as the top tier VC firms in the US, we are 
surely one of the biggest VC firms in Asia, both by fund size and by performance". 
    
Firm B is an independent VC firm, currently with 7 senior partners and total 22 investment 
professionals. "Our reputation in this part of world is mainly technology. We are early stage 
specialists", said the Director. With good investment returns in early days, Firm B became a brand 
name in VC industry. The Director said, "many governments actually put up money and ask us to 
manage for them because they want us to promote technology for them by early stage funding. That's 
the kind of reputation we have built over the last ten years".  
 
To date, Firm B has raised and managed 32 funds to capitalize on technology opportunities 
in the region. For the sources, most of the funds of Firm B come from corporations, insurance 
companies, and banks. Since its inception in 1987, Firm B has invested in about 367 companies 
across Singapore, South East Asia, Great China, India, Korea, Australia, and US. 71 of them are 






Case 3: Firm C 
 
1. Foundation and Fundraising 
 
Firm C was set up by its parent company T in 1991, a world leader in semiconductor 
industry, whose products are widely used in personal computers. It is one of the largest global 
corporate venture programs investing in the technology segment. It has invested more than US$4b in 
approximately 1,000 companies in more than 30 countries. Initially, Firm C invested in a few 
companies whose products and services helped fill the gap in our own product line, capabilities and 
capacity. But soon its mission grew beyond that goal. Now the vision of Firm C is to support 
innovative companies that can help the PC industry grow by attracting new users and opening up new 
uses for connected PCs.  
 
With funding from Company T’s earning, Firm C’s investment team seeks out and invests in 
promising companies worldwide working together to establish new and innovative technologies, 
develop industry standard solutions, drive Internet growth, enable new usage models, and advance the 
computing and communications platforms. Since its inception, about 160 portfolio companies have 
been acquired by other companies (trade sale) and another 150 have gone public on various 
exchanges around the world, according to the company's website. 
 
Firm C's Singapore office was set up in 2002, and is currently managed by one full-time 
staff, who focuses on investments in Southeast Asia.   
 
 
2. Investment Strategy 
 
"As a corporate VC, we invest in companies that strategically align with our parent 
company", said the Manager, "particularly, we focus on hot industries in each region. For example, in 
Taiwan the hot industry is consumer electronics. Korea is on-line game developing. You will see a lot 
of tourism-related software developers in Thailand, etc.". Different from people's perception, Firm C 
defines "strategic" very broadly. The Manager explained, "we invest in not only semi-conductor 
industries, but also other industries that will help us to grow our business, such as software, telecom 
infrastructure, telecom equipment, and communication technology".  
 
The investment of Firm C is geographically diversified. About 40% of Firm C's investment 
were made outside of the US in 2003. Its operation in Asia Pacific region covers Australia, New 




Firm C invests in a great range of stages, starting from startup till pre-IPO. However, its 
emphasis is on early stage. About 40% of its new deals in 2003 were in early stage. Its industrial 
knowledge enables it to identify investment opportunities at early stage. Its nature of corporate VC 
and multiple investment funds under management also mean longer investment horizon that Firm C 
can take. 
 
Deal Source and Selection Criteria 
 
On deal source, "it is a mixture", the Manager explained, "it could be from our parent 
corporation, our networks, external resources, other VC firms, our own search, or even from 
entrepreneurs directly". Concerning the deal quality from various sources, the Manager did not give a 
preference. Even for deals directly from entrepreneur thus without any certification, the Manager still 
see their importance. He explained, "I personally appreciate those entrepreneurs actually go out and 
send e-mail to VCs. It shows that they are putting in efforts. We treat them equally with referred 
deals". He further added, "deals by own search is also important as we may get better deals from it. 
We cannot say one means is more important than the other".  
 
Concerning investment criteria, Firm C looks at both strategic and financial value. The 
Manager said, "to make an investment, there are two crucial angles, strategic and financial, and both 
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should be satisfied. A financial rewarding deal but having no strategic value is not good, and a highly 
strategic deal but not financially viable is not good either". To invest in a venture, "we require good 
product, good market and good people", said the Manager. "A CEO should have a clear vision and 
find ways to move the company forward for success, and have the ability to recruit the right people".  
  
To make the investment decision, each potential deal must go through two approval stages. 
"Though I am the only full-time staff", the Manager said, "I get much help from the parent 
corporation in this process. Deals will have to be presented to our review committee, once approved 
we will then conduct the necessary due diligence. After the due diligence process, if the result is 
satisfactory, we get legal team to check legal issues, and etc. Finally we present the deal again for 
final approval. It's really a teamwork".  
 
Stage Financing and Co-investors 
 
"Our preference would be to have co-investors", said the Manager. It is actually one 
investment policy of Firm C.  On the partner selection, the Manager said, "we prefer a financial VC 
as the partner. The purpose is to have a balance in corporate governance. We come as a strategic 
investor, and we would like to have financial investor who is complementary to us". The other 
purpose is to have someone as the investors' representative sitting on the board. Constrained by 
corporate policy, Firm C normally does not take the board seat in its portfolio companies, but 
requests as an observer in the board. An investment partner can take the board seat and protect 
investors' rights in the venture more actively.  
 
The number of co-investors depends on the deal size. There is only one co-investor in some 
deals, but are more in others.  
 
 
3. Knowledge Base of the Firm and Value-added Activities 
 
Knowledge Source of the Firm 
 
The main knowledge source of Firm C is its parent Company T, including industry, 
management and even local knowledge. Being a leading high-tech corporation in the world, it is 
naturally for Company T to possess good industrial and management knowledge. Furthermore, being 
a multinational corporation (MNC), Company T has set up a lot of subsidiaries in major developing 
countries. Such an extensive network becomes the major source for local knowledge. The Manager 
explained it with an example, "if I plan to invest in Thailand, I will consult the General manager in 
Thailand's subsidiary of Company T. I work with the local team to scan the market, find the potential, 
and work with government there to find out industries they interested". Actually most general 
managers in Company T's subsidiaries are local, and can provide valuable information on local 
market and culture to facilitate Firm C's venture investment.  
 
The Manager possesses good management and regional knowledge. Before joining the 
investment group, he was the General Manager of Company T's subsidiary in one Southeast country. 
He had traveled extensively in this region, and had no difficulty in understanding locals.  
 
Besides its corporate linkage, Firm C also work hard to build it networks with local financial 
institutions, especially other VC firms. The Manager explained, "the networking is very important for 
VC firms. You can first meet local VC association to get a VC list, and then host a lunch or dinner to 
meet other venture capitalists. Then people may start to share information and deals with you". "Co-
investment is also a means for networking", the Manager said, "being a brand-name, other firms are 
also eager to built the relationship with you. We have good relationship with many VC firms, and can 
also help them with our network". The Manager provided an example, "some VC firms go to invest 
in China, and we can introduce our people there (both Firm C's China office and Company T's China 
subsidiary) to help". As the result, Firm C feels no disadvantage in local knowledge even as a foreign 
VC firm. It can get local information largely from its local networks, both Company T's local 





The value adding of Firm C is mainly through its parent Company T.  The networks of both 
Firm C and Company T can provide much needed help for its portfolio companies in seeking future 
financing, finding customers and suppliers. There is a "revenue generation program" in Firm C, 
which matches portfolio company capacities to the needs of Company T's customers and gets the 
people in two sides meet. The leading role of Company T in technology development is a further 
advantage to Firm C's portfolio companies. They can gain access to future technology trends and 
standards by knowing the future products of Company T, and can even work with its R&D labs for 
technology development.  
 
The shareholding of Firm C is minority, and the maximum is 20%. Sometimes its value 
adding is also through its co-investors. The Manager said, " For example, if the venture team is not 
complete, we as investors can help the venture to recruit right people though we can only give 
recommendation. Normally our co-investors can help more in such cases since they have much more 
experience in VC industry". 
 
Though Firm C does not sit on the board of its portfolio companies but only serves as an 
observer, it still actively participates the venture management. The Manager explained, "we 
proactively suggest things and ways to improve the company performance. The company may listen 
to us even though we are minority". Though some Western VC firms in Asia complained that Asian 
entrepreneurs are less willing to listen to VCs compared to the West, the Manager hold a different 
view, "certainly for major decisions, we need to give rationales to the board why we want to do 
certain thing". He added, "the board may not listen to you, but it is not cultural problem, but just 
communication problem. You need to communicate your reasons to them clearly".  
 
 
4. Exit  
 
As far as the exit mechanism is concerned, Firm C has no preference between the IPO and 
the trade sale. Normally Firm C expects exit after 3 to 5 years of investment though it allows some 
flexibility. Selling is done as part of prudent management of a large portfolio to recoup capital for use 








In 1997, Firm D was set up by three founders who had more than twenty years of experience 
in commercial banking in Singapore. As one of the founders, the Managing Director said: “We left 
the banking world with the idea of doing something that will still be finance-related, but which would 
allow us to do a few more things we could not have done in corporate banking.” Specially, “we felt 
that in the developing region such as Asia, it is very difficult for big financial organizations, including 
investment banks, to look after the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) because of the 
comprehensive structures of these international giants”, the Managing Director added. “We set up a 
network of senior corporate directors and even some ex-CEOs, with the purpose of looking after 
those SMEs which have unique capabilities with the potential to grow into a dominant player in the 
global arena. Unlike the typical type of financial institutions, the majority of our professionals are not 
paid". Therefore, Firm D was initially founded and structured very differently from normal VC firms. 
Each portfolio company is taken care by one or several Firm D's partners, and they invest in the 
company with their own money as business angels as well as the fund of Firm D. 
 
Currently, there are 16 partners in Firm D, and they all use their own money invested in 
Firm D as well as invested in portfolio companies. Some of them are full-time while others are part-
time. The Managing Director explained his business model, "different from normal VC firms that 
mainly use others' money to invest and most people there are employees, we are investors ourselves. 
We don't need fund management fee. We are people having the money and want to make money by 
ourselves. We are the 'real' venture capitalists. Our model is closer to the original idea of VC, 
successful entrepreneurs investing in private equity with their own money". Also Firm D is a small 
VC firm, it can get a lot of partners due to its different structure. The Managing Director explained 
the reason, "Our business model is different from normal VCs. VC firms tend to hire many junior 
people to lower the cost. For us, every one who can make money is a partner. So we can have many 
partners". Firm D looks more like a partnership of business angels who often invest together. 
 
Firm D likes to call itself a corporate intermediary rather than a VC firm to emphasize its 
wide range of corporate services beyond the fund provider. It has already helped to look after about 
35 SMEs in seeking funds and planning for growth strategy since its foundation. 
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Firm E is the venture subsidiary of a local insurance company R. It was set up in 1990 as a 
perpetuate fund, similar to a corporate VC firm. The Manager gave a brief introduction, "at that time, 
we had two approaches for VC, the direct investment and fund of funds, i.e., investing in VC funds". 
The size of two funds was $45m and $25m respectively. 
 
The Manager further explained the reason for Company R to start the venture investment. 
"We started the in-house VC business because we felt we could have a lot of leverage out of our 
relationships. We have a database of local SMEs, who are clients of R. The management team felt 
that we could get more leverage from all these relationships. Since we know all these companies, we 
can invest in some better-managed clients with good prospects, and get more leverage by equity 
investment". The Manager added, "at that time, the Second Board (SESDAQ) had started in 
Singapore stock market not long, and we felt a lot of our clients could eventually be listed there. So 
we put together some in-house money, and invested first in our clients. We know these clients very 
well after doing business with them for a few years. So we started to leverage all these relationships".   
 
Currently, there are four investment managers in Firm E. Firm E is going to launch a new 
fund targeting $50m, managing third party's money instead.  
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Firm F is a local independent VC firm, founded by a renowned venture capitalist T. Before 
starting Firm F in 2004, T was the managing director of a famous US VC Firm N, in charge of its 
investment in Asia. T's achievement in VC investment is phenomenal. Of the 13 investments T 
invested during his tenure at Firm N, there have already been four listings with a few more on the 
way. One of its portfolio companies that listed on NASDAQ is regarded as one of the most successful 
technology IPOs since the 1990s.  
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Firm G is a global independent VC firm, founded by a leading bank in Europe in 2000. 
Though initiated by a large financial institution, Firm G is designed to operate as an independent 
entity. Its investors range from large high-tech corporations to famous US VC firms. The fund size of 
its European fund is Euro €210m, and its Asian fund is US$300m. Though based in Europe, its 
network of strategic partners covers all major geographic regions.  
 
The investment focus of Firm G is on telecom, media, and technology sectors. It 
concentrates on private companies that have proven technologies and existing customers in the 
expansion and later pre-IPO stages. It has an investment horizon of five years. Its Asian Fund focuses 
more on bridging the technology gap between Asia and the US by investing mainly in expansion-
stage technology companies and supporting their rollout into the Asian-Pacific region and/or 
developing their local outsourcing capability.  
 
One aspect of investment opportunities Firm G interested is technologically based products 
and services that can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of established companies through 
transforming their internal supply chains and the way they interact with their customers and suppliers.  
 
Here leads to the story of an advisor in Firm G, who joined Firm G to serve as an advisor for 
two companies Firm G supported.  
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Case 8: Firm H 
 
1. Foundation  
 
Firm H is not a typical VC firm, but a business incubator. Firm H calls itself "venture 
accelerator" to highlight its role in helping the growth of SMEs. The Head briefly introduced the 
background of Firm H. "We are one of the very few private incubators in Singapore. Most incubators 
here do not earn money and have been subsided by government agencies (e.g., EDB, ASTAR), 
research institutions (NUS, NTU) or big companies who want to spin off their internal technologies. 
But they neglect the skill component of incubation. Most of them only focus on the physical 
component, such as providing office space, infrastructure. They do not realize a lot of soft skills 
needed for running this business. We are profitable from Day One".  
 
Firm H started in Feb 2004 with three partners and one associate. Currently there are two 
partners (the Head himself is a partner also) and one associate. The Head said, "one very experienced 
guy has just come on board informally and we are easing him into the team before offering him full-
fledge partnership. Our team is deliberately kept small and we outsource most low-value works that 
the clients require such as simple accounting, corporate secretary services and certain legal works like 
the protection of of intellectual properties to “subject matter experts”. Small is good in the sense you 
can control the quality and the output. It is important as ours is a very human business". 
 
 The business model of Firm H is like a corporate intermediary (similar to Firm D in Case 4 
but it does not put in money at the firm level). The Head said, "we get our income from retainer fee, 
financial advisory work and success fees, all are from investees. We help investees in both strategic 
planning and fund raising by leveraging on our extensive investor network, including those with 
business angels, VC firms, and corporate investors. We are like intermediaries, but most of them here 
are pure brokerage, just marrying two sides (one needs investing and one needs money). What we do 
(through a lot of value adding) is well beyond what normal consultants and brokers do".   
 
Being a private incubator, Firm H does not focus on the physical component of doing 
business. However, it also sublets some of its office spaces at a discount to market rate, to incubatees, 
which cannot afford to have big space. The Head said, "we had a large office before but we have 
chosen to scale down our own space requirement to reduce unnecessary costs. After all, we should 
practice what we preach to the incubatees, especially since we are seldom in our office".  
 
 
2. Investment Strategy 
 
Being a business incubator, the investment process of Firm H is a bit different from normal 
VC firms. The Head mentioned three stages. "First we identify the good companies. We are very 
selective since we are very small firm with limited resources. We are is kind of similar to a VC firm, 
although the key difference is that we don't manage a fund. Secondly, after identifying the firms that 
we feel are worth working on, we will enter into a formal engagement relationship. In this stage, we 
do a lot of strategic planning with them. The third stage is to help with its financing. It can be in the 
form of equity financing (like VC), or sometimes you can help to develop the channels for them 
instead of drawing in investors immediately, since it can help in generating revenue for them. We can 
also help to structure working capital financing or debt financing, if the situations require us to do 
so".  
 
Given the extensive local network of Firm H, its business scope is in the local market. The 
Head said, "Currently, we only focus on Singapore firms, but also assists overseas firms expanding to 
Singapore. In China, we have tied up with a famous university incubator. However, it is very difficult 
to work on deals across the border, especially when the deal is small. We have a lot of potential and 
existing deal-flows in Singapore, and we really don't need to go overseas at this stage".  
  
On industry preferences, given the industrial experience and networks of partners in Firm H, 
investees served by Firm H cover most industries. The Head said, "we can invest in all kinds of 





On investment stage, the Head said, "all our investees are profitable companies, but needing 
money to grow. Some investees are desperate for money, and we are wary of such firms. We prefer 
well-managed firms seeking funds to accelerate their growth". So Firm H would mainly engage 
ventures in expansion stage though later stage ones are possible. It seems the consideration of profit 
limits its willingness to help “idea” stage firms.  
 
Deal Source and Selection Criteria 
 
Concerning deal source, the Head said with proud, "all our deals come through our network. 
So far we haven't gone out to market ourselves. A lot of deals come from words of mouth, referred 
deals, and even government agencies may recommend people to us if they need to do valuation and 
require our assistance. We just focus on doing good work and people just tell others".  
 
On the deal selection, the Head repeated the word "selective" for several times. He gave an 
example, "sometimes when people introduce a deal to you out of friendship, you tend to accept it. 
Later you realize you cannot do it this way. We have to focus on more promising deals. If you are not 
selective, it is not fair to investors since they depend on you to introduce and structure good deals". 
 
The Head further explained his criteria, "in the due diligence process, we look at everything 
such as the people, the product, the financials, the technology, and the market need. You cannot have 
fantastic technology but well ahead of time, which requires much effort in educating the public. Of all 
these factors, the team is the most important".  
 
In the due diligence process, Firm H relies on its network very much. The Head said, "in the 
process, we meet the team and talk to them, and then come back to do our own research. We also talk 
to other people without naming our clients to know the industry. We know a lot of industry experts 





In the business of Firm H, finding investors for its investees is important. The Head said, 
"we have a regular list of investors we can work with. Actually before we accept a deal, we tent to 
have someone in mind. But we cannot control the investor side". He further mentioned the process of 
getting investors, "before we go out to find investors, we would prepare a short executive summary. It 
introduces the deal, the industry, and some background. If the VC is interested, we meet with them. 
After that, we prepare a detailed info memorandum for them, and let the investors speak with 
entrepreneurs, facilitate the negotiation of the terms and then move forward. We help both investees 
and investors in this process and do a great deal of mediating. We also put much emphasis on 
valuation of the venture".  
 
Concerning criteria for investors, investees may require more than money. The Head said, 
"we are matching investors with investees. Some people want knowledge, network, guidance, and 
mentorship from investors".  
 
Firm H itself is also selective in its investor partners. The Head said, "some angels don't 
know anything. They are just gambling. I don't want their money and tell them to buy share from the 
stock market". As for VC, it is similar. The Head added, "some VCs are cooperative and some are 
not. Some are willing to help but some always question you for everything, e.g., where is my money, 
why you do this, why not getting more sales, why you travel, etc. Some VCs like to squeeze people. 
They ask for ridiculous terms. This is why venture capitalists sometimes are called vulture capitalists. 
However, sometimes you cannot differentiate them beforehand. You have to know them by 
experience". The Head said, "we don't welcome all VCs. We work with those who are friendly and 
reasonable".  
 
On the relationship with investors, the Head said, “we guard our reputation very carefully. 
We do not earn money from investors’ side unless they engaged us to do due diligence or valuation 
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before they pour in the money. We are always remain very neutral between the two sides and declare 
our interests beforehand, if any, to avoid conflicts of interest”. 
 
 
3. Knowledge Base of the Firm and Value-added Activities 
 
Knowledge Source of the Firm 
 
As a new small firm, Firm H's knowledge comes from its staffs, particularly its partners. The 
Head said, “our two partners have a lot of technology and industrial experience. Personally I had 
managed a few start-ups before. I know what kinds of problems a start-up company may face at its 
different growing stages, such as problems with suppliers, problems in distribution channels, and 
cash-flow problems. A lot of time you may also have partner problems after you become very 
successful. You have to run through it and know how to prepare and solve these problems. All of us 
also have working experience in large government-linked companies, and we know what the politics 
in large organizations are and what the issues they face are. So we understand both the buyer and 
seller side, and can help both sides in the investment process”.  
 
The Head further mentioned his experience in the business of incubator, “I have worked in 
this industry for a long time. Before founding Firm H, I worked in an incubator in Suntec City. The 
boss was generous to bring me around, and I gradually built my networks. Now, I don't necessary 
have to go out for too much networking but still get a lot of deals. My partner is Indonesian Chinese, 
also has a good network due to his good reputation, background and experience. He has worked in 
the private equity line for a long time”. 
  
The Head also talked more on the business of incubation, “incubation industry is an industry 
with high entry barriers. You cannot do it well by knowing one or two investors. The success in this 
industry depends on your knowledge and network, whether people trust in you or not. All these take 
time to build. We do have a wide network among investors and investees. We also have government 
agencies to work with us, who often seek our input. We are entrepreneurs ourselves. We are always 




On the value adding of Firm H to its clients, the Head is quite excited. “We identify and 
have to coach them. There is a lot of handholding. We identify the strategy help to execute and lead 
them further on the path to profitability. We look at their resources, and see what are the pillars 
missing and whether there are any skill-sets lacking such as marketing, financial management, etc. In 
this business, you may see one company full of technical people and the other one full of fantastic 
ideas but no technology knowledge. You have to strike a balance between the two extremes and 
sometimes even marry them together”.  
 
Besides providing guidance in strategic areas, Firm H also focuses on fundraising. The Head 
continued, “concurrently, we gain an insight on what kind of investors they are looking for. There are 
three types of investors we are in contact with, namely business angels, VCs, and corporate investors. 
You need to know them and they know you. When they know you can introduce good deals to them, 
they will work with you. Corporate investors are companies who want to grow through acquisition. 
Sometimes they have extra money to invest in, sometimes they are looking for non-organic growth, 
and other times, they may want to diversify their risk from their core business. We need to know what 
kind of things the investors are looking for”.  
 
After bringing the two sides together, Firm H continues to provide help. The Head said, “we 
also coach investees in their presentation, answering the frequently asked questions, fine-tuning 
business plans, doing valuation, deal structuring, and planning the different stages of financing. We 
also structure team-sheets for them and do a lot of mediation. We try not to do the presentations on 
behalf of entrepreneurs in most cases, since investors need to know them and get a better feel of the 
“substance” available through the process. We are also very strict in reflecting the actual valuation of 
the ventures, although we stand to gain a lot more financially, if we inflate the valuation”.  
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After raising the money successfully, Firm H can continue to provide help. The Head said, 
“after investment, you have to work out the reporting structure to investors, fine-tune your plan, and 
continue monitoring the progress, etc. We may stay on to help the company if required. Sometimes 
investors will bring a team. Sometimes it makes sense for the company to continue engaging us 
because they may not need, or cannot afford a full-time CFO. They just need us to go there once a 
week or twice a week, spend half a day there. Slowly we will move away when they grow their own 
capability”.  
 
To show the commitment of Firm H, Firm H sometimes would convert part of their fees into 
equity and become shareholders also. Sometimes the partners may invest with their personal money 
and become angel investors in the company. The Head said, “we normally don't take board seat but 
sometimes are required by investors as their proxy in the board in case they are not around. We are 
neutral in the board and sometimes can help in solving deadlocks”.   
 
 
4. Exit  
 
On the firm performance, the Head is satisfied, “we don't need to do many deals to survive. 
Income from one deal is substantial for us. So far the success rate is encouraging. We tend to grow 
with the team since it's a long-term business after you take equity in the company”.  
 
However, Firm H sometimes has to exit a deal prematurely, before bringing in any investors. 
The Head said, “for some of the companies, after working with them for a while, we may tell them 
that we do not want to carry on the relationship further. Sometimes the technology is fantastic but the 
founders may have some personal shortcomings. Sometimes you know competitors are out there. 
You talk to them that you should make improvement like this, but they are not coach-able and do not 
listen to you. So we don't want to waste our time, we will cut our losses, and move on to other 




Case 9: Firm J 
 
1. Foundation and Fundraising 
 
Firm J is an independent VC firm formed in 1991 through the collaborative efforts of three 
sponsors that are reputable institutions and organizations in Asia and the United States. 
 
Sponsor I is one of the largest banks in South-East Asia with branches, agencies and offices 
in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, Myanmar, 
Vietnam, India, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. As a public quoted 
bank on the Singapore Exchange, Sponsor I also has stockbroking operations in Singapore and 
Malaysia. 
 
Sponsor II is a Singapore registered multinational corporation which owns a network of 
diverse business operations engaged in such areas as technology, manufacturing, property 
development, leisure industries, trading, and international investment services. Sponsor II is also a 
public company quoted on the Singapore Exchange. The business of Sponsor II spans more than ten 
countries, including Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Brunei, Australia, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, China, United States and United Kingdom. 
 
Sponsor III is a US venture capital investment group with over US$1 billion of aggregate 
committed capital. Sponsor III is independently owned and operated by its management and has 
offices in Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, India, Japan, Australia, and 
the United States. 
 
Since its inception, Firm J has spanned its investments across Southeast Asia and the West 
Coast of the United States. It has made over 80 investments in a diverse range of industries, from 
service to technology; and across every stage of business development, from start-up to expansion. 
Currently Firm J has S$184 million under management, with 26 active portfolios (meaning portfolios 
still under active monitoring, not exited yet). There are five full-time investment staffs in Firm J as 
well as some industry veterans serving as its advisors. 
 
 
2. Investment Strategy 
 
In investment strategy, Firm J now focuses itself on outsourcing service providers across 
different industries, and believes in the growth of service outsourcing in Asia due to the trend of 
globalization and fast economic growth in the region. The Vice President explained the reason for 
Firm J to change its strategy two years ago, “we saw the need to differentiate ourselves from other 
VC firms and thus developed this strategy. It also helps in linking our portfolio companies in the 
same value chain together". The preferred deal size of Firm J is S$1m to $10m.  
 
Firm J developed a strategy that differentiated themselves from competitors. Their core 
focus is streamlined to 5 industries, Information and Communications Technology, Logistics 




Firm J invests in all stages but prefers the expansion stage. 
 
Deal Source and Selection Criteria   
 
The Vice President explained, "we prefer deals with referrals, but we also welcome deals 
from entrepreneurs directly". Deals are from various sources including its own networks (three 
sponsors of Firm J, institutional shareholders, investees) and some reputable consulting groups or 
technology service firms. Firm J is also interested in spin-offs from large corporations, and may 
invest in some promising ones.  
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The Vice President further explained the importance of various criteria, "we value 
entrepreneurs' experience as much as promising product and market. The success of a venture should 
be a combination of all these factors (people, product, market, etc.). We would recommend injection 
of experienced team members if the original team is inexperienced". Firm J expects the venture to 
provide competitive and effective solutions for businesses and achieve economies of scale as the 
venture expands. 
 
Stage Financing and Co-investors 
 
Firm J is normally the lead investor. Reasons for co-investment are normally due to 
investees wanting to bring in players with strong domain expertise, or geographical or marketing 
reach into target markets. Other examples of co-investment is with government related organizations 
who invest to support the industry. 
 
Reasons for syndicated deals range from technology, marketing, financial, and networking, 
and Firm J has learned some industry knowledge through such co-investment experiences, especially 
through its co-investing in early stage firms. 
 
 
3. Knowledge Base of the Firm and Value-added Activities 
 
Knowledge Source of the Firm 
 
Being an independent VC firm, Firm J naturally accumulates knowledge from its 
professional investment staffs as well as advisors. When asking about the role of three sponsors in the 
management of Firm J, the Vice President explained, "we do our daily investment activities such as 
due diligence all by ourselves. Most of our investment staffs are recruited from the market except the 
founder, who was with Sponsor II before. However, normally the three sponsors would have one or 
two representatives sitting in our investment committee, and have the right of final deal approval".  
 
On possible competition with sponsors (two of them conduct VC investment also), the Vice 
President said, "we are different from them in investment focus. The venture arm of Sponsor I 
focuses on pre-IPO deals, and Sponsor III on early stage high-tech ones. We'd rather see the synergy 
with them".  
 
The Vice President further explained the knowledge source of Firm J, "our knowledge 
mainly comes from investment experience and networks are also important. There are high entry 
barriers in VC industry. All our managers are experienced in making investments in private 
companies with different industry focus. Take myself as an example, before joining Firm J, I worked 
in a large corporation in charge of its acquisition business for over ten years. Only when you go 
through the cycle from investment to divestment, you get an understanding of the VC industry. 
Furthermore, most of us have first-hand management experience by managing or helping (managing 
incubators) start-ups in the 2000 dot.com boom". She further added, "we also do researches to update 
our knowledge, and meet our peers to both building networks and knowledge exchanges". The Vice 
President was proud of his team, "our investment professional team possesses complementary 
business and financial skills, as well as technical knowledge. Collectively, the team has valuable 





On venture monitoring, the Vice President mentioned the practice of Firm J. "We normally 
take significant minority shareholdings, about 20% to 50%. We try not to take majority. Normally we 
will ask for a board seat if our shareholding is more than 10%".  
 
On the help to portfolio companies, the Vice President explained, "our main value-added is 
at the board level, giving help from both operational and strategic level. We don't involve in the day 
to day management. Our experienced investment staffs can offer various helps to the venture 
management team. We can render assistance and offer advice on industry trends and the formulation 
of corporate policies and strategic planning. We can also give advise on financial management, 
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negotiation in mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures, as well as initial public offerings. 
Furthermore, our experienced advisors can also be a source of value adding".  
 
The Vice President further added, "we also provide valuable business contacts to assist 
companies in the expansion of their businesses, along with sound advice and sharing of our business 
experience. We see our value adding mainly in networks".  
 
4. Exit  
 
"We normally study possible avenues of exit before making the investment", said the Vice 
President. "Typically, we expect the investment period to be around three years. In practice, about 90 
per cent of our investments last for about 5 years”.  
 




APPENDIX B1: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VC INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS STUDY 
1. Investment Process
 1. First column: Please tick in the first column all process steps that 
are part of the investment decision process in your company. 
Second column: Of the steps you ticked put the steps in the 
sequence (or order) similar to the investment decision process in 
your company by writing numbers in the second column. 
Process Step 5 1, 2, 3, 4, … 
Initial Contact  F 
Pre-Concept check made by analyst or investment 
manager (NOT preliminary screen)  F 
Second management level decides to go further  F 
Meeting with company  F 
Preliminary screening  F 
Meeting / detailed discussion with company  F 
Preliminary non-binding term-sheet  F 
Informal meeting between deal team and senior 
management  F 
First approval by investment committee  F 
Investment due diligence  F 
Investment proposal  F 
Documentation and negotiation (before final approval)  F 
Second approval by investment committee  F 
Documentation and negotiation after final approval  F 
Legal and accounting audit  F 
Iterative adjustments of investment proposal  F 
Iterative final approval by investment committee  F 
Board decision (more relevant for strategic investors)  F 
Government approval (mainly for government related 
investments)  F 
Binding term Sheet with company  F 
Others:  F 
  2.  How much time do you need for the whole investment 
decision process (initial contact to final decision)?       ______ 
weeks 
  3.  How much time do you need on average to accomplish the due 
diligence?    ______ weeks 
 4.  How many investment managers /associates typically work on a 
deal? 
  a. part time:      _______ persons 
 b. full time:       _______  persons 
 5.  How many senior managers (partners, 
directors, etc.) are actively involved in the 
decision process (especially screening and due 
diligence) – and not only in the approval 
stage? 
  a. part time:      _______ persons 
 b. full time:       _______  persons 
 6.  What percentage of all deals do you receive 
from each of the following sources? 
Source of deal from… % 
Direct from entrepreneur ____
Intermediaries ____
Parent organization ____
Existing portfolio businesses ____
Active search using own contacts ____
Connecting managers with business idea ____
Request of investment syndicate  
(coinvestors) ____
Others: ____
 7.  Preliminary Screen: What criteria must the 









Certain IRR objective 0 1 2 
Certain deal size 0 1 2 
Within our industry focus 0 1 2 
Geographical focus 0 1 2 
Interesting market 0 1 2 
Interesting technology 0 1 2 
Form of business plan 0 1 2 
Who arranged the deal 0 1 2 
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2. Investment Due Diligence 
 
8. Rate how good the following predictors are to forecast the future success of the venture. 
        
3. BACKGROUND 
9.  Please indicate the type of VC that best describes your company by ticking one of the following: 
Strategic investor (investment arm of industrial corporation or affiliated to government)  
Independent/Private VC (not backed by a financial institution)  
Financial affiliated VC (e.g. bank, insurance affiliated VC)  
 10.  What percentage of your total funds do you invest in each investment stage? 
Early Stage ___%  Expansion Stage ___% Later Stage ___%  Exit Stage ___%









Management Integrity, honesty, and credibility  1 2 3 4 5 
 Motivation, commitment, energy to execute plan 1 2 3 4 5 
 Vision and business idea 1 2 3 4 5 
 Standing power to face competition 1 2 3 4 5 
 Strategic thinking and managerial know how and capabilities 1 2 3 4 5 
 Teamwork and complementary team skills 1 2 3 4 5 
 Track record and experience  1 2 3 4 5 
 Leadership and human resource skills 1 2 3 4 5 
 Awareness of risks and ability to deal with risks 1 2 3 4 5 
 Organizational relationships, personal turnover within venture 1 2 3 4 5 
Market  Market size, demand forecast, need for product 1 2 3 4 5 
 Customer base: diversity, loyalty, growth, switching costs 1 2 3 4 5 
 Market growth, market and product life cycle 1 2 3 4 5 
 Suppliers: dependency on key suppliers, negotiating power 1 2 3 4 5 
 Strength and profitability of key suppliers and key customers 1 2 3 4 5 
 Market position and market share within industry 1 2 3 4 5 
 Market trends, key driver of markets, competitive dynamics 1 2 3 4 5 
 Competitors: identification, their strength & weaknesses 1 2 3 4 5 
Product Product and technology beta test results 1 2 3 4 5 
 Product uniqueness to satisfy specific customers needs 1 2 3 4 5 
 Newness of the product or technology, potential spin-offs 1 2 3 4 5 
 Ability of product to enter or create new markets 1 2 3 4 5 
 Product protection (IP rights) and resistance against imitation 1 2 3 4 5 
 R&D: ability to develop new products or new product releases 1 2 3 4 5 
 Distribution channels 1 2 3 4 5 
 Product cost components and margins 1 2 3 4 5 
Finance Cost analysis, impact of costs on cash flow 1 2 3 4 5 
 Receivables, revenues, and sales growth 1 2 3 4 5 
 Cash flow growth 1 2 3 4 5 
 Debt analysis (gearing and interest service burden) 1 2 3 4 5 
 Liquidity, assets, debt, and profitability ratios 1 2 3 4 5 
 Profit and loss analysis and past ROI and IRR 1 2 3 4 5 
 Past earnings and profits and their growth rates 1 2 3 4 5 
 Predicted earnings and profits and their growth rates 1 2 3 4 5 
General Quality and layout of business plan 1 2 3 4 5 
 Other investors with high reputation invest in same venture 1 2 3 4 5 
 Venture has risk management process 1 2 3 4 5 
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 11.   Geographic Focus: Please tick one or more geographical areas covered by your portfolio management: 
Singapore  Asia  Europe 
ASEAN countries (excl. Japan)  United States  Others____________     
 12.  What percentage of your portfolio do you invest into high-growth industries (e.g., e-commerce, 
electronics, telecommunications, semiconductor, bio-technology, computer / software)? ________% 
13.  What is the total size of the portfolio that your office/company/VC division in Singapore manages 
including all (total) funds/ventures/investments? 
1 to 10 million US $  51 to 100 million US $  501 to 1,000 million US $ 
11 to 20 million US $  101 to 200 million US $  > 1,000 million US $ 
21 to 50 million US $  201 to 500 million US $         
14. Please indicate the category that describes the average size per single investment that you usually 
undertake: 
< 1 million US $  3 to 5 million US $  11 to 20 million US $ 
1 to 2 million US $  6 to 10 million US $  > 20 million US $ 
15. Please tick and rank the objectives (1, 2, …) which you use in your company (e.g. if you use three 
objectives rank only those three with 1, 2, 3 – if you use just one than write only 1 in the appropriate box): 
16.  Please rate the performance of all venture capital investments your company made in the last two years 
including investments hit by the Asian crisis! IMPORTANT: Please rank either IRR or synergies/spin-offs, or 


















IRR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Synergies/Spin-offs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Objective Use Rank Objective Use Rank
Internal rate of return (IRR)  F
Strategic goal: venture as strategic business unit 
to gain synergies  F
Multiples: return of x-times the initial 
investment  F
Strategic goal: investment as source of new-
technologies providing spin-offs for new markets  F
Multiples: return of x-times the initial 
investment within a given time frame  F Complementary to one’s own product line  F
Multiples: x-times initial investment within 
time frame and considering opportunity costs  F
Public interests such as promoting 
technopreneurship and creating new jobs  F
Strategic goal: venture as basis to enter new 
markets  F Other: ________________________________  F
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APPENDIX B2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VC SYNDICATION STUDY  
Section 1: Firm Background 
 
1. General information of your firm: 
 
Name of your firm:  __________________________________ 
The year founded:  __________________________________ 
Number of investment professionals:  __________________________________ 
Number of funds in existence:  __________________________________ 
Number of portfolio companies in existence:  __________________________________ 
Capital under management (S$):  __________________________________ 
 
2.  Which of the following firm type best describes your firm: 
 
 Independent venture capital firm  Corporate subsidiary 
 Financial institution subsidiary    Other, please specify: 
_______________________ 
 
3.  Which of the following categories best describes the source of your firm’s investment 
funds:  
 
 Own balance sheet   Own balance sheet and managed funds 
 Managed funds  Other, please specify: 
_______________________ 
 
4.  For the different stages of venture capital financing, please indicate your firm’s preference: 
(Please rate from 1 to 5, 1 = least preferred  ... 5 = most preferred) 
    1     2     3      4     5 
Seed                 
Start-up                 
Expansion/Development                 
Buyout/Acquisition                 
Turnaround                 
 
5. To what extent do you consider your firm is specialized in terms of: 
(Please rate from 1 to 5, 1 = highly unspecialised  ... 5 = highly specialised) 
    1     2     3      4     5 
The industry sectors in which it will invest                
The stages of financing in which it will invest                
The geographical regions in which it will invest               
 
6. To what extent has your company been, and to what extent is it, involved in the 
syndication of private equity investments? 
                                                                              Yes    No 
a) Is your company presently acting as a lead investor in a syndicated investment?  
                        
b) Is your company presently acting as a non-lead investor in a syndicated investment? 
                        
c) Has your company ever acted as a lead investor in a syndicated investment?   
                         
d) Has your company ever acted as a non-lead investor in a syndicated investment?    
                       
 
7.  Please indicate the approximate proportion (# deals) of your firm’s investments which are 
syndicated: 
 
 0-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81-100% 
 
8.  Please indicate the approximate proportion of syndicates (# deals) in which your firm acts 
as a LEAD and a NON-Lead member: 
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Lead  0-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81-100% 
Non-Lead  0-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81-100% 
 
 
Section 2: Motivations for Syndication 
 
9.  How important are the following factors in influencing your decision to syndicate deals? 
(Please rate from 1 to 5, 1 = very unimportant  ... 5 = very important) 
               1     2      3     4      5 
a) The deal is outside the industries in which you usually invest                           
b) The deal is located outside of the geographical region(s) in which you usually invest  
                             
c) Difficulty in bringing in industry experts from outside                             
d) The deal is in a foreign country                                  
e) The deal is outside the investment stage(s) in which you usually invest                   
f) The need to access specific skills in order to manage the investment                       
g) The large size of the deal in proportion to the size of funds available                        
h) The requirement for additional rounds of financing                              
i) The large size of the deal in proportion to the firm’s average deal size                     
j) The large size of the deal in proportion to the largest deal previously undertaken by 
      your firm as a sole investment                           
k) A high degree of specific risk associated with the deal                        
l) The need to seek the advice of other venture capital firms before investing 
                                               
m) The possibility of the future reciprocation of deals (deal flow)                           
n) The reciprocation of past deal flow                               
 
Other (please specify) __________________________________ 
 
 
10. How important are the following factors in influencing your decision to join a syndicate as 
a NON-LEAD member?  (Please rate from 1 to 5, 1 = very unimportant  ... 5 = very important) 
             1      2      3     4      5 
a) The deal is in an industrial sector in which you perceive yourself to have a specialization                                 
                
b) The deal is outside the industrial sectors in which you usually invest                                        
                
c) The deal is at an investment stage in which you perceive yourself to have a specialization                                 
                
d) The deal is outside the investment stages in which you usually invest                                        
                
e) The deal is located within the geographical region(s) in which you usually invest                                       
                
f) The deal is located outside the geographical region(s) in which you usually invest   
                                                                                                                                     
g) To gain experience of a particular industry / sector                           
h) To gain experience of a particular geographical region                           
i) The fit of the deal in terms of your portfolio of investments                          
j) The investment time-scale envisaged                           
k) The likely demand for additional finance                            
l) The financial terms of the deal                              
m) Joining a syndicate with a highly reputed lead manager increases your own legitimacy                                  
                
 




Section 3: Partner Selection Criteria 
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11. How important are the following factors, when you act as a SYNDICATE LEAD, in your 
selection of a syndicate partner(s)? (Please rate from 1 to 5, 1 = very unimportant  ... 5 = 
very important) 
               1      2     3     4      5 
a) Good past performance (financial)                                 
b) Perceived industry specialization of the firm in terms of the selection and                                                            
management of investments                                  
c) The firm has a reputation for selecting good investment opportunities                       
d) The firm has a reputation for being trustworthy (i.e. able to deliver)                           
e) Perceived specialist regional knowledge                                 
f) The personnel have reputations for being trustworthy (i.e. able to deliver) 
                                               
g) The personnel of the other firm have strong reputations for selecting                                                                        
good investment opportunities                                
h) Positive past dealings with the firm/fund in problem cases which were  
     syndicated                                                               
i) Positive past dealings with the personnel involved in problem cases which 
      were syndicated                                  
j) The reciprocation of past deal flow                            
k) The expectation of reciprocated future deal flow                          
l) Investment style in relation to re-financing investments                             
m) Investment style in relation to exit intentions                                
n) Investment style in relation to legal documentation                           
o) The absence of co-investment rights                            
 
Other (please specify) __________________________________ 
 
 
 
